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When a man, by the exertion of his rational powers, has pro-
duced an original work, he seems to have clearly a right to dis-
pose of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to vary
the disposition he has made of it appears to be an invasion of
that right.
-Blackstone's Commentaries'
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human produc-
tions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-
became, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air
to common use.
-Justice Louis Brandeis2
1 R. R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 2 (1912) (quoting BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTAMES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1766)).
2 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Of course, the law is not the place for the artist or poet.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes3
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1710, the Statute of Anne established the protection of
books and radically altered the monopoly on book publishing in
England.4 Under the title "An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors of
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned,"5
the English government established protections from copying by
unauthorized publishers. The Statute of Anne was not limited to
copyright, however, but also set a mechanism whereby any member
of the public could complain of the price of a book and seek to
have the price lowered.6 With foresight that foreshadowed the bat-
tle between the Department of Justice and Microsoft,7 the Statute
of Anne reserved to the government the power to limit the sales
price of protected books, to fine booksellers and publishers for
charging excessive fees, and to allow for private recovery.8
Despite the transition from the industrial age into the infor-
mation age, the underlying issues identified in the Statute of Anne
still loom large. The law protects the interest that an author, inven-
tor, or creator9 has in his intellectual property, recognizes owner-
ship, and provides a mechanism for economic reward. Abuse of
3 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29
(William S. Hein 1985) (1920).
4 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.), reprinted in
ROBERT GORMAN &JANE GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 2 (4th ed. 1993) [herein-
after Statute of Anne]. Protection of literary works traces its origins back to Roman law
and is mentioned in writings by Cicero, Horace, and the Roman playwright Terence. See
BOWKER, supra note 1, at 8.
5 Statute of Anne, supra note 4.
6 Id. ("[I]f upon such Enquiry and Examination it shall be found, that the price of
such Book or Books is Inhaunced, or any wise too High or Unreasonable, Then and in
such case the [Lord Chancellor or other empowered officials] have hereby full Power and
Authority to Reform and Redress the same, and to Limit and Settde the Price of every such
Printed Book and Books, from time to time, according to the best of their Judgments, and
as to them shall seem Just and Reasonable.... .").
7 United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998).
8 See Statute of Anne, supra note 4.
9 The personification of the person whose rights are the subject of protection takes on
significant importance. The distinction between authors and inventors signifies the dis-
tinction between copyright and patent under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution. Other intellectual property creators may produce works that are not recog-
nized under copyright or patent doctrine and yet have significant economic or social value.
See generally Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality In Copyright Law, 96 MiCH. L. Rv. 1197
(1996). For purposes of breadth, this Article will use the term "creator" broadly to encom-
pass authors, inventors, and others who have contributed something of economic or aes-
thetic value, without regard to the particular legal regime that creates exclusivity for that
creation.
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this protection, though, may still subject the creator to their loss. 1 °
As the third century of copyright protection draws to a close, how-
ever, the fundamental balance embodied in the Statute of Anne is
once again at the heart of the debate over the future of intellectual
property protection. The monopoly granted by state and federal
law grows larger with each legislative act,1 1 vesting ever-greater con-
trol in the hands of monopoly-oriented entertainment empires.
Increasingly, the protection of the consuming public needs to re-
appear as a consideration in restructuring the public policy of in-
tellectual property.
The dramatic economic restructuring of the global economy
explains much of the upheaval in intellectual property regulation.
The quaint notions of the artist toiling at her easel, the author at
his Underwood,12 or a team of songwriters at the piano have given
way to a multi-billion dollar global economy in digital information.
The rapid technological change has created new industries in com-
puting and communications. It has transformed traditional indus-
tries such as film, music, and visual art. The National Information
Infrastructure Task Force ("Nil Task Force") formed by President
Clinton in 1993, reviewed the technological changes affecting the
economy and assessed the intellectual property law changes
needed to accommodate technological growth.' The NII Task
Force reported that the last complete revision to the Copyright Act
"was enacted in response to 'significant changes in technology
[that had] affected the operation of the copyright law.' "14
The legislative history of the 1976 Act notes that those changes
had "generated new industries and new methods for the repro-
duction and dissemination of copyrighted works, and the busi-
ness relations between authors and users [had] evolved new
patterns."
We are once again faced with significant changes in tech-
nology that upset the balance that currently exits under the
Copyright Act. Our goal is to maintain the existing balance.1 5
10 See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); F.E.L. Publi-
cations, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7' Cir. 1982); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See also William
Thomson Jr. & Margaret Chu, Overstepping the Bounds: Copyright Misuse, COMPUTER LAW.,
Nov. 1998, at 15.
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 A trade name for a portable typewriter-an analog mechanical predecessor of the
laptop computer.
13 See THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2-14 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Nil REPORT].
14 Id. at 13 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976)).
15 Id. at 13-14 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47).
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This goal is contrasted with the work of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute, which have drafted a new provision for the Uniform
Commercial Code-Article 2B governing licensing of informa-
tion. 6 The Introduction to the draft Article 2B explains that the
new Article "provides a framework for contractual relationships
among industries at the forefront of the information era .... Arti-
cle 2B distributes benefits among the various parties."' 7 Unlike the
NII Report, which sets the status quo as its goal, the drafters of
Article 2B explicitly set out to restructure the legal landscape upon
which the new information industries will form.
Congress has taken both approaches, favoring the status quo
with the passage of section 509 of the Communications Decency
Act,"8 but promoting an aggressive ownership paradigm by ex-
tending the monopoly in copyright for an additional twenty
years. 9 The dichotomy between these two approaches may explain
much of the tension that currently pervades the academic and
legal communities over the growth of information-property
regulation. 20
At the heart of the tension between these two approaches is a
fundamental disagreement over the role of regulation in the man-
16 U.C.C. Article 2B-Software Contracts and Licenses of Information (Discussion
Draft of August 1, 1998). At the time of publication of this Article, Article 2B has under-
gone a number of changes. In April 1999, the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") agreed to remove the
proposal from the codification of the U.C.C. and as a result, the American Law Institute
did not participate in the final drafting of the proposal. See NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestand-
ing Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ALI and NCCUSL Announce that Legal Rules
for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of UCC (Apr. 7, 1999), <http://www.nccusl.org/
pressrel/2brel.html> (press release). Renamed the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
action Act ("UCITA"), the draft was approved by NCCUSL on July 29, 1999, and the NC-
CUSL has forwarded the recommendation to the States for adoption. SeeJack McCarthy et
al., Users Lose Under New Law; UCITA Software Legislation Sent to States, INFOWORLD, August 2,
1999, at 1; <http://www.NCCUSL.org>. Despite the procedural changes to the draft, the
provisions discussed herein have remained substantially unchanged since the drafting of
this Article. Unless otherwise stated, citations and references to Article 2B will be to the
draft of August 1, 1998.
17 U.C.C. art. 2B at Introduction.
I8 See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III
1997).
19 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 1125 Stat. 2827
(1998).
20 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 855 (1998). As Professor Nimmer notes, "[t]he
range of rights associated with the five fundamental rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. 106(1-
5) have dramatically grown since the promulgation of the 1976 Act." Id, "Some might view
this expansion unwarranted, but regardless of the characterization, these developments
clearly indicate an on-going policy judgment that the contours of the digital information
era will be shaped, at least in part, by an expanded and different set of rights in informa-
tion than existed during the industrial era. The pattern of expansion in the United States
has international parallels." Id. at 855 n.51.
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agement of information-property. The NII Report implicitly as-
sumes that the balance achieved in the Copyright Act of 1976 was
the correct balance and must therefore be maintained. The con-
gressional findings and statements of policy in the Communica-
tions Decency Act set out a mandate to reduce regulation and
allow the new electronic markets to develop without regulation or
intrusion, except where necessary to eliminate barriers to the
market.
(a) Findings. The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other in-
teractive computer services available to individual Ameri-
cans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability
of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over
the information that they receive, as well as the potential
for even greater control in the future as technology
develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services
have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a mini-
mum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive me-
dia for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and en-
tertainment services.
(b) Policy. It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services and other interac-
tive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utili-
zation of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal
laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
MEDIA & MONOPOLY
and harassment by means of computer .... 21
Despite the expansive language in this "Findings" section, Con-
gress appears to have retreated from its prior position of promot-
ing the competitive free market "unfettered by Federal or State
regulation." Rather, Congress actively sought to add barriers to
marketplace entry by expanding the ownership rights of copyright
holders.22
The drafters of Article 2B have also repudiated any approach
based on the status quo. The origins of Article 2B as an addition to
Article 2 designed exclusively for software transactions suggests
that the drafters believed the balance of copyright was inappropri-
ate for this industry, which was only in its infancy in 1976.23 Critics
of Article 2B suggest that the balance achieved has emphasized the
role of the software distributor over either the consumer 24 or the
software developer who is the author.25 Few, if any, of the provi-
sions in Article 2B encourage the active interchange of free ideas.2 6
Instead, the emphasis is on ownership and control of the informa-
tion,2 7 whether or not the information is otherwise protectable
under federal law.
Constitutional constraints impose limitations on the Congress
when regulating and promoting the information age. Under the
Copyright Clause, Congress has the power "to promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries,"28 but under the First Amendment, "Con-
gress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... "29 These two provisions should provide a frame-
work on which to build the balance between increased protections
21 47 U.S.C. § 230.
22 See id.; see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
23 See Orrin Hatch, Essay, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn
of the Millennium 59 U. PITr. L. REv. 719, 720 (1998).
24 See Cem Kaner, In My Opinion: Restricting Competition in the Software Industry-the Im-
pact of Pending Revisions to the UCC, CYBERSPACE LAWYER, May, 1998, at 11.
25 See Jane Ginsburg, Authors as "Licensors" of "Informational Rights" under U.C.C. Article
2B, 13 BERK.Ev TECH. L.J. 945, 965 (1998).
26 See Peter Lyman, The Article 2B Debate and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1081 (1998).
27 For purposes of this Article, the term ."information" should properly be "informa-
tion-property." Information, as denoted here, is often treated as a commodity or chattel
over which traditional property rights may be asserted. Sighificant disagreement exists as
to the extent of property rights in information, which is the subject of this Article.
28 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is referred to throughout as the Copyright
Clause. It is also commonly referred to as the Patent Clause, depending on which statutory
scheme-copyright or patent-is being reviewed under its constitutional scope.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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for information and increased access to information, unfettered by
regulation or property right. Unfortunately, these constitutional
considerations play little role in the present copyright debates or
the decisions to protect the economy by granting increased owner-
ship to the copyright holders.
Like the Statute of Anne, these constitutional provisions cre-
ate an economic and social framework designed to expand access
of information and authorship to the general public by encourag-
ing its creation and limiting restraints on dissemination. Increas-
ingly, the debate over intellectual property rights has become an
economic battle by the producers of computer software and en-
tertainment media waged to determine who will govern the world
economy in the first half of the next century.30 The economic de-
mands have altered the constitutional framework and changed the
goals from creation and dissemination to ownership and remuner-
ation. The net result of this change has been to misdirect the cur-
rent regulatory schemes in a manner that undermines the original
social objectives of intellectual property jurisprudence and to limit
access to content and public debate. Ironically, the closure of the
marketplace of ideas comes at a time when technology affords the
greatest public access to the marketplace of ideas in history.
Part II of this article provides a review and critique of the con-
stitutional framework provided by the Copyright Clause and First
Amendment and the federal and state regulatory systems that have
arisen to govern the information economy. The discussion tracks
the growth of protection for intellectual property at both the state
and federal level and the erosion of limitations placed on that
growth by the Constitution. Part III identifies the major segments
of the information industries and tracks the growth of these indus-
tries under the existing regulatory structure. It demonstrates the
success of the computer software, Internet, and entertainment in-
dustries, even without the assistance of new federal and state laws
designed to increase ownership and profits on the part of these
industries. Part IV discusses the interrelationship between the eco-
nomic success of the information providers and the potentially
dangerous limitations on information content available to the pub-
lic as a result of the economic concentration taking place in the
information industries. Finally, Part V introduces a legislative and
policy framework for state and federal regulation designed to pro-
mote both the decentralization of the information age's economic
base and a more competitive marketplace. Specifically, the article
30 See infra Part III.
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identifies changes to the Copyright Act drafted to reduce its expan-
sion, including a repeal of the copyright term extension and in-
creased judicial deference to the doctrine of Fair Use. The article
also recommends repeal of certain provisions of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 related to the cross-ownership of television sta-
tions and networks, advocates federal preemption of Article 2B,
and suggests that Congress grant limited protection for copyright
in database information in lieu of blanket commercial license
agreements. Taken as a whole, these proposals suggest a model of
regulation that allows the information market to determine the
successes and encourages market discipline rather than the use of
property rights to promote innovation.
II. BUILDING MONOPOLIES: A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATION
Despite constitutional limitations, century-old legislation,3
and broad public distrust, the U.S. Congress has often used regula-
tory policy to increase rather than limit monopoly power. In-
creased protection for copyrighted works and deregulation of the
telecommunications industry combine to allow ever-greater con-
centrations of market dominance in the leading providers of the
public information that is the heart of the burgeoning information
society. At the state level, the Article 2B drafters' proposals to
amend the U.C.C. would further accelerate the growing oligopoly
enjoyed by the dominant market holders of the software, entertain-
ment, cable and telephone industries. Even the courts-tradition-
ally the least protective arm of government-have begun to
enforce ownership rights where none had previously existed. 2
The reordering of the state, federal and judicial regulation of the
information society will dictate the shape of the developing infor-
mation society at the dawn of the information age.
A. Constitutional Touchstones
The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment set out the
fundamental criteria for governance of the information age in the
United States and should set the tone in the debate over the extent
to which government should regulate the information transactions.
The Copyright Clause states that Congress has the power "to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
31 See, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
32 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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respective writings and discoveries."33 The First Amendment pro-
vides a blanket prohibition on Congress and, by extension, on the
States. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... -34 Taken separately, each of these
constitutional provisions sets an outer boundary on the role of the
government. Taken together, they should provide an outline of
the appropriate regulatory structure governing intellectual prop-
erty. Neither of these constitutional provisions, however, appears
to be a significant component of the current regulatory structure
and little emphasis has been placed on the limitations suggested by
these provisions.
1. First Amendment
Although the courts rarely need to invoke the First Amend-
ment when addressing copyright or intellectual property issues,
First Amendment doctrine and tradition stand as the ultimate
statement on information rights and regulation.3" The First
Amendment and copyright generally coexist without conflict, in
part because of the fair use provisions that grant non-owners of the
protected work limited access to use the work without the copy-
right holder's permission. 36
The language of the First Amendment suggests a broad prohi-
bition against government regulation of media or content. Despite
this broad language, the jurisprudential history is far more circum-
spect. At its heart, the First Amendment provides a strong barrier
against direct content regulation by the government of printed me-
dia,37 live demonstrations, 38 film, 39 theater,4" music," and the In-
ternet.42 Nonetheless, the Court has allowed content regulation in
broadcast media such as radio,43 television,44 and cable." In Red
33 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35 Cf Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445-46 (1984); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
36 See Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 698 n.1 (1984).
37 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Cf Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
38 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning).
39 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing criminal conviction for
exhibition of film Carnal Knowledge).
40 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 310 (1990) (nude dancing).
41 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. (1975) (holding that
refusal to allow production of the rock opera Hair without review of the music or produc-
tion was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression).
42 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).




Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., the Court explained that this con-
tent regulation was based in part on the theory that "[b]ecause of
the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium."46 The Court gave Congress
wide latitude to treat each broadcaster "as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are representa-
tive of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves. '4 7 The Court placed the First Amend-
ment emphasis on the listeners rather than the broadcasters, hold-
ing the broadcast industry to a quasi-fiduciary standard that
required it to approximate a fair marketplace of ideas by providing
access to a variety of speakers. The Court's emphasis was explicit.
"[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount. "48
The Court has not fully repudiated Red Lion, although it has
struggled to balance its First Amendment objectives with govern-
mental control of the content offered by media providers. In Tur-
ner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F C.C.,49 the Court twice addressed
issues regarding the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.50 The Court
held that cable was entitled to greater First Amendment protection
than broadcast television.
[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First
Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its valid-
ity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of
cable regulation. The justification for our distinct approach to
broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical limitations
of the broadcast medium. 5 1
44 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doc-
trine which required broadcasters to provide free air time for opposing candidates to rebut
endorsements or personal attacks).
45 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 137 L. Ed.2d 369 (1997) (upholding the must-
carry provisions which required cable system operators to provide bandwidth or channel
availability to local broadcasters).
46 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
47 Id at 389.
48 Id, at 390.
49 (Turner I) 512 U.S. 622 (1994); (Turner II) 137 L. Ed.2d 369 (1997).
50 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
51 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637. The Court nonetheless applied intermediate level scrutiny.
See Turner II, 137 L. Ed. at 388.
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By distinguishing broadcast from cable, the Court has created
a tiered structure of regulation for media. The Court has struggled
with the distinctions that come from basing the standard of review
on the medium. It has stated that "each medium of expression ...
may present its own problems."52 The Court places print media in
the position of full First Amendment protection, treating virtually
all regulation as content regulation subject to strict scrutiny.53 The
Court places cable at an intermediate level of regulation54 and, for
now, has left broadcast radio and television at the most liberal level
of media regulation, not only because of the scarcity of broadcast,
but also because of the potential for listeners to be accosted by
unwanted and inappropriate broadcast content.55
This continuum approach, which bases the degree of scrutiny
on the nature of the medium, leaves open the regulatory scheme
that will be applied to new technologies as they are invented. In-
ternet websites,"6 for example, have neither the danger of scarcity
of bandwidth nor the risk of intrusive broadcasting.57 In Reno v.
52 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
53 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974); Minneapolis
Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (striking down a
tax differential on newsprint).
54 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661-62.
55 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978). The Court did not find the
potential of unwanted images from a drive-in movie theater to be as objectionable. See
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Court in part bases these distinctions
on the compelling interest in protection of minors and the rights of parents to supervise
their children. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[T]he parents' claim
to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."). While this is a different protected interest which impacts the
interpretation of the First Amendment, the natures of various media often result in differ-
ent determinations because each medium is unique on the amount of access afforded to
minors and the amount of control available to parents. See, e.g., Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1989) (striking down anti-indecency amendments to the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988), because "credit
card, access code, and scrambling rules [provided] a satisfactory solution to the problem of
keeping indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of minors.").
56 The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the
outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET,"
which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense con-
tractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate
with one another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network
were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an
example for the development of a number of civilian networks that, eventually
linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate
with one another and to accessvast amounts of information from around the
world.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (citation omitted).
57 "Push technology" creates website broadcasting that could, in fact, result in the
broadcast of material. The user must first select software and content before the broad-
casting can begin. Unlike radio, the broadcast of Internet content does not currently oc-
cur to crowds in public places. Broadcasting to captive listeners-like riders on a bus-is
not yet a practice common to the Internet.
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A.C.L.U.,58 the Court held that "the Internet is not as 'invasive' as
radio or television," 59 and that "communications over the Internet
do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer
screen unbidden."60 Therefore, based on the technology as it had
evolved by 1997, the Court upheld the lower court's finding that
there was "no reason to employ a less than strict scrutiny standard
of review" to the Internet.
61
E-mail, unlike Internet websites, gives the sender or broad-
caster the power to post content to any computer user who has an
account, and the receipt of unwanted e-mail has been viewed by
the public as highly intrusive. 62 Attempts to regulate the unwanted
dissemination of e-mail have been only partially successful.63
Courts have used trespass to chattels, trademark law, and the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act as ways to deal with unwanted mass e-
mail, but they have not addressed general rights to broadcast e-
mail.64
Despite this continuum of regulatory scrutiny based on the
medium of speech, the Court still espouses a First Amendment
doctrine that seeks to allow an unfettered exchange of ideas.
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.... Gov-
ernment action that stifles speech on account of its message, or
58 117 S. Ct. 2329.
59 Id. at 869.
60 Id, (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
61 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp at 844. See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2344 ("We
agree with [the lower court's] conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.").
62 E-mail may be factually different, but the Court did not distinguish it when striking
down the Communications Decency Act. In the traditional mail setting, the Court has not
found unsolicited mail to be an unacceptable intrusion. "[T]he 'short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can . . .is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the
Constitution is concerned.'" Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)
(quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.),
summarily affd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967)).
63 See America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,46 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding
that the sending of spain e-mail constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C)
(Supp. 1998) and other federal statutes because the large amounts of e-mail interfered
with American Online's computer system). "The undisputed facts establish that defendants
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which prohibits
anyone from 'intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as
a result of such conduct, causes damage.'" Id at 450-51. See also America Online, Inc. v.
IMS, 24 F. Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718 (N.D.
Ohio 1997); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
64 See LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 444; see also CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1022-24;
Griswold, 978 F. Supp. 718.
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that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by
the Government, contravenes this essential right. Laws of this
sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular
ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion.... For these reasons, the First
Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood excep-
tions, does not countenance governmental control over the con-
tent of messages expressed by private individuals.65
With regard to content regulation, this constitutional mandate
continues to be upheld by the Court. For example, within the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress attempted to create
content restrictions on the Internet with the Communications De-
cency Act ("CDA").66 This component of the legislation was never
enforced 67 and has done little other than to create a publicity cam-
paign for elected officials asserting that serious media regulation
has been taking place while at the same time scaring website own-
ers-the very chilling effect the First Amendment is designed to
guard against. As the Court stated:
Title V-known as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996"
(CDA) -contains provisions that were either added in executive
committee after the [Telecommunications Act] hearings were
concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on
the legislation. An amendment offered in the Senate was the
source of the two statutory provisions challenged in this case.
They are informally described as the "indecent transmission"
provision and the "patently offensive display" provision. 68
Neither the indecent transmission provision nor the patently
offensive display provision seriously tested the limits of congres-
sional power to regulate content on the Internet. The indecent
transmission provision prohibited "the knowing transmission of ob-
scene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of
age. '69 The patently offensive display provision prohibited "the
65 Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
66 Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
Title 47, U.S. Code).
67 See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2339 (1997).
68 Id. at 2338 (internal footnotes omitted).
69 Id. The text of the CDA provides the following:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications- ...
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene
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knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a
manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age."7 These
hastily-cobbled provisions took a shotgun approach to regulation
of the Internet, shooting at vague, ill-defined targets including pro-
tected and unprotected speech alike. As the Court stated:
[T] he CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment re-
quires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order
to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA
effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have
a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.
That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legiti-
mate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. 71
The CDA did not limit content regulation with the specificity
that would distinguish serious discussions of sexuality from even
the most graphic of obscene images. Based on the hurried legisla-
tive process, poor drafting, and vague language of the CDA, a
strong inference can be drawn that Congress never intended to
regulate pornography on the Internet. Instead, Congress took the
political posture of enacting legislation destined to be struck down
as unconstitutional.
Congress has responded to the defeat of the CDA with an-
or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to
be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it
be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
70 Id
(d) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner avail-
able to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regard-
less of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the in-
tent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or impris-
oned not more than two years, or both.
Id. § 223(d).
71 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
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other regulatory attempt, the Child Online Protection Act.72 How-
ever, like the CDA, the statute met with an immediate injunction
against enforcement. 73 Congress has not used the guidelines pro-
vided by the Court in Ginsberg to narrowly craft the statute to pro-
tect the Court-recognized interests of protecting children and
protecting a parent's interest in raising the child. 4 Instead, the
history of the CDA suggests that Congress does not wish seriously
to structure legislation narrowly tailored to the various media in a
manner that could withstand the strict scrutiny applied to content
regulation.75
For regulation of the media that is not based on content, the
standards are based on a three-prong test that results in an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny. 76 "A content-neutral regulation will be
sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important gov-
ernmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
72 Section 231, Tide 47, U.S. Code, provides that:
(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT. Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the
World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors
shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or
both.
47 U.S.C. § 231(a).
Congress defined material that is harmful to minors as:
[A] ny communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording,
writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.
Id. § 231 (e) (6).
(2) INTENTIONAL VIOLATIONS.-In addition to the penalties under para-
graph (1), whoever intentionally violates such paragraph shall be subject to a
fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this para-
graph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.
(3) CIVIL PENALTY.-In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and
(2), whoever violates paragraph (1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day
of violation shall constitute a separate violation.
Id. § 231 (a) (2)-(3).
73 See ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (memorandum and order granting
preliminary injunction).
74 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
75 See id. Compare Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2329, with Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38
(1994).
76 See Turner II, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369, 388 (1997); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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further those interests."77 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,78 the
Court found that New York could lawfully control the sound vol-
ume on a public stage. 79 The Court has explained that content
neutral regulation poses "a less substantial risk of excising certain
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue." 80
The Court's rhetoric has emphasized that the First Amend-
ment is designed to protect the marketplace of ideas, and that the
balance of rights between speakers and listeners may properly be
maintained to promote this end. "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mo-
nopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself
or a private licensee."8 1 Nonetheless, despite the differing stan-
dards of scrutiny for the different media, the cumulative effect of
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence provides the speaker
tremendous protection from government regulation or interven-
tion. Rarely does the Court emphasize the rights of the audience.8 2
The impact of the First Amendment's emphasis in speaker's
rights serves to protect the interests of the most powerful speak-
ers-the corporations that both create and distribute content.
Although antitrust laws do apply to media companies to the extent
that they "advance[ ] important governmental interests unrelated
to the suppression of free speech and [do] not burden substan-
tially more speech than necessary to further those interests, '8 3 the
First Amendment necessarily limits the role the government can
take in regulating media companies. While media companies have
77 TurnerI, 137 L. Ed.2d at 388 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Compare this standard,
id., with the test as articulated in Clark, 468 U.S. at 292 ("We have often noted that restric-
tions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."). The positive statement that the regulation leave open channels of commu-
nication has been replaced by the negative prohibition that the regulation does not sub-
stantially burden more speech than necessary. Arguably, this is a somewhat higher
standard of scrutiny because more regulations may fail to meet the test as provided in
Turner. Whether there is any practical difference is not certain.
78 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
79 Id. at 803.
80 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 517.
81 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
82 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973). In Turner l,
the Court upheld the must-carry provisions, but the analysis was based on the need to
protect one set of speakers-local broadcasters-from another set of speakers-cable op-
erators and national broadcasters. The Court did not allow for the audience to decide by
relying upon the marketplace for the programming. See Turner I, 137 L. Ed.2d at 390. But
see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (protecting audience from un-
wanted speech, patently offensive speech).
83 Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d at 388 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
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been found to have violated antitrust laws, 8 4 the regulation of mar-
ket power tends only to occur in the ownership and transfer of
broadcasting licenses-the area in which the Court imposes less
judicial scrutiny.8 5 The Court did not look to the impact or influ-
ence of the newspaper in Miami Herald to address whether the
readers of the newspaper had actual access to multiple points of
view from general circulation newspapers. Instead, the Court took
a traditional view of the press as immune from any orthodoxy em-
bodied in government-approved standards of fairness. The
speaker's rights are paramount; the impact on the listener is not an
appropriate consideration. Although broadcast is treated differ-
ently, the underpinning of the scarcity doctrine will limit its impact
and may erode entirely as broadcast media becomes increasingly
less significant in the information marketplace.86
This is not to say that the Court erred in its analytical frame-
work or its results. Miami Herald properly identifies the newspaper
rather than the general public as the speaker that has a First
Amendment right to speak.87 Those subscribers or members of the
public who wish to write to the newspaper in reply should be al-
lowed to do so solely at the discretion of the newspaper-regard-
less of whether they have any meaningful alternative to expressing
their views. The First Amendment protects the speaker's interest.
The marketplace of ideas is left open by empowering the speakers,
84 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (affirming
finding of significant violations of the Sherman Act and ordering divestiture of theater
ownership and sweeping changes in the studios' distribution practices).
85 The Telecommunications Act includes a series of restrictions on the number of out-
lets a broadcaster may own in any given market and the total amount of national penetra-
tion a company may have. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1998). The regulations provide limits
on the number of radio licenses a broadcaster may have in any given market; limits on
cross-ownership of both radio and television licenses in any given market; and a bar on
cross-ownership of either radio or television licenses with ownership of a newspaper in any
given market. The regulations also limit national network ownership to 35% of the na-
tional market. See id. § 73.3555(e)(1).
86 To the extent that the scarcity doctrine results in regulations that require a broad-
caster to provide the forum, these attempts have traditionally failed. The fairness doctrine
required a broadcaster to allow a reply for political endorsements or statements of a con-
troversial nature. The result was not more robust debate. Rather, it merely discouraged
the broadcasters from addressing issues that would trigger the obligation. As the F.C.C.
acknowledged, "we find that the fairness doctrine, in operation, actually inhibits the pres-
entation of controversial issues of public importance to the detriment of the public and in
degradation of the editorial prerogative of broadcast journalists." General Fairness Doc-
trine of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418, 35,419 (1985).
87 See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
("The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the
voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when
others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a
concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.") (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
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not by creating arbitrary rules of fair play. Similarly, the Court's
decision in Reno v. A.C.L.U., treating the Internet as analogous to
print rather than broadcast, leaves the most dynamic market ever
to be created to be regulated under a common law tradition.88
The Court's decisions in Turner I and Turner II, on the other
hand, have not been decided in a manner consistent with other
First Amendment decisions. Cable broadcasting represents an ac-
tual marketplace of ideas. Cable operators provide the public with
ideas, information, and entertainment based on what the public is
willing to purchase and watch. There should be no better model
for a theoretical marketplace than an actual marketplace.89 Cable
operators select which signals to carry based on the profits gener-
ated by that signal. The Court, however, recognizes that interests
other than the rights of the speakers are at stake. The Court ex-
plained that the must-carry provisions were to provide "three inter-
related interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air
local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemi-
nation of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) pro-
moting fair competition in the market for television
programming."90
To require that some programming have priority over others,
based on the geographic location of the speaker, continues the in-
consistent approach the Court has adopted with regard to the dif-
fering.media. The Court will not allow the government or private
parties to make a compelling argument that newspapers should
promote a multiplicity of sources, but the Court does allow the gov-
ernment to make that case in the broadcast arena. Further, the
Court recognizes the government's interest in promoting broad-
cast television.91
The Court provided a partial explanation that the must-carry
provision was a content-neutral regulation, which had little actual
impact on most broadcasters.9 2 Ironically, this argument shows the
weakness in the Court's decision. The Court was willing to impose
88 Libel law, for example, is modified by First Amendment jurisprudence, but is not
eliminated as a cause of action. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2341 (1998); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).
89 The analysis may have been different if local broadcasters were suing because suppli-
ers of multiple-channel content were receiving an unfair financial advantage or otherwise
complaining that the marketplace was rigged. This, however, was not a question of requir-
ing all participants at the marketplace to play by the same rules.
90 Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
91 See id,
92 See Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d 369, 403 (1997) ("Significant evidence indicates the vast
majority of cable operators have not been affected in a significant manner by must-carry.").
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a regulation on the marketplace precisely because the marketplace
did not need it. Had the must-carry provisions created a substan-
tial burden, they may not have survived even the intermediate scru-
tiny applied by the Court. The result is to replace a market-driven
solution with a legal solution that closely mirrors the market as it
stood at the time when the findings of fact were made. The market
conditions may change dramatically over time, but the legal solu-
tion upheld by the Court will be far less able to adapt to the eco-
nomic and social change.
The freedom granted by the First Amendment must be recog-
nized to provide a powerful tool to the largest and most effective
speakers-the media conglomerates and information content
providers. The First Amendment creates the framework for the in-
formation age marketplace that significantly limits the govern-
ment's power to regulate that market.
To the extent that the standard of review governs the reach of
Congress in regulating media, the differences will dictate Con-
gress' ongoing efforts. Currently, only cable and broadcast televi-
sion regulations provide for the intermediate level of scrutiny that
is necessary to allow some government intervention." For cable,
Court support for this level of scrutiny is stated in strong terms, but
is weaker in total given the multitude of opinions on the Court and
the rapid change in technology.94 Nonetheless, the Court recog-
nized the "'important or substantial governmental interest' neces-
sary to regulate cable."95 Specifically, the Court upheld Congress'
interests in protecting local broadcast television. As the Court
stated,
[w] e have identified a corresponding 'governmental purpose of
the highest order' in ensuring public access to 'a multiplicity of
information sources,' ... and it is undisputed the Government
has an interest in 'eliminating restraints on fair competition ....
even when the individuals or entities subject to particular regu-
lations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.'96
This concern will not change soon. If the Court, however, elects to
apply a strict scrutiny standard to the regulation of cable, it is
93 See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
94 Turner I was decided by a 5-4 vote with five separate opinions; Turner II was again
decided 5-4, but with a majority adopting the standard of intermediate scrutiny. "We begin
where the plurality ended in Turner, applying the standards for intermediate scrutiny
enunciated in O'Brien." Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d 369, 387-88 (1997).
95 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
96 Turner I, L. Ed.2d at 388 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663).
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highly unlikely that any regulations aimed at providing access to
certain speakers will be sufficiently narrow to meet constitutional
muster. Because every marketplace operates more efficiently with
some basic rules of access, it is essential that the Court continue to
provide Congress some latitude in fashioning these rules.9 7
2. Copyright Clause
The most direct constitutional power granted to Congress to
regulate the information age is the Copyright Clause, which affords
Congress monopoly power over patents and copyrights. As embod-
ied in the Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence, this
congressional power has been limited in scope. At its heart, the
power is granted to provide economic stimulus for authors and in-
ventors, and an economic model that provides authors broad mo-
nopoly over their works may ultimately undermine this economic
growth. 98
a. Copyright's History of Limited Monopoly
Just as the First Amendment mandates governmental non-in-
tervention and embodies a doctrine of restraint on the federal gov-
ernment, the Copyright Clause historically played this same role.
The constitutional power to create exclusive rights in patents and
copyrights is, by its terms, limited in scope. In his 1912 treatise on
copyright law, R. R. Bowker lamented that the courts and Constitu-
tion of the United States had adopted the English precedent,
which had limited an ancient copy-right with a much more limited
copy-privilege.99 In the 1774 case of Donaldson v. Becket, the British
House of Lords held that the Statute of Anne eliminated the prior
common law perpetual rights of an author to publish his work.'
This interpretation of the Statute of Anne was the basis of the U.S.
Constitution, the governing precedent that was explicitly incorpo-
rated into the U.S. Constitution by the phrase "for limited
times."10  Following the pattern, Congress recommended that the
97 The Court has provided mixed guidance on this issue. The Court did not find this
argument persuasive in Miami Herald "An enforceable right of access necessarily calls for
some mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental coercion, this
at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment
and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed over the years." Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
98 See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
99 See BOWKER, supra note 1, at 7.
100 See id. at 26.
101 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("[Congress has the power] to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. .. ."). Compare the copyright
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states pass copyright legislation in 1783, which generally "followed
the precedent of the English act of 1710 [the Statute of Anne]". °2
Congress then passed the first national copyright act in 1790, enti-
tled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning. 0 3
The history of copyright protection under the U.S. Constitu-
tion suggests that the limits placed by the Constitution should be
an integral part of any regulatory scheme and a substantial limita-
tion on Congress' power to act. The Supreme Court recognized
the importance of these limitations in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,104 wherein the Court explained:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.10 5
If the Court is to be believed, then the U.S. Constitution limits con-
gressional authority to passage of copyright statutes that motivate
creation of new works and place those works into the public do-
main as soon as that motivational objective has been achieved:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and other arts. The im-
mediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.
10 6
Any congressional scheme that attempts to achieve unrelated pur-
poses or seeks to infringe upon the rights of the public to have
access to the work may be beyond the power of Congress. The
objective cannot be to create property interests in authors or inven-
tors. The monopoly granted is necessarily limited to the extent it
statutory term, 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), as amended by Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, §§ 102-103, 1125 Stat. 2827, 2827-29
(1998), with the patent term, 35 U.S.C. § 154, which lasts twenty years from the date of
filing.
102 BOWKER, supra note 1, at 34.
103 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
104 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
105 Id.
106 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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achieves the goal stated in the Constitution. The Supreme Court
has often articulated this distinction:
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration. . . .Chief Justice Hughes
spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by
Congress, "The sole interest of the United States and the pri-
mary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general bene-
fits derived by the public from the labors of authors." It is said
that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the
public of the products of his creative genius.
10 7
One view of copyright is that the goal of copyright is to expand
the public domain for works of authorship and inventions as rap-
idly as possible, so long as that expansion does not unduly burden
the continued creation of new works. At a minimum, the federal
government could not, under this view, gain the benefit of copy-
right in any work created by it.108 This provision placed many great
projects into the public domain during the 1930s (such as the Fed-
eral Theater Project), because they were created under the aus-
pices of the Work Projects Administration, a federal program. 0 9
All copyright legislation from 1790 through the 1909 Copy-
right Act adopted an approach that encouraged rapid expansion of
the public domain. The regulatory scheme divested the author of
ownership rights for failure to reserve expressly the rights of au-
thorship with the statute.110 This was based on a presumption of
the Copyright Act that most work did not need federal protection
and upon publication was free for all. Only those works that the
author deemed worth protecting would be covered by the act, as-
107 Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
108 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (prohibiting copyright protection "for any work of the
United States Government," but not limiting the government from holding copyrights
transferred to it).
109 See The New Deal Stage: Selectionsfrom the Federal Theatre Project 1935-1939 (last modified
Oct. 19, 1998) <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fedtp/fthome.html> ("The Library of
Congress is not aware of any copyright in the materials in this collection. Generally speak-
ing, works created by U.S. Government employees are not eligible for copyright protection
in the United States."). The Federal Theatre Project was directed by Hallie Davis and
featured directors such as John Houseman and Orson Welles, who left to create the Mer-
cury Theater. The Library of Congress houses an extensive collection (free of copyright
restrictions) including thousands of scripts and designs. See The Library of Congress Federal
Theatre Project Collection (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fedtp/
ftabout.html>. See also Osc;AR BROCKETT, HISTORY OF THE THEATER 629-30 (4' Ed. 1982).
Today, copyright would have vested in the authors of the works and the government would
have received a license for the payment.
110 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909) (notice requirement), §§ 19-20 (form and placement
of notice), § 21 (accidental omission of notice), repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
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suming the author fully complied with the statute.1 1' In addition,
the length of the protection would be modest, unless the author
remained diligent and renewed the right to the monopoly at the
proper time.' 1 2
With the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976,118 and entry
into the Berne Convention 1 4 in 1988,115 these presumptions have
dramatically changed. Copyright now protects a work as soon as it
is embodied in a tangible medium of expression,' 1 6 whether pub-
lished or unpublished, without regard to the formalities followed
by the author.'
17
The original Berne Convention document established two main
principles: the concept of a union, composed of the nations ad-
hering to the Convention; and the national treatment rule....
Members of the Union agree to maintain a certain minimum
level of copyright protection and to treat nationals of other
member countries like their own nationals for purposes of copy-
rights. The rule of national treatment required by the Berne
Convention provides that authors enjoy the same protection for
their works in other nations as the protection those nations con-
fer to their own authors."1
8
In addition to national treatment, the Berne Convention re-
quires minimum standards of protection of works that must be pro-
tected, which include "every production in the literary, scientific
and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its ex-
pression."' 9 Subject to some limitations, the exclusive rights of
copyright owners include the right to translate; the right to per-
form in public dramatic, dramatic-musical, and musical works; the
right to recite in public literary works; the right to communicate to
the public the performance of such works; the right to broadcast;
111 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1909) (deposit requirement and forfeiture of copyright
for failure to comply), repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541.
112 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (renewal), repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541. Prior to the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of the renewal provi-
sion was extended nine times, beginning in 1962 while Congress drafted the modern stat-
ute. See Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat 1873 (1974).
113 90 Stat. 2541.
114 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
168 Consol T.S. 185, revised Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 218, revised June 2, 1920, 123
L.N.T.S. 233, revised June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217, revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
115 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
116 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
117 SeeJane Ginsburg &John Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins
the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTs 1 (1988).
118 Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 769, 780 (1997).
119 Berne Convention, supra note 114, art. 2(1).
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the right to make reproductions; and the right to make adaptations
and arrangements of the work.120
The Berne Convention completed the transformation of the
U.S. copyright system from a paradigm that required authors to
weave through procedural hurdles in order to avail themselves of
statutory protection to one in which all barriers to copyright pro-
tection had been eliminated.1 21 "Formalities such as the notice re-
quirement, manufacturing clause, copyright renewal, and
registration requirements-as a condition for suit and for the col-
lection of statutory damages and attorneys fees-distinguished U.S.
copyright law from the myriad of copyright laws under which
American texts are protected around the world." 122 The imple-
menting legislation eliminated these barriers to copyright protec-
tion and brought the United States into compliance with the
leading nations in intellectual property law. 123 "[0] ne of the most
significant requirements of the Berne Convention is that no mem-
ber country may condition enjoyment of copyright protection on
formalities. Thus, the United States' admission to Berne required
elimination of the formalities present in U.S. copyright law. 124
The Berne Convention did more than merely eliminate the
barriers to copyright protection. The Berne Convention's broad
protection is not founded in an economic analysis, but rather a
protection of the author's progeny. To that end, the Berne Con-
vention also includes protections to protect the integrity of the
work and the attribution of the work to the author. 26 Although
Congress elected to amend domestic law the least amount neces-
sary to comply with the Berne Convention, 127 the non-economic
120 See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 118, at 780.
121 See generally Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 117.
122 Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 C.anozo ARTS & ENr. LJ., 521, 522
(1993). See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-404 (1994) (notice); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 3, 26 Stat.
1106 (repealed 1909); 17 U.S.C. § 16 (1909) (repealed 1976); 17 U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (manu-
facturing clause); 17 U.S.C. § 304 (copyright renewal); 17 U.S.C. § 409 (registration); 17
U.S.C. § 411 (1994) (conditions for filing of suit).
123 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853; Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264.
124 Karp, supra note 122, at 522.
125 Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United
States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENrT. LJ. 1, 2 (1994).
126 Berne Convention, supra note 114, art. 6bis. See generally John Kernochan, Moral
Rights In U.S. Theatrical Productions: A Possible Paradigm, 17 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 385. 385
(1993) ("There is still heated debate in the United States (to say nothing of such debate in
other Berne nations) as to whether United States law adequately complies with Article 6bis
of the Berne Convention which requires that member nations give effect to the so-called
"droits moraux," or moral rights, of integrity and attribution."). See also Gilliam v. American
Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that breach of contract limitations and
the Lanl Act create analogous rights).
127 For example, the Berne implementing legislation states
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moral rights embodied in the Berne Convention began to appear
in the U.S. Copyright Act with the adoption of section 106A, pro-
tecting the rights of attribution and integrity for certain narrowly
defined works of visual art. 28 "Authors of qualifying works of vis-
ual art enjoy attribution rights consisting of both the right to re-
quire authorship attribution for the author's work and the right to
those of prevent the misattribution of works that the author did
not create. 12 9 While these rights are severely limited in compari-
son to European authors, they nonetheless represent a significant
expansion of statutory copyright law in the United States and are
further evidence that the trend toward the broad European model
of intellectual property rights is gaining ascendancy.1 3 0
The transition from an economic statute with severe limita-
tions to an all-expansive rubric for protection of the creation of the
author's mind may go well beyond the constitutional power of
Congress under the Copyright Clause. Admittedly, Congress may
elect to provide this protection under the Commerce Clause, at
(b) Certain Rights Not Affected. The provisions of the Berne Convention, the
adherence of the United States, thereto, and satisfaction of the United States
obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a
work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law -
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modifications of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the
author's honor or reputation.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat 2853.
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). A "work of visual art" is-
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a lim-
ited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing
in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. A
work of visual art does not include-
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "work of visual art").
129 Netanel, supra note 125, at 46; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83
(2d Cir. 1995) (discussing application of Berne Convention Article 6bis on domestic law).
130 See id, at 47. Non-statutory protection has sometimes been afforded to copyright
holders in the United States using trademark law, publicity rights and other similar doc-
trines. See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (breach of contract limitations and Lanham Act
violation); Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (use of recent photo-
graph in republication of authorized work may violate Lanham Act).
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least for all works that are involved in interstate commerce, but
even that minor jurisdictional limitation might slow the growth of
copyright protection to a limited degree. The change of copy-
right's focus from the public to the author grants authors tremen-
dous leverage in the marketplace of ideas. This slow transfor-
mation of emphasis under the Copyright Clause is not consistent
with the early development of the constitutional provision. Instead
of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment working to-
gether to provide a balanced approach to speaker and listener (or
author and public), the new copyright regimen radically alters the
balance in favor of the speaker.
b. Economics of the Copyright Monopoly
As the Court has repeatedly noted, the value of the monopoly
it grants through the creation of copyright is the public benefit-
public access to the works, both because the reward serves as an
incentive for the creation of the work and because the work be-
comes free for all uses after the monopoly period has run.' The
scope of the grant will determine the public's rights. If the scope is
broad, individuals will need to engage in a greater amount of pri-
vate bargaining for access to the rights. If the scope is narrow, indi-
viduals may use the unprotected aspects of the work without regard
to the copyright holder. 3 2 The bargain between the parties in the
shadow of the Copyright Act will measure the value of the rights,
based on the scope-and a copyright about to expire will be worth
significantly less than the same copyright with a greater period of
economic protection. Economist Ronald Coase aptly described the
economic model underlying the upcoming information age.
[A]lmost all resources used in the economic system (and not
simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount
and scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists.
Land, labo, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not
call for government regulation. It is true that some mechanism
has to be employed to decide who, out of the many claimants,
should be allowed to use the scarce resources. But the way this
is usually done in the American economic system is to employ
the price mechanism, and this allocates users without the need
131 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
132 An example of this is the first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994), in
which the lawful owner of a copy of a work, such as a book, may dispose of that copy as he
or she pleases. This includes the re-sale of the work in competition with the copyright
holder, as well as destruction or mutilation of the work. See Quality King Distribs., Inc., v.
L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (1998).
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for government regulation .... A private-enterprise system can-
not function properly unless property rights are created in re-
sources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a
resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears;
and so does the government except that a legal system to define
property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course,
necessary.'3
3
Coase's statement describes the structure of the marketplace
for intellectual property, that is, property rights in information and
expression. His statement also identifies the inherent limitation
that government has the exclusive role in structuring the property
rights. The Constitution placed the emphasis on a system designed
to promote innovation by providing limited property rights. None-
theless, Congress has repeatedly extended the breadth and scope
of copyright protection, straining the meaning of the phrase "for
limited times" well beyond any historical recognition.
Nothing in the economic model of private transactions sug-
gests that the rights created cannot end as soon as they have ful-
filled their primary role of promoting innovation. Although there
is no empirical research, one can hardly imagine that authors
would cease to write, painters to paint, or software designers to de-
sign works if the copyright term were reduced-even to the fifty-six
years (twenty-eight year term plus twenty-eight year renewal) af-
forded to authors prior toJanuary 1, 1978.13 Indeed, software may
133 Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959).
134 See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1976).
Hal R. Varian, Dean, School of Information Management and Systems, University of
California, Berkeley, provided an affidavit in the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. See Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065
(filed D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1999). Dean Varian explained the lack of economic incentive pro-
vided by the additional twenty years of copyright protection. He analyzed the economic
impact of the copyright term extension on both new works and pre-existing works. For
new works he stated the following:
The decision to invest in producing a creative work is influenced in part by
economic considerations. Investing time and money now produces a cash flow
in the future, so one must trade off the time and money invested now with the
potential returns in the future .... In my opinion, extending current copyright
terms by 20 years for new works has a tiny effect on the present value of cash
flows from creative works and will therefore have an insignificant effect on the
incentives to produce such works .... I base these opinions on the following
.... At a 10% rate of interest, the present value of the cash flows 51-75 years in
the future is .08 cents-or about 0.8% of the value of the cash flow in the first
50 years (since .08/9.92=0.0081). The present value of the cash flows from 76-
95 years is about 1 cent today-or one tenth of a percent of the value of the
cash flow in the first 50 years.... The above calculations show that the value of
investment returns after 50 years in the future has a minuscule present value
compared to the early returns. Hence the value of the cash flows during these
later periods has a tiny effect on the present economic incentives to invest in
creative works.
Id. (affidavit Hal R. Varian). Dean Varian's analysis for copyright extension for pre-existing
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become commercially obsolete after less than six months.13 5 A few
works survive the test of time and remain a valuable commodity
throughout the term of the copyright. Most works, however, never
make it into circulation, and of those that do, only a tiny fraction
have a residual value that continues throughout the life of work.1 36
The economics favor only the most valuable works. To the
cost of the works, add the transaction costs involved in identifying
the holder of the rights and privately negotiating the terms for use
and the economic model would predict that more works will disap-
pear under a scheme of robust protection. For example, if a short
story has a reprint value of $100 but it will cost $50 to locate the
author and $200 to arrange the fees, the total cost of republication
rises to $350. The publisher can invest any amount in a new work,
up to $350, without incurring additional costs. The author of the
short story is already accepting less than one third of the $350 pay-
ment, and lowering her fee will not greatly enhance the chances of
reprinting the work. The short story does not become reprinted.
The transaction costs also increase the costs to the publisher, so
fewer works may be published or the costs to the consumer may
rise.
If the short story were in the public domain, the costs to the
publisher, exclusive of the production costs, would be minimal.
One consequence of this scheme would be that the author of the
new work would be at a comparative financial disadvantage be-
cause she would be competing with less expensive, free works. The
consumers, on the other hand, would benefit from the less expen-
sive reprints (or possibly free electronic versions on the In-
ternet)" 7 and a lower price for original works. Unless this model
forced new authors out of the marketplace, the public would bene-
fit from greater access to more works at a lower cost. Given the
works is more explicit. "In my opinion, there is no economic rationale for applying copy-
right extension to pre-existing works. The incentives to produce these works are those that
existed at the time of creation. If these incentives were deemed adequate at the time, there
is no additional social benefit from extending them retrospectively." Id.
135 See Charles Piller, The Cutting Edge; Innovation; Latest Is Not Always Greatest In Cyber
World, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 1. This statement, however, overstates the obsolescence
of software, because the rights to the derivative work-subsequent versions of the
software-generally have significant long-term economic value.
136 According to Librarian of CongressJames H. Billington, "[d ] espite the heroic efforts
of archives, the motion picture industry and others, America's film heritage, by any mea-
sure, is an endangered species. Fifty percent of the films produced before 1950 and at least
90 percent made before 1920 have disappeared forever." James Billington, quoted in Libra-
rian Names 25 More Films to National Film Registry (last modified Nov. 17, 1998) <gopher://
marvel.loc.gov:70/00/loc/announce/prs/98/98-1 8 1/> (press release).
137 See Eldritch Press (last modified Apr. 20, 1999) <http://eldred.ne.mediaone.net>; Pro-
ject Bartleby Archive (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.columbia.edu/acis/bartleby/>;
Bartleby Library (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.bartleby.com>.
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number of film re-makes, recordings of the same musical score,
and published anthologies, it appears that reprints and original
works do not compete in most media markets, and therefore the
danger of eliminating the new works should not be significant.
Further, in many media such as film, the additional costs for stor-
age and maintenance of older works add costs to the "free" works
and reduce the financial advantage of public domain works against
new works. 138
Bantam Books conducted a study on so-called classics. They de-
termined the following: more than 23 million classics are sold
each year; over half of all classics to high schools and colleges.
Now, assume royalties are about ten percent of the cover price,
assume the price of those books is $15, and assume all works are
copyrighted (which is unlikely since many are public domain
works). If these facts remain constant for twenty years, that
means the public pays out $345,000,000 in royalties, just for
these books just in high school and college, over a twenty year
period. That is $345 million that could go elsewhere in educa-
tion. Saving valuable resources or allocating more for education
is the value of the public domain.13 9
The cost of limiting the public domain is not a theoretical ex-
pense. The theoretical model described above distributes this ex-
pense as a baseline cost for education. More troubling is that these
costs will have a disproportionate impact on those households that
have not built a reading library over time. Even as the government
continues to recognize illiteracy as one of the most significant so-
cial costs, Congress adds millions of dollars in costs for those who
are most in need of inexpensive, quality literature.
The cost to the public also includes the inability to create de-
rivative works.
"Corporate copyright is increasingly enforced so vehemently
that it enormously hinders artists who are trying to use what has
come before as building blocks for the future," says Steve Zeit-
lin, director of City Lore, a New York based center to promote
urban folk culture. "Even tracking down the copyrights for the
materials you are using is an enormously expensive task." 4°
In music, for example, free popular music would be unavailable for
a great period of time. The transaction costs would discourage pri-
138 See National Film Preservation Foundation (last modified Aug. 3, 1999) <http://
www.filmpreservation.com/>.
139 Hon. Hank Brown & David Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Sapping American Creativ-
ity, 44J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 94, 100-01 (1996).
140 Gail Chaddock, WMen Is Art Free?, CHRISTAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1998, at B1.
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vate bargaining for use of the music-even if the author were will-
ing to allow others to use the music for free.141 Since music is a
component of many types of entertainment, the costs of film, tele-
vision, and theater would also be increased.
[The copyright term extension] would be the current term-
life of the author plus fifty years plus an additional twenty years.
Put another way, the monopoly grant could extend over seven
generations. After the author's life, he would likely have chil-
dren and grandchildren. Fifty years after that, the author's chil-
dren or grandchildren would be grandparents. Adding another
twenty years to that would likely mean that the children or
grandchildren of the author's grandchildren would have chil-
dren of high school or college age.
Irving Berlin. He wrote "Alexander's Ragtime Band" in
1915. He lived until 1989. If the proposed standard of life-plus-
seventy years applied to Berlin, his song, "Alexander's Ragtime
Band" would not be freely available to the public until 2059.
The length of Berlin's copyright term or monopoly grant would
be from 1915 to 2059, or one-hundred and forty-four years from
creation. We would thus be denying seven generations of Amer-
icans the right to freely use the song.
Duke Ellington's works from 1921 and later would not be
freely available to the public until 2016 or later. "East St. Louis
Toodle-O," written in 1927, would not come out until 2022.
"Mood Indigo," written in 1930, would not see the light of day,
so to speak, until 2025. George Gershwin's "Rhapsody in Blue,"
written in 1924, would not come out until 2019. "I Got
Rhythm," written in 1930, would not come out until 2025.142
Despite an economic model that suggests the public would
benefit from more limited protection of intellectual property, the
trend in Congress and in the states is to increase the scope of pro-
tection. Congress has focused on the economic success of the most
dominant providers of media content. For those providers, greater
protection improves their ability to bargain with the property they
own, while increased transaction costs tend to increase the eco-
nomic barriers to competition.
B. Eliminating the Statutory Barriers to Monopoly
Congress has acted generously for the holders of copyrighted
141 Music is subject to a compulsory license. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994). The compulsory
license does not extend to synchronization rights necessary to use the music in a film or
multimedia work, nor does it apply to grand performing rights necessary to use the music
in a stage musical.
142 Brown & Miller, supra note 139, at 94-95.
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works while trying to strike a balance between the interests in-
volved in the creation and consumption of copyrighted works. The
legislative history of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA")' 43 suggests that the balance was a fair one.
Through this legislation, we extend new protections to copy-
right owners to help them guard against the theft of their works
in the digital era. At the same time, we preserve the critical bal-
ance in the copyright law between the rights of copyright owners
and users by also including strong fair use and other provisions
for the benefits of libraries, universities, and information con-
sumers generally. 14
4
The Copyright Clause balances the interests of authors against
those of the public; however, the DMCA places this balance be-
tween the for-profit corporations who own copyrights and the non-
profit universities and libraries that provide access to information.
"The case for extending copyright protection is anchored in corpo-
rate profit. The so-called copyright industries (including televi-
sion, movies, music, books, and computer software) are the
nation's No. 1 exporters and contributed $60 billion in foreign
sales in 1996, according to the Washington-based International In-
tellectual Property Alliance."145 Left out of the balance is the pub-
lic, the beneficiary of the public domain and broad fair-use
provisions. 146
1. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
Congress created the greatest boon to monopoly power with
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which added
twenty years to the term of all existing copyrights. 47 Under the
143 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
144 105 CONG. REc. E2166 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher regard-
ing passage of the DMCA).
145 Chaddock, supra note 140.
146 Even before the DMCA, Congress was strengthening and expanding provisions of
the Copyright Act. For example, Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft Act ("NET
Act"), which added criminal liability for copyright infringement even when committed
without any financial gain to the copyright infringer. See No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). The purpose of the NET Act as well as the WIPO
implementation legislation included in the DMCA was, in part, to reduce copyright piracy
by increasing penalties. A discussion of the extent to which piracy affects commercial sales
of copyrighted works and the extent to which additional criminal statutes reduces this
piracy is beyond the scope of this Article. But cf John Dvorak, I Take it Personally, Bill, P.C.
MAG., Mar. 23, 1999, at 87 ("[Mlost piracy is really a marketing tool. The first dominant
word processor, WordStar, was largely a phenomenon of piracy. People would pass it
around and then eventually buy a copy if they found it useful. The lost sales attributed to
piracy never account for these conversions.").
147 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 1125 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of Title 17, U.S. Code).
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new statute, any work that would otherwise have fallen into the
public domain on December 21, 1998, will now continue to have
copyright protection until 2018.148 For the advocates of the copy-
right term extension, the more important extension is the addition
of twenty years for all work-for-hire projects, extending the term to
ninety-five years for such works. 149
The Walt Disney Company is among the biggest beneficiaries
of this congressional largesse. Disney had made a large financial
investment for additional rights in "classic" Pooh, the works origi-
nally created by A. A. Milne. 5 ' The purchase of these rights was
contingent on the passage of the copyright term extension because
the work was soon to fall into the public domain.
The passage of the copyright term extension suggests that
Congress believed the public would benefit more from Disney's
marketing of products and novelties based on the A. A. Milne char-
acters than from the free access to the books published on the In-
ternet, new stories using the characters created by aspiring authors,
and the obligation of Disney to create original work to generate
new profits. Twenty years of additional protection is particularly
important for Disney. Steamboat Willie, the first appearance of the
character now known as Mickey Mouse, debuted in 1928.15 Any
threat to the continued economic globalization of the Mickey
Mouse franchise could disrupt the Disney empire. 52 With only five
years before the first Mickey fell into the public domain, the pub-
lic's interest in free access to great works of fiction and non-fiction
would necessarily take second place to the government's interest in
Disney's continued economic health. 153 Congress has clearly cho-
148 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304, as amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
§§ 101-103.
149 See id.
A work made for hire is-(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilations,
as an instructional text, as a test, answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "work made for hire").
150 See Pandora, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 13, 1998, at 4.
151 STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928).
152 Disney chairman Michael Eisner lobbied Senate majority leader Trent Lott directly
and gave campaign contributions to 10 of the 13 original sponsors of the legislation. See
Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension no Mickey Mouse Effort, Congress OKs Bill Granting Cre-
ators 20 More Years, CHIC. T~iB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22.
153 See Dennis S. Karala, Letter to the Editor, Rush to Extend Copyright Shield will Impoverish
Public Domain, CHICAGO DAILY LAw BULL., Jan. 19, 1998, at 2 ("The proposed legislation is
no more than a welfare measure to those persons who own copyrights on old works-a
wealth transfer imposed on the American public for the benefit of large entertainment and
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sen how to set the balance between the rights of the copyright cre-
ators and the public's interest.
[I]n recent years two irritating things have happened. First, the
copyright industry... has become less and less concerned with
providing income for authors and their families, and more and
more about supplying huge companies with never-ending in-
come streams .... [T] he copyright law-far from being on the
side of creative artists-can often be turned against them, trap-
ping them into lifetime servitude to some faceless corporation.
Secondly, copyright terms have got [sic] longer and longer.154
Disney is not the only copyright holder to benefit from the
copyright term extension. "[H] eirs like the Gershwin Family Trust,
large corporations like Disney and Time Warner, and organiza-
tions like the Motion Picture Association of America and the Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers began lobbying
for a change in Federal law."15 5 Any large corporation or estate
with substantial holdings in an existing body of copyrighted works
benefits from the change. The less likely the company or group
will be to create new works, the more likely they favored the term
extension. The passage of the legislation also figured prominently
in the relationship established between the Republican party and
the ties former House Speaker Newt Gingrich established with the
media and entertainment industries. 15 6
Ironically, the balance struck by Congress actually stripped
publishing corporations (like Disney, whose copyright on Mickey Mouse has only five years
or so to run) .... ").
154 Richard Morrison, The Rights That Don't Smell Quite Right, THE TIMES (London), Oct.
23, 1998, at Features. The London Times has taken a decidedly anti-European and anti-U.S.
approach to the copyright extension.
While most of the world set its copyright term at life plus 50 years, the Germans
opted for 70-apparently to compensate their authors for "loss of earnings"
during the two world wars (well, whose fault was that?). Three years ago the
European Union decided to "harmonise" copyright-and of course the Ger-
man view prevailed: a 70-year term was fixed throughout the EU. . . . "This is as
good a year as we have ever had," gloated Jack Valenti, the Motion Picture
Association's boss, after his Congress victory. Quite. The rest of humanity may
be forgiven for thinking that it is being surreptitiously screwed.
Id.
155 Sabra Chartrand, Congress has extended its Protection for Goofy, Gershwin and Some Moguls
of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at C2.
156 SeeJuliet Eilperin, GOP Members'Loyalty Helps Land Plum Committee Seats WASH. PosT,
Nov. 24, 1998, at A4, available in 1998 WL 22536925. Another discussion regarding the
relationship between the film studios and the Republican leadership has been relayed as
follows:
Representing a wealthy district that includes Palm Beach and serving as chair-
man of the GOP's Entertainment Task Force, [House Representative Mark]
Foley made a point of targeting such companies as Time Warner and Disney
for campaign contributions. Six months ago he brokered a meeting between
entertainment executives and House leaders in which Gingrich pledged to pass
[Vol. 17:491
MEDIA & MONOPOLY
some rights of the copyright holders-but not in favor of the gen-
eral public. Title II to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act provided expanded access to free music and television broad-
casts for restaurants and retail stores.' 57 Entitled "Fairness in Music
Licensing Act of 1998, "158 the provision expands the exemption for
restaurants and retail outlets that play radio music or television
broadcasts of sporting and other events. 5 9 Retailers, other than
bars and restaurants, that occupy less than 2000 square feet are
exempt from the licensing of performance rights societies such as
ASCAP and BMI. 6° Bars and restaurants can occupy as much as
3750 square feet and maintain their exemption from licensing.'61
Under the newly adopted provisions, a retailer larger than the
specified square feet allowance may still be exempt from licensing
if "the performance is by audio means only, the performance is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeak-
ers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1
room or adjoining outdoor space."1 6 2 Televisions must be fifty-five
inches or smaller, diagonally with the same speaker limitations as
listed for the audio. 63 This is true for both retail stores and bars
and restaurants. 164
These changes represent a significant victory for the stores
and restaurants, which had previously been limited to modest,
home-style speaker systems. 16  The Fairness in Music Licensing Act
changed the legal balance between the performing rights societies
and the restaurant owners in favor of the restaurateurs and publi-
a copyright extension bill and legislation enacting intellectual property rights
agreements, two measures that made it through Congress in its final days.
Id See also infra Part IV.B.
157 See Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298 tit. II, 112 Stat. 2830
(1998) (to be codified in scattered sections of Title 17, U.S. Code).
158 Id.
159 Congress first codified this exemption in the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 110(5)
of Title 17, U.S. Code, exempted from copyright infringement,
communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving appara-
tus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless-(A) a direct charge is
made to see or hear the transmission; or (B) the transmission thus received is
further transmitted to the public.
17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994) (amended 1998).
160 See Fairness In Music Licensing Act of 1998 §§ 202-206.
161 See id
162 Id, § 202(a) (1) (B) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (B)).
163 See i&
164 See id
165 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994) (amended 1998). See Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (decided prior to effective date of Copyright Act of 1976 and
codification of exemption); Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); Sailor Mu-
sic v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
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cans. Although the president of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America ("RIAA") 1 6 6 expressed pleasure and relief at the
passage of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
implementation legislation, representatives of ASCAP and BMI
were much less enthusiastic. 67
Hilary Rosen, RIAA's president, was ecstatic at the passage of
the copyright legislation. "I'm incredibly grateful that a very hard-
working group of members of Congress, music industry advocates,
and our copyright allies have worked together to produce this out-
come. It's tremendous. This legislation will really promote the
next generation of progress of music on the Internet.'1 68 In con-
trast, the presidents of the two leading performing rights societies
issued a joint statement condemning the passage of the act's "fair-
ness" provisions. ASCAP president and board chairman Marilyn
Bergman expressed her disappointment. "In one sweeping legisla-
tive action, the House and Senate have passed copyright-term ex-
tension with one hand yet severely curtailed copyright protection
with the other."' 69 BMI president and chief executive officer Fran-
ces Preston echoed Bergman's sentiment. "It is a sad day for all
creators of music in America and intellectual property rights
owners."
170
Given that the original purpose of the copyright changes was
to promote creation by authors, Congress chose to balance the in-
terests of the large music publishers represented by the RIAA
against those of the restaurant associations with little interest in the
representatives of the composers or songwriters. Representative
Bart Gordon, when criticizing the provision's passage, made this
statement: "Although some characterize this provision as a 'com-
promise,' this provision is entirely unfair to American songwrit-
ers.... I believe it is hypocritical of the leadership of this body to
pass this lop-sided provision .... [T] his music licensing exemption
weakens copyright protection for songwriters and their creative
166 Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunica-
tions, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Commerce Comm., 105"' Cong. (1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 300231 (Federal Document Clearing House) (statement of Hilary B.
Rosen, Pres. & C.E.O., RIAA) ("The RIAA is a trade association that represents the inter-
ests of the copyright owners of more than 90% of the sound recordings distributed in the
United States-from small independent companies like One Little Indian andJim Henson
Records, to the major labels such as Epic, RCA, Capitol, Motown, Warner Brothers and
Universal Studios.") [hereinafter Rosen Statement].
167 See Bill Holland, Congress Extends C'right Term; WIPO Passage Seen, BILLBOARD, Oct. 17,






works."17' Interestingly, Representative Mary Bono, Sonny Bono's
widow and successor, also objected to the passage of this
provision.17
2
The choice to provide restaurants greater power over the intel-
lectual property they exploit may be the economically and socially
sound public policy. The 'compromise' strips the performing
rights societies of significant ownership against the small restau-
rants and retailers. The legislation also reflects a social custom that
a free radio or television broadcast should not have to be
purchased by the recipient, since the broadcaster was already com-
pensated by the advertising revenue.
Nonetheless, the hypocrisy to which Representative Gordon al-
luded remains part of the new copyright legislation. The same
concerns which led Congress to protect small business owners over
the copyright holders remains true for the owner of small theater
producers, small website operators and all individuals. The restau-
rants reflect one small sub-population of consumers of intellectual
property. Rather than denying them access to the intellectual
property, Congress should have seen them as an illustration of the
problems caused by excess protection for the copyright holders.
The local 3750 square foot ice cream parlor will now be able to
play the Mickey Mouse Club Theme over its four-speaker stereo
without paying royalties, but it cannot display the Steamboat Willie
poster for twenty-five more years, lest the owner face a criminal
sentence.
Because of a challenge to the copyright extension, the courts
are forced to review the limitations on the power of Congress to
extend the copyright act. In Eldred v. Reno,17' Eric Eldred filed suit
on his own behalf and on behalf of his unincorporated nonprofit
association, the Eldritch Press, requesting injunctive relief against
the 1998 extension of copyright protection, alleging that the exten-
sion is unconstitutional, if not to all copyrighted works, at least as
to those works that have already been created.174 Eldred founded
the Eldritch Press in 1995 to demonstrate how the Internet could
be used to present books in the public domain and add features to
those printed texts. 175 "The site features early editions of poetry
collections and novels, including Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet
171 144 GONG. REc. E2070-04 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gordon).
172 See id
173 No. 1:99CV00065 (filed D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1999).
174 See id (complaint at 35.a.).
175 See id. (complaint at 31).
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Letter and Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier."1 7 6
The lawsuit challenges Congress' ability to enact a statute that
does not realistically increase the incentive to create new works
prospectively, and cannot in any manner increase the incentive to
create new work retroactively.
The [Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA")] confers benefits
retroactively. This can have no rational basis, since no incentive
to future individual creativity is provided by conferring an eco-
nomic reward upon someone who has already created the work
in question or upon someone to whom the creator of the work
transferred or sold the rights in the work in a transaction that
contemplated a shorter copyright term. This is equally true
when the author is dead. However, this is exactly what the CTEA
does, since it extends the copyright term for existing copy-
righted works by another 20 years.1 77
The legal challenge to the copyright extension will give the
courts the opportunity to re-examine the constitutional limits
placed on the fundamental federal powers afforded to Congress. It
does not, however, address the questions of the appropriateness of
the legislation. Absent a broadening of the lawsuit by other inter-
ested parties, the courts will not review the lack of concern for the
public's interest in a robust public domain. This aspect of the de-
bate does not appear to have survived the development of the copy-
right extension.
2. Balancing the Interests for the Internet Service Providers:
Protections Against Vicarious Liability
Congress was concerned that a balance be maintained be-
tween the copyright holders and the Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") who provide the infrastructure for the flow of information,
protected intellectual property, personal e-mails, and software
across the Internet. The goal was to provide a mechanism that en-
176 Jeffrey R. Young, An On-Line Publisher Files Court Challenge to Copyright-Extension Law,
CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Jan. 22, 1999, at A20.
177 Eldred v. Reno ( complaint at 35.a.). The lawsuit has since been joined by a number of
other plaintiffs, including American Film Heritage Association, a non-profit film preserva-
tion group established to represent film preservationists; Luck's Music Library, Inc., which
supplies classical orchestral sheet music; Dover Publications, Inc., a commercial book pub-
lisher; Moviecraft, Inc., an incorporated commercial film archive; and Copyright's Com-
mons, a non-profit coalition operated out of Harvard University's Berkman Center for
Internet & Society. See id& (First Amended Complaint at 1-11.) Professor Lawrence Lessig,
once special master in the antitrust suit against Microsoft, is the Berkman Professor of Law,




couraged the use of the Internet while providing a system to stop
unwanted traffic-whether it be pirated software or libelous e-mail.
At the heart of the balance was a choice by Congress not to
place the ISPs in a position of criminal or civil liability for the con-
tent transmitted by other parties.178 Congress recognized this ten-
sion in Title II of the DMCA. 79 Representative Frank explained
the goal of the provision in his comments on the introduction of
the legislation. "If you are an on-line service provider, if you are
responsible for the production of all this out to the public, you will
not be held automatically responsible if someone misuses the elec-
tronic airway you provide to steal other people's property."18
Unfortunately, Representative Frank placed his emphasis on
the need to exempt ISPs from liability as part of two broader issues:
the protection of free speech and the elimination of governmental
standards that lessen the rights of speakers who use electronic me-
dia rather than the rights of those who used print media. One fo-
cus of his remarks dealt with the historical difference between the
print and electronic media in the context of First Amendment pro-
tection.'81 The other focus of his remarks dealt with the limitations
provided to ISPs from civil liability for copyright violations.
There is a balance here. We want to protect property, but we do
not want to deter people from making this widely available. We
have a problem here of making sure that intellectual property is
protected, but we do not want freedom of expression impinged
upon. Madam Speaker, I found that particularly important for
this reason, and I think this is a point that I want very much to
stress: We live in as free a society from the standpoint of expres-
178 See Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 502, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)-(e) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997). See also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998).
179 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
180 105 CONG. REc. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank).
181 Representative Frank's comments included the following statement.
The problem is we have had two doctrines of freedom of expression. We have
had one which covered all speech and written speech, newspapers, magazines,
theater, billboards; that has been very free. Beginning in the 1930s when radio
came into play, we started a new form of speech, and that was speech electroni-
cally transmitted. And because we started with a limited spectrum, because we
started with physical limitations on the amount of speech that could go out, we
began with electronically-communicated speech in the 1930s to develop a par-
allel doctrine which gave less protection to speech electronically transmitted.
Over time we had a tradition of constitutionally very protected speech, and
then speech transmitted electronically that was less protected.
Id. This discussion goes to the changing approach taken by the courts in scrutinizing legis-
lation designed to regulate the content of speech on the Internet-particularly the CDA-
rather than any of the provisions included in the DMCA. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and supra text accompanying note 61.
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sion as I believe has ever existed in the world. The level of free-
dom of expression which Americans enjoy is very, very
profound, and that is very important to us.... But one of the
things that was a potential danger here was that by protecting
intellectual property, a very important job, we would have im-
posed on the on-line service providers such a degree of liability
as, in fact, to diminish to some extent the freedom they felt in
presenting things. What I am most happy about in this bill is I
think we have hit about the right balance. We have hit a bal-
ance which fully protects intellectual property, which is essential
to the creative life of America, to the quality of our life, because
if we do not protect the creators, there will be less creation. But
at the same time we have done this in a way that will not give to
the people in the business of running the on-line service entities
and running Internet, it will not give them either an incentive
or an excuse to censor.1
8 2
Representative Frank places his emphasis on the balance be-
tween extending copyright protection so that authors can earn a
livelihood, against the free expression of the ISPs. Although his
first remark acknowledged that the protection afforded the ISP was
a limitation on liability from contributory copyright infringe-
ment,183 he couched the discussion of balance as one of protection
versus expression. Representative Frank captures the need to bal-
ance the goals of protection for copyright holders, freedom from
strangling lawsuits for innocent copyright violations, and protec-
tion for the ISPs from claims of defamation based on content
posted by other users of the Internet. His statement, however, con-
flates the issue of copyright protection and immunity from defama-
tion lawsuits. By blurring the distinction between these three
distinct objectives, Congress misconstrued the balance achieved in
the legislation.
Under the provisions of Title II to the DMCA-the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act-an ISP will be
immune from civil liability for transmission of messages, 184 caching
of content that infringes another party's copyright, 85 storage of
182 105 CONG. REc. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank).
183 Contributory infringement is liability for "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other.... ." Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 435-36 (1984); GoRmAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 654-58.
184 See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act § 202(a) (to be codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
185 See id. Caching is "the intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider... for the purpose of mak-
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content that infringes another party's copyright,18 6 or hypertext
linking to other parties' materials.187 Although each provision is
somewhat unique, they all have the same essential components as
those that serve as the prerequisites for immunity for transmission
of infringing material:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the
direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the
transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is
carried out through an automatic technical process without se-
lection of the material by the service provider; (3) the service
provider does not select the recipients of the material except as
an automatic response to the request of another person; (4) no
copy of the material made by the service provider in the course
of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the
system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone
other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is main-
tained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessi-
ble to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is
reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision
of connections; and (5) the material is transmitted through the
system or network without modification of its content.188
The safe harbor provisions immunize an ISP from copyright
infringement of copyrighted works traveling between third parties,
whether the material is transmitted though the ISP's routing sys-
tem or copied into memory, so long as the ISP has no knowledge
of the infringement, makes no financial gain from the infringe-
ment and acts to remedy the situation once notice has been given.
A service provider shall not be liable if. .. the service provider
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an
activity using the material on the system or network is infring-
ing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent;
or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expe-
ditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has
the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
ing the material available to users of the system or network who . . . request access to
[another person's] material .... " Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)).
186 See id (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
187 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)).
188 Id (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
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paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable ac-
cess to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity.189
The balance achieved for the ISPs was not a controversial one.
Major software companies such as Microsoft have no economic in-
centive to sue companies such as Earthlink or America Online for
the trafficking of pirated software on the Internet. The cases in
which large institutional copyright holders have sued are almost
always against small bulletin-board operators who are actively en-
couraging the copyright piracy.190 Generally, the ISPs find that liti-
gation stems from small copyright holders.191 While the possibility
exists that ISPs would have started to refuse to post material based
on the fear of potential lawsuits, this form of self-censorship had
not been showing signs of developing. Self-censorship would only
develop in the wake of significant actual liability and none had yet
been found. The safe harbor provision was not a response to any
existing threat to the ISPs. Potentially, this threat could materialize
under the expanded scope of the WIPO implementation provi-
sions or more widespread use of the digital formats, such as the
MP3 digital compression format for music.
When direct conflict arises between significant industry com-
panies, the economic consequences are too great not to find a
common ground. For example, shortly after Lycos Inc., one of the
leading portal companies, elected to provide search engine capa-
bilities for digitized music on the MP3 format, the company quickly
agreed to work with the RIAA to reduce copyright piracy. t9 2 "Lycos
said it will take down links to sites that house illegal material, but it
is up to the [RLAA] and other copyright holders to alert the com-
pany to the copyright violation. 'We're in the business of locating
things, not policing the Net,' explained a company spokesper-
son."' 9 ' The strategy brings Lycos into compliance with the statute
while not losing sight of the economic reality that the MP3 digital
music format could develop into a significant market segment.
Ongoing disputes between the RIAA and the companies involved
in the MP3 hardware and software industry will result in some liti-
189 Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (d)).
190 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. Inc. v. WebbWorld Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997);
Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310 (N.D. Ohio,
Nov. 25, 1997); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
191 The notable exception to this is Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Nelcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).





gation, but changes to the business practices will also need to oc-
cur.194 The RJAA has started to suggest that it will bring the
copyright fight to the infringers, particularly the students on col-
lege campuses. 19 5 The strategy of the RIAA reflects the impact of
the safe harbor available under the Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Liability Limitation Act. Without a large target for strategic
litigation, the music industry will be forced to rely on changes in
technology and business practice to control the threat of piracy.'96
The act deflects the initial lawsuits against the ISPs until the actual
infringement has been identified.
The greater threat to the ISPs stemmed from the danger of
civil liability for defamation in their role as publishers of their sub-
scriber's e-mails and websites. Arguably, this is the threat to which
Representative Frank could have been alluding with his comments
that the balance struck "will not give [the ISPs] either an incentive
or an excuse to censor."197 If the ISPs were treated as publishers
for purposes of defamation litigation, they would be obligated to
censor the material on the websites hosted by them to avoid third
party liability.198 Such cases exposed the ISPs to significant liability.
Congress acted to change this balance strongly in favor of the ISPs.
In a portion of the CDA upheld by the courts, Congress exempted
the ISPs from civil liability arising out of their client's defamatory
acts. 199 Under the terms of the 1996 legislation, Congress provided
that "[n] o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider."20 0 This simple defini-
tional section removes ISPs from the chain of liability that would
otherwise attach to every publisher in the chain of republication of
194 See P. J. Huffstutter, A Musical Free-for-All on the Net, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at Al.
195 See id. ("This month, the group plans to alert colleges and commercial Internet ser-
vice providers that, if the association serves them with a subpoena, they will have to hand
over the name of students operating pirate Web sites.").
196 See Collin Levey, New Technology Calls the Tunes, WALL ST.J., Mar. 8,1999, at A18. ("In
an effort to counter online piracy, the Recording Industry Association of America and its
overseas counterparts enlisted Italian researcher Leonardo Chiarliglione to head its Secure
Digital Music Initiative.... Part of the industry's solution will have to be ... by making
music cheap enough that it's not worth stealing and easy enough to access that it's worth
the average consumer's time. And by hiring Mr. Chiarliglione, it looks like the industry
has finally realized that it's better to embrace new technology than to fight it.").
197 105 CONG. REc. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank).
198 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2341 (1998); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). See also Cubby,
Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
199 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 502, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. III
1997). See also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
200 47 U.S.C. § 223(c) (1).
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a defamatory statement."' Historically, courts have distinguished
between publishers that have the power to control content20 2 and
book-sellers or other distributors who merely transmit pre-printed
materials. 20 1 The statute places ISPs into the latter category for lia-
bility purposes.
In Zeran v. America Online Inc.,20 4 the first appellate case inter-
preting section 230, the court followed the broad mandate of the
statute. Zeran, a subscriber, sued America Online after another
subscriber posted a message falsely accusing Zeran of selling offen-
sive tee-shirts that made light of the terrorist attack on the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.205 The postings con-
tinued, and a local radio station reported the ads, asking listeners
to call and respond. 20 6 "By April 30, Zeran was receiving an abusive
phone call approximately every two minutes," that included harass-
ing language and death threats. 20 7 Despite the clear, immediate
impact of the defamatory conduct and an allegedly complete lack
of response by America Online, the court affirmed a summary
judgment dismissing the complaint. "[Section] 230 precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer ser-
vice provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional
editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, with-
draw, postpone or alter content-are barred." 20 8
The Zeran court recognized the congressional mandate to
open the Internet to robust debate and to eliminate those barriers
which might have a tendency to chill speech through the medium.
201 See Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Olne who
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had origi-
nally published it.") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977)). See also
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995).
202 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (allegations of libel
stemmed from a paid advertisement).
203 Cubby, Inc. 776 F. Supp. at 139 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959),
which held that criminal liability for ownership of an obscene book required knowledge of
the book's contents).
204 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998).
205 Id. at 329 ("On April 25, 1995, an unidentified person posted a message on an AOL
bulletin board advertising 'Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts.'... On April 26, the next day, an
unknown person posted another message advertising additional shirts with new tasteless
slogans related to the Oklahoma City bombing. Again, interested buyers were told to call
Zeran's phone number, to ask for 'Ken,' and to 'please call back if busy' due to high
demand. Over the next four days, an unidentified party continued to post messages on
AOL's bulletin board, advertising additional items including bumper stickers and key
chains with still more offensive slogans.").
206 See id
207 Id
208 Id. at 330.
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Mindful of the potential chilling effect libel actions can have on
free speech,20 9 the court did not equivocate in its disposition.
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to dis-
cern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits
pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet
medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for
the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech.
Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature
of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep govern-
ment interference in the medium to a minimum.
2 1 0
The Zeran court also addressed the potential for liability as a dis-
tributor, eliminating this potential exposure as well.211
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liabil-
ity, they would face potential liability each time they receive no-
tice of a potentially defamatory statement - from any party,
concerning any message. Each notification would require a care-
ful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the
posted information, a legal judgment concerning the informa-
tion's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial deci-
sion whether to risk liability by allowing the continued
publication of that information. Although this might be feasible
for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings
on interactive computer services would create an impossible
burden in the Internet context.
2 12
Other courts have shared the Fourth Circuit's broad assess-
ment of tort immunity. "Any attempt to distinguish between 'pub-
lisher' liability and notice-based 'distributor' liability and to argue
that Section 230 was only intended to immunize the former would
be unavailing. Congress made no distinction between publishers
and distributors in providing immunity from liability."2 1 3 ISPs are
under no obligation to screen what is posted or to remove defama-
tory material. ISPs do have a somewhat greater affirmative obliga-
tion to remove material that is allegedly infringing on a third
party's copyright, but only once notice has been given of the
infringement.
The cumulative effect of the two statutes passed by Congress to
209 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
210 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
211 See id at 333.
212 Id
213 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at
333).
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shield ISPs from liability should place ISPs outside the inevitable
litigation stemming from the content of the material passing
through the Internet. These changes are beneficial for all inter-
ested parties, since the liability eliminated is vicarious in nature.
The case that best exemplifies the type of liability now eliminated is
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,2" 4 in which the
major film studios tried to hold Sony vicariously liable for selling
video cassette recorders which were used by individuals who were
illegally pirating software. Ultimately, the Supreme Court said that
Sony was not obligated to take affirmative steps to stop people from
using its products in an infringing manner. 21 5 Congress has now
made a similar statement regarding ISPs, legislating that an ISP is
not automatically responsible for the misconduct of its subscriber's
use of its service.
The evils of copyright infringement and defamation can still
be addressed by action against the perpetrator of the misconduct.
The victims of the abuse will still have a remedy available; what they
lose is a broad target for financial recovery. While such a large
corporate defendant is easier to identify, the lawsuit will tend to
focus on the actual misconduct.
3. WIPO Implementation
Most of the provisions involved in the WIPO implementation
are uncontroversial, technical changes, designed to replace refer-
ences to the Berne Convention with corresponding references to
the WIPO treaty. There are, however, a few provisions that may
change the balance between creators and consumers of copy-
righted works.2" 6 Most notably is the clause creating anti-circum-
vention protection for works that are protected.
Under the new provision, "[n]o person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected by copyright."217 Congress is attempting to add civil and
criminal penalties for anyone who overcomes the encryption tech-
nology used in the transmission or delivery of digital media con-
tent. The technology may be very robust or very simple. "[A]
technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the appli-
214 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
215 See id. at 455-56.
216 For a thorough and thoughtful discussion, see Pamela Samuelson, The Digital Agenda
of the World Intellectual Property Organization, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
217 See WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, tit. I, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2861, 2863-76 (1998) (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A)).
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cation of information, or a process or a treatment, with the author-
ity of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work."218 The
effect of this provision is to move the battle between encryption
and hacking from the technological arena into the legal arena.
The statute does not address the adequacy of the technology, only
its existence. Anyone violating the copyright will be subject to civil
damages, attorneys' fees and costs. 219 Willful violations are subject
to criminal liability. 220 This will deter code breaking of computer
games and add additional criminal penalties against hackers. This
will also discourage game enthusiasts from sharing computer game
passwords by making all the parties liable for copyright infringe-
ment.22 1 Taking the law only a small step further, this will also give
each twelve-year-old legal redress against anyone reading his or her
diary without permission, so long as it has a lock or a password.
The statute also prohibits the manufacture of equipment that
could circumvent encryption technology. "No person shall manu-
facture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device component or part
thereof that ... is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title."22 2 The purpose of this
section of the provision is to eliminate traffic in 'black boxes,' elec-
tronic descrambling devices. Under the new act,
'to circumvent a technological measure' means to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological mea-
sure, without the authority of the copyright owner.
223
Tightening the restrictions on manufacture and sale of devices
designed to descramble and steal cable signals or to decrypt en-
coded CD-Roms should promote efficiency in the marketplace.
Black boxes result in revenue losses for the cable systems and video
rental stores. Powerful, effective encryption will allow software
manufacturers to sell software using the Internet or CD-Roms. CD-
Roms can contain multiple programs, and purchasers pay for the
program or version they like. At any later date, the purchaser may
218 Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(B)).
219 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1203)
220 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1204).
221 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
222 WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act
of 1998 § 103(a) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A)).
223 Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (B)).
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upgrade or purchase additional programs off the disk simply by
contacting the company and paying for the additional password.
Dangers exist in providing excessively robust protection
against decryption. Congress attempted to balance this issue by al-
lowing for "reverse engineering," but the language of the excep-
tion is narrowly crafted.224 Until the courts begin to interpret these
sections, it will be difficult to assess whether the exception was
drawn too narrowly to protect legitimate competition in the
marketplace. 225
4. Regulation of Cable Ownership
Congress has varied its regulatory approach to the cable indus-
try on a regular basis for the last two decades. Initially, to promote
its development, Congress has tried to shield each of the cable and
television industries from unfair competition by the other while
keeping both separate from the telecommunications industry. 226
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, for example, pro-
hibited a local telephone company from owning the cable system
in the area served by that local telephone company.2 2 7 These regu-
lations kept the various components of the telecommunications
and media industries segmented and apart.
Keeping with this earlier tradition, in 1992 Congress enacted
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act,
which attempted to regulate cable fees while creating controls on
the size of cable operators' subscriber base. 228 Among the objec-
tives of the legislation was an attempt to create statutory require-
ments that provide access to cable systems for a portion of the local
224 Id (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(0).
225 Reverse engineering to learn the structure of a software program as a precursor to
developing a compatible product is allowed under the provision. This may be too narrow,
however, because it limits the use of reverse engineering for educational purposes, such as
learning how to build better code. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-
28 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-44(Fed. Cir. 1992). A full discussion of reverse engineering and its implications is beyond the
scope of this Article.
226 See City of Dallas v. FCC, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 563 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999). In 1970,
the F.C.C., concerned with preventing the expansion of local monopolies, adopted rules
prohibiting telephone companies from providing cable service in their telephone service
areas (the "cable-telephone company cross-ownership ban").
227 See47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1) (1984); 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1985), both repealed ly Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b) (1), 110 Stat. 56, 124 (1996). Prior
to repeal, the limitations were challenged on First Amendment and other grounds. See
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 585-86 (D.D.C. 1987), affirmed in part,
reversed in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F.
Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), affirmed, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
22 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of Title 47, U.S. Code). The attempt
to control cable size was not successful.
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broadcasters. In reviewing the legislation, the Supreme Court
identified three goals: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-
the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and
(3) promoting fair competition in the market for television pro-
gramming."229 The 1992 regulations also included many controls
on ownership and cross-ownership of television and cable media.23 °
"With the stated purpose of encouraging a diversity of speak-
ers in the electronic media, the 1984 Cable Act taken together with
existing FCC regulations limited (with some exceptions) the own-
ership of cable television systems by those parties who own co-lo-
cated television stations and telephone companies in their service
areas."231 The model of increasing regulation and differentiating
among the various media began to break down as technology con-
tinued to advance throughout the decade. These limitations were
reduced or eliminated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in
order to create the opportunity for competition between different
media.232
Responding to what has been described as "technological con-
vergence" and "legal Balkanization,"233 Congress substantially
amended the Communications Act of 1934 with the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 ("1996 Act" or "Telecommunications Act").284
The Telecommunications Act was sweeping in scope. It liberalized
regulations on multimedia empires for broadcast, cable, and tele-
phone. The effect was to wave the green flag at the convergence
race-the race to amass the largest information company-by re-
ducing or eliminating ownership barriers. "The premise of the
drafters of congressional telecommunications reform was to let
'everyone get into everyone else's business.' ",235
Congress, for example, eliminated the national limitations on
229 Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
230 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385.
231 1 DANIEL BRENNER, ET. AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO LAW
& POLICY § 4.02 at 4-5 (1998).
232 See id. § 4.03 at 4-10.
233 THOMAS KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw & POLICY 23 (2d ed. 1998)
("Technological convergence refers to the fact that we have witnessed, since 1934, an ex-
traordinary explosion in the types of devices used for various form of telecommunications
as well as a plethora of transmission paths.... Legal Balkanization refers to the fact that,
notwithstanding increased technological convergence, the law often treated similar tech-
nologies differently.").
234 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133
(codified in scattered sections of Title 47, U.S. Code).
235 BRENNER, ET. AL., supra note 231, at 4-2. See generally Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the
Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. LJ. 251(1997).
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the common ownership of television networks and cable systems236
and liberalized the ownership restrictions to allow ownership of
multiple radio stations in the same market.23 7 Similarly, the Tele-
communications Act increased the amount of television coverage
up to a national audience reach of thirty-five percent rather than
twenty-five percent, and eliminated the restriction on the number
of stations that could be owned by a single party or entity.238
Although the explanation for the Telecommunications Act
was broad deregulation, rapid technology growth and reduced
consumer cost, the actual legislation created a new structure for
regulation .239
[T] he Telecommunications Act establishes a very different legal
framework from the one that prevailed before. But it does not
represent the end of regulation - rather, it is a system of regula-
tion transformed.... [T]he changes taking place in regulated
industries law [are] not in terms of "regulation" versus "deregu-
lation," but in terms of a transformation from the "original para-
digm" of regulation to a "new paradigm" of regulation.24 °
The traditional goal of the cross-ownership restrictions was to
increase the diversity of viewpoints in the broadcast media so as to
promote the marketplace of ideas in a physical and regulatory
framework. 21  As the Supreme Court stated when reviewing the
236 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(f), 110 Stat. 56, 111.
Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Act, the Commission's rules limited the
extent to which cross ownership was permitted between cable television systems
and television broadcast networks. Network-cable cross ownership was allowed
if the combinations did not exceed 10 percent of the homes passed by cable
nationwide, and did not exceed 50 percent of homes passed by cable within an
area of dominant influence.
Norman Sinel et. al., Recent Developments in Cable Law Regarding Franchising and Franchise
Renewals, Transfers and Modifications, 535 PLI/PAT 343, 400 (1998).
237 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b) (2).
238 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1998). The F.C.C. also regulates the cross-ownership be-
tween cable, broadcast television and radio, and newspapers. Prior to the 1996 Act, signifi-
cant barriers existed to cross-ownership or co-ownership of telephone services, cable, or
number of radio licenses. The statute and F.C.C. regulations also prohibited the dual own-
ership of a local newspaper and local television license in the same market. As the F.C.C.
stated, "[l]ike all of our multiple ownership rules, the newspaper/broadcast cross-owner-
ship rule rests on the twin goals of promoting diversity of viewpoint and economic compe-
tition." F.C.C. Notice of Inquiry, Waiver of the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership
Restriction, 61 Fed. Reg. 53,694 (1996).
239 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 (1997) ("As stated on the first of its 103 pages,
its primary purpose was to reduce regulation and encourage 'the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.' The major components of the statute have nothing to
do with the Internet; they were designed to promote competition in the local telephone
service market, the multichannel video market, and the market for over-the-air
broadcasting.").
240 Joseph Kearney & Thomas Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1235 (1998).
241 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) ("In setting its
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cross-ownership restrictions, "the greater the number of owners in
a market, the greater the possibility of achieving diversity of pro-
gram and service viewpoints."24 2 While this principle has not been
abandoned, the combination of new media for programming and
greater scrutiny for F.C.C. regulations has led Congress to place far
less emphasis on the need for diversity.
After the 1996 Act, only a few of the regulations were main-
tained. The statute and regulations limiting cross-ownership by tel-
ephone companies and cable operators were almost completely
eliminated,"' as were limits on the number of radio stations that
could be owned in a single market.24 4 The F.C.C. is reviewing the
elimination of the television "duopoly" rule, which limits an owner
of broadcast television stations to two in any given market,245 and
the "one-to-a-market" rule, which generally prohibits the common
ownership of a television and a radio station in the same market.
24 6
Similarly, the 1996 Act eliminated a prohibition on a television net-
work from owning a cable system, but it did not lift the ban on the
owner of a local television station from owning a cable system, mak-
ing the statutory change ineffective. 24 7 The F.C.C. is reviewing the
remaining limitations so that it can allow television networks into
the cable industry.248
While the limitations on cross-ownership of local newspapers
and local television stations in the same market is prohibited,249
the F.C.C. has been reviewing this policy for radio stations with the
possibility of eliminating the restriction or granting waivers on a
licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass
media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service
viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic power."). See also
Mark D. Schneider, Reevaluating The Ban On The Cross-Ownership Of Newspapers And Broad-
cast Stations, 16 COMM. LAw. 7 (1998).
242 National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 814.
243 See 47 U.S.C. § 573 (Supp. III 1997). See also id § 573(c) (2) (Implementation [of
Section 302 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996]); F.C.C. Final Rule, Open Video Sys-
tems, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,698 (1996); F.C.C. Final Rule, Open Video Systems, 61 Fed. Reg.
43,160 (Third Report and Order released Aug. 8, 1996); City of Dallas v. FCC, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 563 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999).
244 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1998). The number of local radio stations that could be
commonly owned was increased to eight and limitations on national ownership was elimi-
nated entirely. See Order, In re Implementation of Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (Broadcast Radio Ownership), 11 F.C.C. Rec. 12,368 (1996).
245 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b).
246 See id. § 73.3555(c).
247 See 47 U.S.C. § 533 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See F.C.C. Notice of Inquiry, 63 Fed. Reg.
15,353, 15,359 (1998). Because each of the broadcast networks also owns a number of
broadcast stations, the networks cannot avail themselves of the cross-ownership opportuni-
ties for cable without divesting the local television stations.
248 See 63 Fed. Reg. 15,353, 15,359.
249 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d).
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more regular basis.250 The debate over the continuation of this
cross-ownership provision captures the essence of all the conflicts
regarding cross-ownership. Specifically, the question is whether
there is any actual benefit to the public as a result of the ownership
ban. Organizations opposing the cross-ownership limitations em-
phasize that the limitations are inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment and unfairly single out selected media.
[The Newspaper Association of America ("NAA")] argues that
in adopting the rule there never was a record of evidence that
cross-owned stations engaged in anti-competitive practices. NAA
further argues that, whatever the FCC's original reasons for the
rule were, "[i]n the abundantly diverse and highly competitive
mass media marketplace of the late 1990s, maintenance of these
selective cross-ownership restrictions is unnecessary, discrimina-
tory, and unjustifiable." NAA points to relaxation in other Com-
mission ownership rules and argues that the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule unfairly singles out newspaper
publishers, denying them the ability to realize efficiencies and
synergies while leaving their competitors free to do so. NAA also
argues that relaxation of the newspaper/broadcast cross-owner-
ship rule will help preserve newspapers and broadcast stations as
viable media outlets and enhance diversity. Finally, NAA asserts
that the rule is inconsistent with the First Amendment and that
courts today would require a far stronger showing than was
made in 1975 to support such a direct limitation on the free
speech rights of a particular class of citizens. 251
In contrast, those who support a continuation or extension of
the cross-ownership limitations raise concerns over the homogeni-
zation of local media. They also point to the control that an undif-
ferentiated voice can have in local opinion, or that the effect will
be to further nationalize news and information, eliminating the lo-
cal community's ability to carry on public debate.
Supporters also contend that newspaper/broadcast combina-
tions would give a single entity too much of a voice with respect
to forming opinion on public issues. The new media pointed to
by opponents of the rule, they state, do not add significant local
viewpoints, are not locally based, and do not provide news or
information on local issues. Although supporters of the rule
agree that cable television and the Internet have the potential to
facilitate debate on local issues, they dispute that they yet serve
that purpose to any significant degree and argue that these me-
250 See F.C.C. Notice of Inquiry, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,353.
251 M at 15,358 (citations omitted).
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dia are costly and do not reach large segments of the
community.252
The debate between supporters and opponents of the cross-
ownership ban focus on the same underlying issue-access to in-
formation by local consumers of media. Both sides are emphasiz-
ing access to a variety of information and greater diversity of
viewpoints. The F.C.C. has approached diversity from a number of
different perspectives.
[The FCC] diversity analysis focuses upon the ability of broad-
cast and non-broadcast media to advance the three types of di-
versity (i.e., viewpoint, outlet and source) [its] broadcast
ownership rules have attempted to foster. Viewpoint diversity re-
fers to helping to ensure that the material presented by the me-
dia reflect a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and
interpretations. Outlet diversity refers to a variety of delivery
services (e.g., broadcast stations, newspapers, cable and DBS)
that select and present programming directly to the public.
Source diversity refers to promoting a variety of program or in-
formation producers and owners.253
The traditional assumptions that the existing, dominant tech-
nology would stifle the growth of new technology has faded in the
face of transformative technological innovation. To the extent that
the cross-ownership provisions were designed to stop an estab-
lished technology (such as broadcast television) from purchasing
and destroying a developing technology (such as cable television,
direct broadcast satellite, or Internet broadcasting), the speed of
technological innovation appears to have reduced the likelihood of
success. 54 The relationship between viewpoint diversity and
source diversity remains at the heart of the controversy. The ulti-
mate goal of diversity is to provide a range of "antagonistic" or al-
ternative views that will compete with one another for public
attention and support. Unless the public allows the government to
moderate the public discourse-an extraordinary step under the
252 ld. (citing comments of David E. Hoxeng d/b/a ADX Communications, MM Docket
No. 96-197 at 2). "Hoxeng provides as an example San Antonio, TX, where, he states, the
cost-per-thousand to newspaper advertisers skyrocketed following the buyout and closure
of one San Antonio daily by the other." Id. n.51 (citing MM Docket No. 96-197 at 2-3).
253 Id, see also id. at 15,355.
254 But see United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998)
(alleging that Microsoft has used its monopoly power to control access to the Internet); In
reTime Warner, Inc., No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997) (1997 FTC Lexis 13) (decision and order)
(requiring some divestiture of assets following the merger of Time Warner, Turner Broad-
casting, and Tele-Communications Inc. because of cable subscriber and cable content
dominance).
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First Amendment-any public policy must rely on a surrogate to
achieve the goal of viewpoint diversity. The F.C.C. has used source
diversity to expand the range of speakers, hoping to increase the
number of different viewpoints without directly controlling which
viewpoints are supported or rejected. Of the three goals of the
F.C.C. regulations, outlet diversity is controlled by technological
change, viewpoint diversity is limited by the First Amendment, and
only source diversity is within the realm of governmental
regulation.
Whether source diversity serves as a proper surrogate for view-
point diversity remains an unanswered question. The issue must
be addressed both in the abstract and the particular. The F.C.C.
must review the extent to which the cross-ownership limitations re-
duce the potential for market dominance and the extent to which
communities have a truly diverse media experience. If the result is
to have one of the same few corporations own each of the newspa-
pers while the television networks control the content of the broad-
cast television (with all cable television being national content),
then the idealized model of robust local debate is illusory in any
event and the issue is not particularly compelling. Alternatively, if
the effect of the cross-ownership limitation is to keep the national
television networks from owning the nation's newspapers and
thereby maintaining an additional source for news reporting on
both the local and national level, then the limitation does provide
the value of increased economic competition and diversity of
viewpoints.
Because the dangers inherent in the possible compression of
news and media outlets raises the specter of increased oligopoly or
cartel behavior, however, any regulatory change that would reduce
barriers to common ownership should be suspect and tested using
a waiver process, rather than repealed outright.255 The rapid
change of technology will result in a convergence of industries, but
this convergence need not eliminate the number of participants.
Even if the Balkanization is reduced and the regulations made
more consistent across media, there is no obvious reason not to
encourage source diversity by limiting the reach of each media
conglomerate and thereby opening the market to a greater
number of participants.
255 See infra Part IV.A (discussing oligopoly and media orthodoxy).
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C. The Demise of Shared Culture-The Public Domain, Fair Use, &
Over-reaching Contracts
The economic rationale underlying the U.S. copyright scheme
actually contains within it an implicit social paradigm which may
create an inherent assumption that every work is created by a sole
author working alone. The myth of the rugged individual has ex-
panded to include the lone artist and fuels a regulatory model that
assumes each work is new and novel. Unfortunately, this model
sometimes fails to account for the raw material that all authors
use. This tendency can distort our understanding of the interac-
tion between copyright law and authorship. Specifically, it can
lead us to give short shrift to the importance of the public do-
main and of the fair use doctrine by failing to appreciate that
the public domain is the law's primary safeguard of the raw ma-
terial that makes authorship possible.256
1. The Public Domain
The public domain represents all works or components of work
that are not protected by copyright. This includes works, or com-
ponents thereof, that are not eligible for copyright, 257 works that
were created before copyright existed,258 works that have had their
copyrights expire, 25  and intellectual property that is defined by
the Copyright Act to fall outside the scope of its protection.26' The
true importance of the public domain and fair use are to provide
.the necessary grist for the creative mill to churn.
256 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990).
257 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated or embodied in such work."); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 499
U.S. 340 (1991) (factual compilations); Baker v. Seldon 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (blank forms);
Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (recipes). Compo-
nents may include design elements such as layout, structure, or operations. See Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding command pull down
menus to be unprotectable "method of operation"), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 516
U.S. 233, reh'g denied, 516 U.S. 1167 (1996).
258 Litman, supra note 256, at 975-76. ("Works created before the enactment of copy-
right statutes, such as Shakespeare's Macbeth or Pachelbel's Canon, are available for fourth
grade classes across the nation to use for school assemblies without permission from any
publisher or payment of any royalties.").
259 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 243 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
original author's right to 'consent' to the copyright of a derivative work terminates when
the statutory term of the copyright in the underlying work expires.").
260 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (works of the United States Government); Twin Books Corp.
v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) (works that did not meet statutory
compliance with the notice and registration provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909); Lotus
Dev., 49 F.3d 807.
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The role of public domain material in the creative process
may contradict accepted paradigms of creative development. The
principle that public domain material is necessary for creative de-
velopment, for example, is inconsistent with the model which pre-
supposes that the author, toiling alone and shut off from society,
independently creates all original work.
An author transforms her memories, experiences, inspirations,
and influences into a new work. That work inevitably echoes
expressive elements of prior works. Whether it infringes the
copyrights in the prior works depends upon the conscious and
subconscious processes within the author's mind. We cannot
verify them; neither can she. If this author's work lands in a
copyright suit, the legal conclusions that will be drawn will de-
pend in the first instance on facts (such as whether she is suing
or being sued and whether she is holding a certificate of regis-
tration) that have nothing to do with the nature of the author-
ship process.
26 1
Even under this model of creative isolation, the mental pro-
cess does not track the legal model of copyright. Instead, the au-
thor builds a new work from social events, from personal
memories, from experiences which include viewing or hearing
other works, whether copyrighted or in the public domain.262
Although sometimes invoked,2 63 this model was never fully ac-
cepted by the courts. As Judge Learned Hand explained in the
copyright dispute between the author of Abie's Irish Rose (once the
longest running play on Broadway) and Universal Pictures over the
film The Cohens and the Kelleys, common elements are necessarily
part of the fabric upon which creation begins.
We assume that the plaintiffs play is altogether original, even to
an extent that in fact it is hard to believe. We assume further
that, so far as it has been anticipated by earlier plays of which
261 Litman, supra note 256, at 1007-08.
262 The phenomenon of unconscious infringement has been used to account for an
author copying the work of another without any direct recollection of the act. See Bright
Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd sub
nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding
George Harrison's "My Sweet Lord" to have infringed on "He's So Fine").
263 Cf Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (L.
Hand, J.) ("But we understand by this no more than that in its broader outline a plot
[regarding a play, Letty Lynton,] is never copyrightable, for it is plain beyond peradventure
that anticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright. Borrowed the work must indeed
not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an 'author'; but if by some magic a man who
had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats's.") (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249
(1903)), affirmed, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
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she knew nothing, that fact is immaterial. Still, as we have al-
ready said, her copyright did not cover everything that might be
drawn from her play; its content went to some extent into the
public domain.264
Apply this model to the work-for-hire context of a film or mul-
timedia work and the amount of pre-existing work expands expo-
nentially as each member of the development team-perhaps
hundreds of individuals on large projects-adds his or her per-
sonal experience. The issue is not whether there is some copying
that occurs in the creation of each work, but the extent to which
copying is allowed before it is actionable. 65 Even in the theater-
where individual artists are highly protected by contract and copy-
right law-the process remains highly collaborative.266
Sports and pageantry are examples of yet another paradigm of
authorship, but in this case it is authorship outside the scope of the
Copyright Act.26 7 The broadcast of a sports event is protected be-
cause the broadcast is simultaneously fixed on videotape. 268 Apart
from the broadcasts, courts have not recognized the performance
of the athletes or event planners as falling within the range of copy-
righted works.
Unlike movies, plays, television programs, or operas, athletic
events are competitive and have no underlying script. Prepara-
tion may even cause mistakes to succeed, like the broken play in
football that gains yardage because the opposition could not ex-
pect it .... What "authorship" there is in a sports event, more-
over, must be open to copying by competitors if fans are to be
attracted. If the inventor of the T- formation in football had
been able to copyright it, the sport might have come to an end
264 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
265 Reviewing the amount of copying allowed rather than attempting to identify in-
fringement might alter the paradigm for so-called "thin copyrights," those of factual com-
pilations, innovative theories, or simple designs. SeeJane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1902-03 (1990)
("For low authorship informational works, one may posit three different kinds of copying:
1) close copying of all or substantial portions of the work in the creation of a competing
work; 2) use of the work as a "starting point" to save a competitor time, money, and effort;
and 3) reproduction of substantial elements of information in the creation of a different,
not directly competing work.").
266 See Kernochan, supra note 126, at 385-87. Cf Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d
Cir. 1991) (rejecting actor's claim of joint authorship in playwright's work).
267 See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663,
669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986); Production Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broad. Co., 622
F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that parades are not protectable works of
authorship).
268 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The definition of fixation has incorporated this dis-
tinction. "A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is
'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with
its transmission." Id. § 101 (definition of "fixed"). See also Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668.
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instead of prospering. Even where athletic preparation most re-
sembles authorship-figure skating, gymnastics, and, some
would uncharitably say, professional wrestling-a performer
who conceives and executes a particularly graceful and diffi-
cult-or, in the case of wrestling, seemingly painful-acrobatic
feat cannot copyright it without impairing the underlying com-
petition in the future. A claim of being the only athlete to per-
form a feat doesn't mean much if no one else is allowed to
try.
2 6 9
The limits placed by a broad public domain protect the other
participants in the endeavor. As the court correctly noted, the abil-
ity to copyright the work or movement is not the only issue; also at
stake is the underlying competition. This is as true in the market-
place as on the field of play.
Neither the model of the sports program nor the model of the
isolated author bears any relation to the current digital environ-
ment in which technology is redefining accepted norms. Large-
scale lawsuits between software giants such as Apple Computer, Inc.,
v. Microsoft Corp.270 and Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Interna-
tional Inc. 2 7 1 create a very different paradigm. In the computer
software arena, the very culture of the computer software-based in-
formation has developed in a matter of a few years. Regardless of
either the merits of an individual claim or the language of the
Copyright Act, courts are properly reluctant to extend monopoly
power over this burgeoning electronic community. Instead, the
courts define the essential elements of the copyrighted works as
processes outside the scope of copyright protection,272 or rely upon
the fair use doctrine to categorize the conduct as appropriate
under the circumstances, notwithstanding the infringing
conduct. 273
2. Public Domain Data, ProCD, & Contracts to Eliminate the
Limitations of Copyright
Also outside the works of authorship are those that would pro-
269 National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d. Cir. 1997).
270 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
271 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233, reh'g denied,
516 U.S. 1167 (1996).
272 See, e.g., id. at 815 ("We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an un-
copyrightable 'method of operation.' The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the
means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3."); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Those elements of a computer program that are
necessarily incidental to its function are similarly unprotectable.").
273 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(analogous situation during development of home recording industry).
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tect ideas, procedures, or processes.2 7 4 This longstanding limita-
tion on copyright includes the factual information contained in
databases. Although these databases may be very expensive to com-
pile, the data they contain remains in the public domain. While
this result was not necessarily the only reasonable interpretation of
the history of copyright, 275 the Supreme Court adopted this ap-
proach in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
2 76
where it held that the copying of alphabetized telephone informa-
tion was not a copyright violation because the data was not subject
to copyright and the organization was not sufficiently original to
grant even modest copyright protection. 277 Like the computer in-
terface cases, the courts have been reluctant to provide the poten-
tial monopolistic control over data that a contrary result might
engender.
Perhaps the most noticeable single exception to this judicial
reluctance to extend copyright's monopolistic control is ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg,78 in which Judge Easterbrook wrote that the con-
tract governing the sale of a database would govern the use of the
public domain data contained in the software program. Judge Eas-
terbrook's opinion was noteworthy on each of the two issues ad-
dressed: whether the "shrinkwrap" license was binding and
whether copyright law precluded the enforcement of the entire
agreement. The ProCD court explained that a shrinkwrap license is
a contract or license agreement in which the terms and conditions
are included inside th6 packaging and a notice exists on the
outside of the package alerting the purchaser of the terms in-
side.279 Despite some authority to the contrary,28° Judge Easter-
brook had little difficulty finding authority to enforce the
shrinkwrap license under the U.C.C. 28 1 Nor, despite a tremendous
amount of legal hand-wringing to the contrary, is he wrong-as far
274 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
275 Professor Ginsburg provides an illuminating history which tends to undermine the
historical basis of the Court's opinion. See Ginsburg, supra note 265, at 1895-97.
276 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
277 See id. at 357. "[T]here is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alpha-
betically in a white pages directory.... It is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable."
Id. at 363.
278 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
279 See id. at 1453.
280 See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988).
281 See id at 1452 ("A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to
treat as acceptance. And that is what happened. ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer
would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at lei-
sure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software splashed the license on
the screen and would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance.") (citing U.C.C.
§ 2-204(1)).
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as the analysis goes.282 A contract provision that appears on the
computer screen in normal-sized type and requires the user to ac-
tively acknowledge consent by pressing a button falls well within
the accepted range of conduct courts have enforced in other
contexts.283
More troubling is Judge Easterbrook's discussion of the power
to draft non-negotiable, mass produced contracts that limit the
scope of the material that is otherwise in the public domain.284
The opinion states that "[s]omeone who found a copy of
SelectPhone on the street would not be affected by the shrinkwrap
license . . 285 Yet, if the user is required to indicate that she
agrees to the limits of the software license as a condition of the
software loading into the computer, that user is bound.286 "Prop-
erly" drafted, the clickwrap license will cover every instance of the
software's use.287 For all practical purposes, such a construction of
the shrinkwrap provisions could effectively end the right to the
public domain for material that is commercially sold. 288 The opin-
ion places a great deal of weight on the myth of the bargained-for
exchange. "A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by
contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as
they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights.' 289 The
fallacy is that if every user is subject to the same contract, regardless
of the manner in which the software is acquired, then the contract
282 See generally Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing
Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REv. 569 (1997); Maureen O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the
ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997); Mark Lemley, Intel-
lectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1995).
283 ProCD suggests examples from insurance policy binders, cruise tickets, concert tick-
ets, and consumer goods. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52.
284 See Dennis Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 511, 523 (1997).
285 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
286 This form of assent is now known as "clickwrap," a variation on the shrinkwrap be-
cause the "I Agree" button appears at the installation of the software. See Zachary M. Harri-
son, Just Click Here: Article 2B's Failure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-
Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907 (1998); Hotmail Corp. v.
Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
287 Perhaps the purchase by a second user of the computer itself, with the software
loaded, would avoid the license and the limitation. A well drafted license, however, will
include a provision that prohibits the transfer of the software to a user who does not agree
to its terms. It may go further and require indemnification by the original purchaser for
any breach by subsequent users or bind the user of the software with an on-screen re-
minder at start-up.
288 SeeJulie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Manage-
ment," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 485 n.79 (1998) ("Scholars within the fields of both law and
economics have characterized the standard form contracts that the UCC enables as 'private
legislation'-de facto legislation produced by private firms pursuant to a delegation of
authority from the state, via the legal rules governing the formation and enforceability of
such contracts.").
289 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
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becomes a right against the world. The analysis of ProCD would be
entirely reasonable for a truly negotiated contract, but not for such
a universal right. The court should acknowledge the consequences
of its decision as applied in the case before it rather than relying
upon theoretical limitations that it can expound. No facts in ProCD
suggest that there were any users of the data who were not bound
by the license agreement, so in making its determination the court
should not have relied on their theoretical existence.
The distinction is important because the Copyright Act will
pre-empt a state law claim unless such state law claim has an extra
element not found in the copyright claim. 29 ° "Some courts have
held that breach of contract claims necessarily contain an 'extra
element' insofar as contracts involve specific promises between two
parties, rather than obligations which arise by operation of law."2 91
While many contracts will meet the threshold criteria of an extra
element, not every contract does so. 29 2 A clickwrap license that
controls every and all uses of the work subsumes the copyright. It
essentially provides "all rights reserved-including those otherwise
limited by sections 107 through 120 of the Copyright Act."
Judge Easterbrook analogized to the law of trade secrets to
suggest that a finding of preemption would threaten other areas of
the law, such as trade secret law, particularly as it relates to patent
law.293 The secrecy necessary to maintain a trade secret should
serve as the extra element necessary to take it outside the preemp-
tion discussion, and therefore it provides a poor analogy to the
shrinkwrap license. 29 4  To the extent that the analogy provides
290 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994) ("[A]li legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.").
291 Frontline Test Equip. v. Greenleaf Software, 10 F. Supp.2d 583, 592 (W. D. Va. 1998).
292 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B] [1] [a]
(1997). But see Raymond Nimmer, supra note 20, at 863-64. See also National Car Rental
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 119 F.2d 426, 434 n.6 (8th Cir.) ("According to
[Melville & David] Nimmer, then, if a license agreement contains a provision prohibiting
the licensee from copying the program, the licensor could sue for breach of contract
rather than for copyright infringement. Other courts have concluded, however, that
breach of contract actions in which the alleged breach consists of the exercise of one of the
exclusive copyright rights are preempted.").
293 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
294 A close reading of the opinion reveals poor, ill-fitting analogies to medical disclaim-
ers and instructions, and consumer products. A discussion of these parallels, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, in an exhaustive opinion, the Supreme Court
explained that allowing states to afford trade secret protection to inventions would not
undermine the objectives of patent law, the objectives of which are to provide new innova-
tion for the public by fostering and rewarding invention and, in exchange, requiring dis-
closure of invention. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
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some guidance, the reliance is misplaced.
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an
unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been
freely disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly
contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which
is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through
the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially re-
direct inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patenta-
bility developed by Congress over the last 200 years.295
The appropriate analogy here is that the enforcement of a
state statute such as the UCC in a manner that contractually elimi-
nates some or all of the exceptions to exclusivity in copyright also
redirects creative efforts away from the Congressional goals to bal-
ance the rights of the author with those of the public.
The difficulty in the ProC) decision is that, despite the flawed
legal analysis and negative policy implications, the decision to hold
Zeidenberg liable is most likely the correct result as a matter of
fairness and of protection for the software industry.29 6 The defend-
ant knowingly violated the license agreement in order to compete
directly with the plaintiffs product.29 7 Unfortunately, there is no
method of statutory construction that will allow the court to find
liability once the contract claim is properly preempted because
under copyright law the material sold by ProCD was unprotectable
data.29 8 To avoid confusion in the courts and to open the market-
place to an appropriate competitive regime, federal law must ex-
plicitly preempt the shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses and at the
same time provide limited protection for compilations of data.29 9
3. Fair Use
The reason the ProCD decision is potentially so dangerous is
that it allows distributors of mass-produced media content contrac-
tually to expand the scope of copyright to unprotected works and
"Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.
While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest
means, e. g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates 'against the
world,' forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of
time." Id. at 489-90.
295 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1989).
296 See Cohen, supra note 288, at 497.
297 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. Fairness, however, is not necessarily the issue before the
court. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
298 The software also included database software which was protected by copyright, but
Zeidenberg did not reproduce the copyrighted software, only the unprotected data.




to opt out of the limitations Congress placed on copyrights in sec-
tions 107 through 120 of the Copyright Act.300 These provisions
provide the important balance to the Copyright Act, limiting the
monopoly power granted to the copyright holder. Among the
most important of these limits is the doctrine of fair use, which
allows anyone a limited privilege to copy the protected work with-
out consent.
3 0 1
An essential component to a free marketplace of ideas is that
even those works that are protected under copyright are still avail-
able to the public for comment or criticism. Copyright law has tra-
ditionally allowed other authors and commentators a limited right
to incorporate the protected material into new works without the
original copyright holder's permission.30 2 The origins of fair use
stem from the longstanding judicial tradition that the monopoly
granted by the copyright should not unduly limit or interfere with
other authors' creativity. The tradition of the fair use doctrine has
consistently been reasserted by the Supreme Court. 'Justice Story
distilled the essence of law and methodology [for the application
of fair use] from the earlier cases: 'look to the nature and objects
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original
work.' "303
The original basis for the doctrine was entirely consistent with
the constitutional mandate of promoting science and the useful
arts. The rationale "was that the second work, had, in effect, cre-
ated a new, original work which would itself promote the progress
of science and thereby benefit the public."30 4 Since the value was
in creating an opportunity for the second work, the monopoly
300 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (Fair use) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 108 (Reproduction by librar-
ies and archives); 109 (Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord); 110 (Exemp-
tion of certain performances and displays); 111 (Secondary transmissions); 112
(Ephemeral recordings); 113 (Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works); 114 (Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings); 115 (Scope of exclusive
rights in nondramatic musical works: Compulsory license for making and distributing
phonorecords); 116 (Negotiated licenses for public performances by means of coin-oper-
ated phonorecord players); 117 (Computer programs); 118 (Use of certain works in con-
nection with noncommercial broadcasting); 119 (Secondary transmissions of superstations
and network stations for private home viewing); 120 (Scope of exclusive rights in architec-
tural works); 121 (Reproduction for blind or other people with disabilities).
301 Id § 107.
302 See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
303 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (quoting Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
304 See WiIUA4 PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIvILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAw 3 (1985).
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power granted by copyright had to be limited so as to allow the
second work to be produced.
Increasingly over time, fair use served as a safety valve for
overly-rigorous enforcement of the statute"0 5 and was codified in
the 1976 Copyright Act (with minor updating) as follows:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.30 6
The enactment was intended to memorialize the existing judicial
doctrine rather than to re-write the traditional, historical gloss
courts had placed on the copyright monopoly.307 The first and
fourth factors stress the importance of commercial competition to
a finding of fair use. 308 This emphasis places a substantial burden
on mounting a successful fair use defense. Two of the four prongs
support a finding of an unfair use if the defendant that appropri-
ated the material has significant market power and influence.3 °9
305 Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1133
(1998); Campbel4 510 U.S. at 577 ("The fair use doctrine thus 'permits [and requires]
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."') (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
306 17 U.S.C. § 107.
307 The purpose of section 107 was "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way .. " H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
308 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985);
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-50 (1984).
309 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. But see Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137
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The second prong focuses on the nature of the work, suggesting,
for example, that a factual work can be more readily copied than a
fictional work Finally, the third prong focuses on the amount of
the original work that was copied, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. An insubstantial taking should not be actionable; a substan-
tial taking will be prohibited whether the taking was a significant
amount of material or a significant component of the material.310
While all four prongs must be considered, ultimately the balancing
is intended to be qualitative, with the four prongs serving as guides
for an appropriate result rather than trip-wires for automatic
liability. 31'
The balancing of interests in any particular fair use case is dif-
ficult objectively to analyze, factually unique, and closely tied to the
context in which the case is decided. 3 " As the Supreme Court dis-
cussed in Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, it is not merely a
question of quantity, but whether or not the essence of the work
has been lifted.313 Mechanical analysis of the taking is insufficient
to make the determination. This issue is not new. "The quintes-
sence of a work may be piratically extracted, so as to leave a mere
caput mortuum, by a selection of all the most important passages
in a comparatively moderate space. "314
The importance of the fair use doctrine continues to be rein-
forced by the Supreme Court in theory, but limited in practice. In
its decision holding that the first sale doctrine allows an importer
to sell lawfully manufactured goods in the United States without
the copyright holder's permission, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of such a construction as a means of protecting fair use.
Of even greater importance is the fact that the § 106 rights are
subject not only to the first sale defense in § 109(a), but also to
all of the other provisions of "sections 107 through 120." If
§ 602(a) functioned independently, none of those sections
would limit its coverage. For example, the "fair use" defense
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that parody of Anne Leibovitz photograph used in adver-
tisement of motion picture was fair use despite the commercial nature of the parody).
310 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 ("[T] he Nation took what was essentially the heart
of the book.") (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp.
1067, 1072 (1983)).
311 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) ("Nor may the four
statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.").
312 See id at 577. ("The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute,
like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.").
313 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65.
314 Gray v. Russell, 10 F.Cas. 1035, 1038-39 (C.C.D Mass. 1839). See PATRY, supra note
304, at 18.
1999]
556 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
embodied in § 107 would be unavailable to importers if
§ 602(a) created a separate right not subject to the limitations
on the § 106(3) distribution right. Under L'anza's interpreta-
tion of the Act, it presumably would be unlawful for a distributor
to import copies of a British newspaper that contained a book
review quoting excerpts from an American novel protected by a
United States copyright."1 5
The Court continues to support a statutory construction that
stresses the exemptions to the exclusive rights granted under copy-
right. Nonetheless, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,3 t6 even as
the Court upheld the right of the defendant, rap group 2 Live
Crew, to create a parody of the plaintiffs song, it added an addi-
tional gloss that limited the nature of fair use.
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether
the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original crea-
tion ... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is "transformative." Although such
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of
fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guaran-
tee of breathing space within the confines of copyright .... and
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the signif-
icance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use. 17
Justice Souter's opinion in Campbell, however, went on to limit
parody to those works that focused on the source material itself
rather than satire which "can stand on its own two feet and so re-
quires justification for the very act of borrowing."3 1 This analysis of
fair use has the effect of reducing the scope of the doctrine by
potentially excluding satirical works from the range of protected
uses. Since the Court does not use parody as an expansion of the
four-prong test, the exclusion of satire is wholly unsupported by
case law or logic. Nonetheless, the precedent has been set.3 19
The Campbell decision missed the importance of the social
315 Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1133
(1998) (footnotes omitted).
316 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
317 Id. at 579 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
318 Id at 580-81.
319 See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.) (find-
ing satire of 0. J. Simpson trial not a fair use, presumably because parents could become
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fabric upon which satire-as used by the Court-is based. Satire
works precisely because it evokes other materials. For example, the
use of The Cat in the Hat to critique the judicial system is successful
precisely because of the juxtaposition of the two "characters"-O.J.
Simpson and the Cat.120 To suggest that this is not worthy of fair
use protection misses an essential purpose of fair use. This is the
type of mischaracterization which, along with the extension of the
copyright term, will reduce satire-and the shared cultural associa-
tions-from the communal dialogue in society. Nonetheless, de-
spite the sometimes misplaced rhetoric of the Souter opinion, the
opinions in L'Anza, Sony, and Harper & Row, and the results in
Campbell, continue to indicate strong support for a vibrant fair use
defense.
The greatest limitation on fair use as a component of a broad-
based regimen for an open marketplace is that the doctrine is an
affirmative defense. As such, it makes for a weak bulwark as a plan-
ning device. "Fair use does not assist parties, or industries, in mak-
ing ex ante determinations whether or not to copy, and if so, how
much. It is a highly fact-specific defense usually deemed inappro-
priate for resolution at the summary judgment stage."3 2 The more
predictable the result, the more effective the planning. The highly
case-specific balancing of the fair use doctrine and the inconsistent
application of the doctrine provide insufficient guidance and pre-
dictability. If the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of the
doctrine as a planning device, it can shape its opinions to provide
better guidance rather than adding new glosses to the doctrine Jus-
tice Story clearly explained.
D. State Protectionism & the Article 2B/UCITA Powerball
In addition to the constitutional parameters on all state con-
duct and the regulation at the federal level, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute have led a public dialogue on the need for and scope
of a uniform state law designed to deal in transactions involving
electronic commerce. 22 The resulting proposal is designed to pro-
confused and read the book-which did not have illustrations-as a bedtime story), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
320 See iL at 1399-1400 (applying fair use factors).
321 Ginsburg, supra note 265, at 1926 n.226.
322 See David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on
Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and "Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1173, 1190 (1998). Article 2B has been renamed the Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Act ("UCITA") and recommended for adoption by the States. See supra note 16. A
discussion of the individual provisions of Article 2B is beyond the scope of this Article.
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vide gap-fillers and default provisions for private contracts involv-
ing the digital industries and provide uniform state regulation of
contracts governing information transactions. 23 The preamble to
the Draft Article 2B explains:
Article 2B deals with transactions in information; it focuses
on a subgroup of transactions in the "copyright industries" asso-
ciated with transactions involving software, on-line and internet
commerce in information and licenses involving data, text,
images and similar information. It .. .covers transactions in
digital and related industries. In the digital economy, informa-
tion industries are rapidly converging into a multi-faceted indus-
try with common concerns. That converged industry exceeds in
importance the goods manufacturing sector. It is growing
rapidly.
Article 2B concerns transactions that largely have never
been covered by the U.C.C. The industries and transactions af-
fected by Article 2B involve subject matter unlike the traditional
U.C.C. focus on goods. In Article 2B transactions, the value lies
in the intangibles: the information and rights to use
information. 324
Article 2B does not purport to be neutral in structuring the
law to enforce the status quo. Rather, it attempts to create a new
balance between the interests in the information age.325 At the
core of the development for Article 2B were two uncontested un-
derlying assumptions: First, that transactions involving software
and data are conceptually distinct from sales of goods because of
the ability digitally to recreate the item without any practical limita-
tions, and second, that the information industries have such a com-
mercial significance so as to warrant the attention and legal
protection.326
From this rather benign starting point, Article 2B developed
into a decidedly different regime. The drafters of Article 2B
elected not to utilize the existing structure of copyright law to
achieve their results. Instead, they created a regime that attempts
to reorder the marketplace of ideas by over-emphasizing the prop-
erty rights in the ideas, facts, information and expression of the
dominant media providers. Although unwilling to accept the con-
323 U.C.C. art. 2B at Introduction (Discussion Draft of August 1, 1998) ("Article 2B pro-
vides a framework for contractual relationships at the center of the information era. This
proposal is in effect a cyberspace contract statute.").
324 Id. (footnotes omitted).
325 See id. ("Evaluating the balance hinges on one's perspective, yet, as the following
indicates, Article 2B distributes benefits among the various parties.").
326 See id. at Project History.
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sequences of their regulations, the drafters of Article 2B are cogni-
zant of the social implications of their endeavor.
[B]asic First Amendment and related policies must remain cen-
tral. Even as informational content becomes a significant com-
mercial commodity, we must not forget that informational
content and its communication in a marketplace of ideas re-
mains equally relevant to political and social norms in this coun-
try. What law does here affects not only the commercialization
of information, but also the social values its distribution has al-
ways had in society.3
27
At one level, Article 2B does provide a true First Amendment para-
digm for dealing with information. By placing all transfers of infor-
mation into private hands, it eliminates Congress' role of
interference in the marketplace of ideas. Under this rubric, the
influence of Congress' attempts to balance the interests of authors
with those of the public would be reduced, and the private order-
ing of the marketplace would occur. Just as the Supreme Court
intervened in Miami Herald to say "[i] f it is governmental coercion,
this at once brings about a confrontation with the express provi-
sions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that
Amendment developed over the years, '328 so can the use of private
licenses-in essence, a private regulatory regimen-eliminate the
last vestiges of regulations that are inconsistent with the First
Amendment.
Arguably, under such a licensing scheme, a licensee of cable
systems (the viewer) could agree under the subscriber license not
to view the local broadcasters for which Congress provided cable
bandwidth, thereby negating the must-carry provisions by private
agreement.3 29 This model of private ordering does break down
327 Id. at Nature of a Commercial Statute.
328 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974).
329 See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); Turner II, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369, 388 (1997).
This approach leaves the local network operators out of the analysis. Courts would have a
difficult time upholding the regulation, however, if the license agreement precluded the
subscribers from viewing the stations even if available. If Congress required broadcast of a
program that could not be watched by the licensee, then it would hardly meet the interme-
diate level of scrutiny. In addition, section 2B-104(6) excludes coverage of cable broad-
casts. The Reporter's notes suggest that this is a transitional exclusion.
Broadcast, Movies and Cable. Subsections (6) and (8) excludes traditional licens-
ing in the motion picture, broadcast and cable industries. The exclusion re-
flects various considerations, including both the existence of a regulatory
overlay (cable and broadcast) and the different nature of liability and other
concerns involved. The exclusion is limited to traditional activities and, as with
reference to financial systems, is not an exclusion of the industry. As compa-
nies move into on-line systems, software, multi-media and similar licensing, Ar-
ticle 2B applies.
U.C.C. § 2B-104 at Reporter's Notes (7).
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somewhat, however, since the First Amendment is interpreted to
provide protections for the speaker and does not generally protect
the interests of the audience member.33 ° If this form of height-
ened non-interventionism is not the type of First Amendment pro-
tection identified by the drafters of Article 2B, then despite the
acknowledgment of the need for deference to First Amendment
ideals and the similar balancing provisions contained in the Copy-
right Act, few of the provisions contained in Article 2B are
designed to address these concerns.
By creating a new transactional approach to intellectual prop-
erty regulation, Article 2B introduces unnecessary variables that
add to the unpredictability of transactions in intellectual property.
Among these is that the licensing paradigm of Article 2B is inap-
propriate and that the reliance on state law will lead to inconsisten-
cies with federal law, and invariably will develop differences among
the states.331
1. Improper Application of the License Paradigm
Given the difficulty in developing true uniformity among the
fifty states, the choice to forgo an existing federal regulatory struc-
ture would seem counter-intuitive. Goals of predictability and uni-
formity should be easier to achieve under a single statutory
framework than under a state-by-state framework. The drafters of
Article 2B readily acknowledged the role of copyright in the licens-
ing of computer software and information content. "In areas cov-
ered by Article 2B, copyright law is a dominant (but not sole)
source of intellectual property rights. Copyright law gives the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to make copies of its work, to distribute
copies, to make derivative works, to publicly display or perform the
work, and other rights."33 2 Copyright, however, is fundamentally
different from the structure proposed by Article 2B. The exclusive
rights of copyright are limited by sections 107 through 121 of the
Copyright Act, limiting the broad monopoly power of the copy-
330 This may not eliminate the rights of the local broadcasters to have their signals re-
transmitted, but it might render any action moot. See Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d at 388. The
broadcasters could not, however, claim to protect the rights of the audience. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321(1988) ("The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect.' Because the display clause regulates speech due to its potential primary
impact, we conclude it must be considered content-based."). See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. 2329, 2342-43 (1997).
331 Additional concerns also exist. Among those are the definitional problems inherent
in the scope of Article 2B and its creation of a new category of transaction for "mass-
market" licenses. Both these discussions are beyond the coverage of this Article.
332 U.C.C. art. 2B at Transactional Context.
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right holder.3 3 Article 2B, then, provides another gap-filling func-
tion. It contractually eliminates the gaps or exclusions created by
the Copyright Act. The explanation of the difference between a
sale and the licensing protocol advocated under Article 2B serves
as a productive example. "A sale relinquishes some rights with re-
spect to the copy. A license tailors what rights are granted."3 4 This
simple phrase captures the essence of the Article 2B architecture
and emphasizes the flaws of that approach as it effects the growth
of the information age. Recast, the sentence explains that the
"seller relinquishes some rights with respect to the copy of the
work sold that the seller would rather keep." By recasting the
transaction as a license, however, "the licensor is under no statu-
tory mandate to grant any rights not explicitly included in the
agreement. ' 335 The introductory provisions to Article 2B provide
examples of the distinction the proposal would like to develop.
The explanation given by Article 2B details the intended goal of
the licensing scheme and highlights its fundamental flaws.
In both [sale and license] formats, the information product
eventually reaches an end user. If it does so in an ordinary
chain complying with the distribution license, the end user is in
rightful possession of a copy. If the authorized distribution in-
volved sales of copies, no more is required to give the end user
the very limited rights of the owner of a copy spelled out in
copyright law (e.g., to transfer it, make a back-up if it is software,
make some changes essential to use if it is software). If, how-
ever, the copyright owner elected a licensing framework, the
end user's right to "use" (e.g., copy) the software depends on
the end user license. 6
As this article has already detailed, Congress has been inclined
to promote the interests of copyright holders over those of the gen-
eral public in developing its balance between the monopoly
granted and the limits placed in the law for the public good.
Nonetheless, both Congress and the courts have repeatedly
333 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-121 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
334 U.C.C. art. 2B at Transactional Context.
335 A license is
a contract that authorizes access to or use of information or informational
rights and expressly limits the contractual rights or permissions granted, ex-
pressly prohibits, limits, or controls uses, or expressly grants less than all infor-
mational rights in the information. A contract may be a license whether the
information or informational rights exist at the time of contract or are to be
developed, created, or compiled thereafter, and whether or not the contract
transfers title to a copy.
U.C.C. § 2B-102(a) (28).
336 1&
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stressed the importance of the exceptions to the exclusive rights
granted copyright holders.31 7 If the copyright holder can elect to
opt out of the copyright system by declaring the transaction a li-
cense, then the terms provided by the copyright holder govern
rather than the terms defined under the Copyright Act. The care-
fully crafted exclusions become meaningless for a wide arrange of
transactions.
The Federal Trade Commission, though arguably favorable to
the codification project, expressed a number of concerns regard-
ing the draft.3 '
The staff [of the Federal Trade Commission] is concerned that
Article 2B, as currently drafted, is inconsistent with existing in-
tellectual property and antitrust laws and policies. Some provi-
sions in Article 2B implicitly endorse a contracting/licensing
structure that allows software and other information to be dis-
tributed with significant restrictions on users' rights to compete.
Those restrictions could be contract/license terms that explic-
itly forbid competition with the seller/licensor of the good or
terms that restrict in some manner "reverse engineering," i.e.
The detailed analysis by one firm of another firm's product in
order to produce a related good. Both types of restrictions could
unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws,
constitute misuse of intellectual property, and/or violate state
trade secret statutes.3 39
The concerns the Federal Trade Commission raised on this
issue stem from the concerns that use of the license will slow com-
petition and increase barriers to entry in what are currently com-
petitive fields. Copyright law excludes ideas, processes, and facts
from statutory protection precisely so that they will be freely dis-
seminated among the public. Patent law allows for the exclusive
ownership of such processes and inventions, but only for a signifi-
337 Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1133
(1998) ("Given the importance of the fair use defense to publishers of scholarly works, as
well as to publishers of periodicals, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to im-
pose an absolute ban on the importation of all such works containing any copying of mate-
rial protected by a United States copyright.").
338 Letter from Representatives of the Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion and of the Policy Planning office of the Federal Trade Commission, to Article 2B
Drafting Committee, Oct. 30, 1998, reprinted in CYBERSPACE LAw., Dec., 1998 ("We support
the efforts of NCCUSL and ALI to draft uniform rules for the enforceability of contracts
related to sales of software and on-line access.") [hereinafter Letter to 2B Drafting
Committee].
339 Id The FTC expanded on the concern in a footnote: "The risk that restrictions on
reverse engineering will damage competition is heightened in information industries, be-
cause interoperability is often fundamental to both the incentive and ability of firms in
those industries to compete." Id.
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candy shorter period of time, and only with a heightened showing
of novelty. 4' If the work seeking patent protection is not suffi-
ciently novel, it is not deserving of the monopoly the federal law
affords. The patent application requires full public disclosure so
that the public can get immediate benefit from any ideas which will
not be subject to patent protection and eventual benefit of those
ideas which are deserving of the patent. 4 ' A broadly enforced pri-
vate license reverses this paradigm and provides essentially perpet-
ual grants of ownership to the licensor. The result is to add
barriers and expense to competition, slow the growth of technol-
ogy, and raise the costs to consumers.
The licensing paradigm has also come under attack as being a
misapplication of prior doctrine.342 Many of the arguments against
the enforceability of the licensing regime rest on the absence of
bargaining between the licensor (the software manufacturer) and
the purchaser (a consumer). Essentially, this complaint stems
from the concern that the licenses are euphemisms for contracts of
adhesion.
Contracts of adhesion-those drafted entirely by one party and
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-deserve separate treatment.
If one party cannot bargain over contract terms, adhesion con-
tracts will likely standardize around terms favorable to the draft-
ing party. Indeed, since the only means of "bargaining" available
to non-drafting parties is the threat to go to a competitor offer-
ing better terms, drafting parties may have a strong incentive to
standardize their terms to squelch competition. Rob Merges has
referred to such uniform, cartel-like terms within an industry as
"private legislation."343
This practical complaint of the licensing structure identifies
that a standardized, non-negotiated license agreement will become
the private law governing all software transactions. With Microsoft
controlling ninety-five percent of all new operating systems for
computer software, 44 it already has the leverage to create such a
standard.
340 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994).
341 See id. § 112.
342 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 284, at 529; Lemley, supra note 282, at 1277-79; David
Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30
JURIMETPICSJ. 157, 175-76 (1990).
343 Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL.
L. REv. 479, 588-89 (1998) (quoting Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Be-
yond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 107, 118-22 (1995)). The theme of cartel
behavior and oligopoly policies reemerges in every component of intellectual property
regulation.
344 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998).
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Beyond concerns that the so-called license agreements are ac-
tually contracts of adhesion, other distinctions exist between the
software licensing model and traditional leasing arrangements of
property.345 Under the traditional lease, the lessee makes periodic
payments, both parties have ongoing obligations to continue to
perform throughout the term, and the lessor who retained title
throughout the term of the lease repossesses the property upon
the expiration of the lease. 346 The paradigm of the software "li-
cense" actually amounts to an outright sale of less than all the
property. At the consumer level, it is typically a single fee for an
unlimited use of a copy of the protected work. The limits of the
license generally prohibit activities that are already limited under
the exclusive rights of copyright. A purchaser of software cannot
create multiple copies of the software, nor can she rewrite the
software and sell the new product because that would be a deriva-
tive work. The agreement has no limits on duration, geographic
use or non-interference with the ongoing obligations of the lessor/
seller. This is a fundamentally different transaction than the copy-
right license referred to by the drafters of Article 2B, where "an
[sic] contract is a license if it grants greater privileges than in a first
sale, restricts what use privileges might otherwise apply, or deals
with issues that are not explicit results of a first sale. Whether
terms are enforceable is determined under this Article and other-
wise applicable federal and state law."3 47 Under this definition, a
license is every relationship other than a warranty-free, "as is" trans-
action, such as a used book sale.348
This use of a licensing rubric is fundamentally different than
that which has gone on in intellectual property transactions before.
Under a traditional copyright licensing scheme, the license pro-
vides for limited grants of the exclusive rights under copyright.
The grant of rights was closely analogous to that of agency princi-
ples. The licensee is an agent in a particular market or medium for
the copyright holder which retains the bundle of exclusive rights.
Film distributors would license territories throughout the world by
which a local distributor would have exclusive rights within that
jurisdiction to act as the copyright holder. That license would have
345 See David Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product: U.CC. Article 2B, 22 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 621, 644-45 (1997).
346 See Karjala, supra note 284, at 529.
347 U.C.C. § 2B-102 Reporter's Notes (Discussion Draft of August 1, 1998).
348 Note that there is one limitation. " ' License' includes an access contract and, for
purposes of [the U.C.C.], a consignment of a copy, but does not include a reservation or
creation of a financier's interest." U.C.C. § 2B-102. A financier has an interest that must
not be as great as the other parties at the bargaining table.
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further limitations, providing, for example, that the licensee could
not alter the picture except to the extent necessary to comply with
local censorship laws. The licensing of film prints to exhibitors was
a traditional, personal property lease. The distributor loaned the
print to the exhibitor for the length of the run in exchange for
weekly payments. At the end of the run, the distributor would re-
claim the print and ship it to another exhibitor. The lease of the
print was distinct from the rights to public performance or display
purchased by the exhibitor. The public performance rights were
not affected even if the leased copy of the film was destroyed. A
license to the end-user of a commercially available software prod-
uct has none of these characteristics.
The license rubric proposed by Article 2B may be limited by its
terms to the computer industries, but the potential for extending
the licensing regime in the manner provided for under Article 2B,
whether directly or by court analogy, would be quite likely.349 The
Supreme Court decision in Sony allowing home videotaping of tele-
vision could be reversed, at least for all cable broadcasters. Media
producers (including the original plaintiffs in Sony) could require
cable system operators to impose a license on cable subscribers
that prohibited the right to time-shift as allowed by the Supreme
Court. Using the entrance ticket as an acceptable license agree-
ment,350 all attendees at sporting events could be required to treat
the scores and dispositions of the game as proprietary information
until at least fifteen minutes following the end of the sporting
event, effectively reversing the decision in National Basketball Associ-
ation v. Motorola, Inc. All free passes would, of course, need the
same restriction. Indeed, even political events could place this re-
striction on entrance and use it to require permission before any
349 The distinction is not clearly drawn from the drafting, nor can it be made more
distinct, because the underlying impetus for creating new legislation comes from the
growth and convergence of information technologies. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-103, 104. The Re-
porter's comments are illustrative.
Broadcast, Movies and Cable. Subsections (6) and (8) [of 2B-104] excludes tradi-
tional licensing in the motion picture, broadcast and cable industries.... The
exclusion is limited to traditional activities and, as with reference to financial
systems, is not an exclusion of the industry. As companies move into on-line
systems, software, multi-media and similar licensing, Article 2B applies.
Id. Reporter's Notes. See also Scope of UCC Reforms Trimmed While FFC Proposes Further Adjust-
ments, 57 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYMGHTJ. (BNA) 78 (Nov. 26, 1998).
350 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
[C] onsider the purchase of an airline ticket. The traveler calls the carrier or an
agent, is quoted a price, reserves a seat, pays, and gets a ticket, in that order.
The ticket contains elaborate terms, which the traveler can reject by canceling
the reservation. To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even terms that in
retrospect are disadvantageous.
Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)).
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press coverage of the event was allowed. 51 Under the licensing
regime, no First Amendment restrictions are implicated; private
parties have freely ordered access to information.
Because this result is not merely apocryphal, careful scrutiny
should be given to any regulations codifying the proposition that
mere description of a license paradigm, without more, should be
enforced as a license rather than as a sale. Whether or not current
federal and constitutional law allows for the choice to be made is
ultimately not the issue. The broader concern is whether Con-
gress, the courts, and the states recognize the dangers of where the
licensing paradigm may lead.
2. Preemption & Confusion between State & Federal Law
Article 2B does attempt to show that it cannot entirely replace
federal law through its private ordering of the parties. Section
105 (a) provides that any provision "preempted by federal law is un-
enforceable to the extent of such preemption." 52 The Reporter's
notes try to explain why Article 2B restates this federal preemption
doctrine.
Subsection (a) states a rule that applies to all state law. If fed-
eral law invalidates a state contract law or contract term in a
particular setting, federal law rule controls. Subsection (a) re-
fers to preemptive federal rules, but other doctrines grounded
in First Amendment, copyright misuse and other federal law
may limit enforcement of some contract terms in some cases....
State laws, including the UCC, cannot alter or create federal
law.3
The Reporter's Notes expand on this notion that Article 2B is
a complement to the federal laws, and that the Copyright Act
preempts state laws to the extent the state laws create rights
equivalent to copyright.354
There are many sources of federal preemption. Some stem
from intellectual property law. Section 301 of the Copyright Act
351 Cf id. ("Just so with a ticket to a concert. The back of the ticket states that the patron
promises not to record the concert; to attend is to agree. A theater that detects a violation
will confiscate the tape and escort the violator to the exit."). Here, Judge Easterbrook
confuses a true license agreement with a notice provision on the ticket not to interfere with
the exclusive rights of the copyright holder.
352 U.C.C. § 2B-105(a). To provide some meaning to the otherwise superfluous provi-
sion, the last phrase of the section, "to the extent of such preemption," may be read as a
savings clause intended to apply Article 2B to the greatest extent possible and as limiting
the preemption as narrowly as a court can construe it.
353 Id. at Reporter's Notes.
354 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
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preempts any state law that creates rights equivalent to copy-
right. That rule will seldom apply to contracts since a contract
deals with the relationship between parties to an agreement,
while property law in the Copyright Act deals with interests good
against persons with whom the property owner has not dealt.3 55
The analysis supplied by the Reporter draws heavily on Judge
Easterbrook's ProCD opinion.35 6 The parties to the agreement
have privately arranged a license whereby certain uses of the prod-
uct can be made. An educational, interactive CD-Rom covering
material such as American history may contain textual material,
notes, questions, sound clips and short video animation and will
serve as a good example of the Article 2B licensing rubric. The
student licensing the CD-Rom can read or play the content, but
despite the first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act, the student can-
not transfer the CD-Rom or any of its content at the end of the
semester.357 Even modest portions of the CD-Rom cannot be cop-
ied for purposes of comment or criticism, 3 58 and the ideas and
facts it contains cannot be transferred.359 The license agreement
could be drafted to re-incorporate these exceptions to the Copy-
right Act, but without such a broadening of the license, the student
licensee would violate the terms of the agreement by writing "book
reports"36 ° or by discussing the facts described in the materials in
class. If the license expanded the uses, for example, to "educa-
tional purposes only,"361 the proposed narrow reading of the li-
cense under Article 2B would result in a breach of the agreement if
the student who learned her American history from that CD-Rom
went on to incorporate the facts into a short story, poem, or song
lyric that eventually resulted in commercial sale. A student who
later commercially published her doctoral thesis would be liable
for breach of the CD-Rom license.
Proponents of Article 2B characterize such examples as scare
tactics intended to frighten legislators and the public. No licensors
would create such an anomalous and ridiculous situation. None-
theless, examples abound. On the 1998 Homewood Alumni Direc-
tory for Johns Hopkins University,36 2 the following license appears
on the back of the CD-Rom case.
355 U.C.C. § 2B-105(a) at Reporter's Notes.
356 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449; supra Part II.C.2.
357 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (first sale doctrine).
358 See id § 107 (fair use doctrine).
359 See id. § 102 (scope of copyright); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455-56.
360 This is a term that may become idiomatic of a bygone age.
361 The limitation posted on Westlaw resources, for example.
362 © 1998 Johns Hopkins University. All rights reserved.
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All information,contained herein remains the property ofJohns
Hopkins University and may not be reproduced in whole or in
part by any person or entity without the written permission of
Johns Hopkins University. Johns Hopkins University Alumni Di-
rectory is published for use by Johns Hopkins University and its
alumni only. Use of this directory for any other purpose-in-
cluding, but not limited to, unauthorized reproduction or elec-
tronic storage, or unauthorized use of addresses and names
contained within-is prohibited and is in direct violation of
copyright .... Johns Hopkins University and Publishing Con-
cepts, LLC disclaim all liability and responsibility for the accu-
racy of this information.3 63
This example of a license provision (from a highly esteemed
institution) illustrates the fundamental problems of a privately or-
dered regulatory system in an age of rapid change and highly com-
plex issues. While common sense might suggest that the provision
is intended to stop the type of abuse promulgated by the defendant
in ProCD, this license does not differentiate between copying a few
names to update a Rolodex and posting the entire CD-Rom to the
Internet. Both acts are banned without prior written consent. The
statement that only Johns Hopkins University and its alumni can
use the CD-Rom suggests that these are the only classes of individu-
als who can make the written request to the school for use of the
data contained in the CD-Rom. Finally, the statement that use of
the data is "in direct violation of copyright" seems to indicate lack
of understanding of both Feist and ProCD. ProCD would suggest
that use of the CD-Rom in violation of the license was a breach of
contract. Both opinions would maintain the premise that the data
contained on the CD-Rom is probably not sufficiently original to
be protected under copyright.364
The proposed neutral stance of Article 2B on preemption is
inappropriate from the perspective of the U.C.C. as a planning de-
vice and inconsistent with the goals of promoting the information
industry as a whole. Instead, the purported neutrality will favor the
existing industry players who need not avail themselves of the de-
velopment made possible by the fair use doctrine and the ability to
use reverse engineering techniques. "The [Federal Trade Commis-
sion] staff notes that it might be impossible for Article 2B to assert
363 Id.
364 The author of this Article is not an alumnus ofJohns Hopkins University and there-
fore has no rights to play the CD and discover its contents. Nonetheless, the author may
have community property rights in the CD to the extent it was purchased by the author's
spouse with community property assets.
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a "neutral" position on competition policy, and believes that the
draft could be substantially improved by affirmatively reconciling it
with federal antitrust and intellectual property laws."36 5 To the ex-
tent that antitrust and intellectual property laws balance the inter-
ests of the property owners with that of the public, including
current and future competitors, any system that eliminates this bal-
ancing will reduce competition. An analysis of the specific provi-
sions of Article 2B is beyond the scope of this article. 366
Nonetheless, an analysis of the project's objectives is appropriate.
If the true goals of Article 2B are greater uniformity and predict-
ability, an amendment to the U.C.C. may not be the correct solu-
tion. To begin with, the Reporter acknowledges that the task is
extremely difficult.
"The principal objects of draftsmen of general commercial legis-
lation.., are to be accurate and not to be original. Their inten-
tion is to assure that if a given transaction ... is initiated, it shall
have a specified result; they attempt to state as a matter of law
the conclusion which the business community apart from statute
... gives to the transaction in any case. But achievement of those
modest goals is a task of considerable difficulty."3 67
The difficulties in effectively crafting Article 2B to meet the
goals of uniformity and predictability may be insurmountable.
First, the preemption of many of its provisions creates "traps for
the unwary" who draft agreements relying on the language of Arti-
cle 2B without an understanding of the necessary limitations of the
Copyright Act and other federal legislation. Second, as described
above, Article 2B adds a layer of complexity to commercial transac-
tions and attempts to invent a new licensing paradigm that has not
been widely accepted by the courts or the public.368 Despite the
365 Letter to 2B Drafting Committee, supra note 338.
366 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information
Age: Forward to a Symposium, 87 CAL. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Con-
tract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FoRtD.am L. REv. 1025 (1998); Fred Miller, Realism
Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 707
(1998); Rice, supra note 345, at 621.
367 U.C.C. art. 2B at Default Rules (Discussion Draft of August 1, 1998) (quoting Grant
Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341 (1957)).
368 See Karjala, supra note 284, at 529; Rice, supra note 342, at 175-76. Both arguments
rest on the absence of bargaining and the distinctions between traditional leasing arrange-
ments of property-periodic payments, ongoing obligations of both parties to continue to
perform throughout the term, and return of the property upon the expiration of the
lease-with the paradigm of the software "license" which actually amounts to an outright
sale of less than all the property. This license paradigm works for limited grants of the
exclusive rights under copyright because it amounts to an extension of agency principles.
A licensee is an agent in a market or medium for the copyright holder and the ultimate
exclusive rights remain with the licensor. An end-user of a commercially available software
product has none of these characteristics of the property lessee or the copyright holder's
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academic criticisms regarding Article 2B, the most significant con-
cerns regarding the draft's ability to meet its goals come from the
draft's own introductory comments.
A default rule that ignores this preemptive provision creates
true traps for the unwary. In Article 2B, state contract law is
made parallel to such specific preemptive rules, although in sev-
eral situations, provisions push against explicit federal rules in-
sofar as reasonably possible. This interaction of state law and
specific federal yields (sic) default rules that, in some cases, do
not correspond to the treatment of analogous issues in other
parts of the UCC. These provisions reflect a policy of correspon-
dence of rules in addition to simple recognition that federal law
preempts contrary state law.369
This statement suggests that the goals of predictability and
consistency identified by Professor Gilmore will not be achieved by
adoption of Article 2B. The proposal introduces new layers of con-
fusion into the regulatory mix; it adds a claim of preemption to
every state law action thereby blurring the role of federal and state
jurisdiction; it provides different default provisions than does
U.C.C. Article 2 (sale of goods), thereby adding a second trap for
those attorneys who are familiar with goods but not information
goods (assuming that the parties to the contract correctly antici-
pated and documented the provision of the U.C.C. by which their
contract was to be governed); and it attempts to "push against ex-
plicit federal law," thereby creating intentional conflicts between
state and federal regulation for which businesses will risk liability if
they fail to comply with conflict law and high costs (including not
insignificant transaction costs and legal costs) as they try to antici-
pate their statutory and contractual obligations in this highly unset-
tled area of law.
In effect, Article 2B would reduce the public's interest in the
marketplace of ideas by creating a paradigm that might allow con-
tent providers to contractually eliminate fair use and the other pro-
tected limitations of the Copyright Act while at the same time
increasing the uncertainty for transactions governed by the UCC
involving information.
agent. As a result, the license paradigm is an ill-fitting analogy for the software purchaser
and an inappropriate regulatory scheme.
369 U.C.C. art. 2B at Intellectual Property Overlay.
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III. THE EXISTING "INFORMATION" INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE-
SUCCESS WITHOUT PROTECTION
Many of the assumptions driving the growth of intellectual
property protection stem from in assumption that, to better pro-
mote the industry, greater protection of the industry's products are
necessary. Despite suggestions that deregulation and greater mar-
ket-based controls are the more effective manner of promoting an
industry, there has been a systemic movement towards greater in-
tellectual property protection. The DMCA and proposed Article
2B are just two U.S. examples of this trend.
Without addressing the economic model assumptions that un-
derlie either a pro-regulatory posture or a pro-market based regula-
tory system, this Part attempts briefly to summarize the current
information industry and show, by example, why additional protec-
tion is irrelevant at best and may be harmful if extended as far as
currently contemplated.
The study of information-property economics is made difficult
by the rate of expansion and change in the converging industries.
The NII Report states that "U.S. copyright industries are significant
contributors to the United States' current trade accounts, reducing
our balance of payments deficit by some $45.8 billion in 1993.37
°
Cybernation, a joint report by the American Electronics Association
("AEA") and NASDAQ is more explicit. "America's electronics
and information technology industry is driving national economic
growth... and is fundamentally changing the way Americans live
and work." '71
The definition of high-technology remains somewhat vague,
leading to an imprecise amalgam of data from one source to an-
other. The AEA used the Standard Industrial Classification system
of the Office of Management and Budget to define the list of high-
technology components.3 72 Cybernation grouped forty-five classifi-
cation codes into three categories: "high-tech manufacturing, com-
munications services, and software and computer-related
services. '' 7' These categories include both computer hardware
and software, for example, but exclude other entertainment and
370 NII Report, supra note 13, at 131.
371 AMERICAN ELECrRONICS ASSOCIATION AND NASDAQ CYBERNATION 9 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter CYBERNATION].
372 See id. at 128. The Standard Industrial Classification ("SIC") code system is used as a
method of extracting Office of Management and Budget data, but these codes are not
categorized by specific technologies. Aircraft and automobile manufacturing, for example,
are dependent on high-technology, are not considered "core" to the industry, and are not
included by the AEA. See id
373 Id. at 128.
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digital information sold or licensed through the Internet or CD-
Rom.
374
The range of industries suddenly covered by esoteric changes
in copyright law and licensing protocols foreshadows the true com-
ing of the information age. The analysis below illustrates some of
the more pronounced short-term effects of the information age,
but only hints at its true scope. Over the next decade or two, the
growth of both computing and content will be exponential.
Moore's Law states that the capacity of a computer chip doubles
every eighteen months.375 Further, according to Bill Gates,
"Moore's Law is likely to hold for another twenty years. If it does, a
computation that now takes a day will be more than 10,000 times
faster and thus take fewer than ten seconds."376 What such expan-
sion will mean in terms of commerce, communications, entertain-
ment, and education is truly unimaginable. Small examples
abound. In 1998, the United States reached the point where over
half the households owned a personal computer, up from twenty-
seven percent in 1995.177 Commercial transactions using either
checks or cash comprised only 75% of all transactions in the
United States in 1996, a 5% drop from the previous year.378 The
percentage is expected to drop to below 46% within a decade. 9
The ubiquitous role of the computer and the slow demise of the
cash economy will usher in changes to many societal exchanges
and social activities. 380
Society may be so profoundly changed that the suggestions in
articles such as this will serve as no more than historical curiosities.
On the other hand, the changes may be only in form, such that the
substance of the issues will remain constant: When does legal pro-
tection begin for an item of commercially marketable informa-
tion;"' how far does it extend;38 2 and what can a party other than
374 See id. at 128-29. The SIC code system is being replaced by the North American
Industrial Classification System ("NAICS") to meet the requirements of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Association ("NAFTA"). "The NAICS also will include a new "information"
sector that will cover the software publishing industry and online services. . . ." Id. at 129.
375 BiLL GATES, THE RoAD AHEAD 34 (2d ed. 1996). Gordon Moore first made the state-
ment in 1965. Moore went on to co-found Intel with Bob Noyce. See id.
376 Id. at 36,
377 See PC Ownership Reaches Half of U.S. Homes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at C3.
378 See Patricia Lamiell, Electronic Commerce Increasingly Zaps Cash from Consumers' Wallets,
O.C. REG., July 13, 1998, at Bus. 4 (citing The Nilson Report).
379 See id,
380 This Article cannot begin to speculate what form those changes will take, but un-
doubtedly, a profound impact will be felt.
381 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
382 See, e.g., id. § 106.
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the "owner" do without the owner's permission?. 3 Ironically,
although not all these issues are directly covered in modem copy-
right codes across the globe, they were all covered by the Statute of
Anne, and they are still being addressed by much of the recent or
proposed legislation governing intellectual property. The conver-
gence of high-technology and telecommunications is a matter of
technical innovation, but the public response depends on the qual-
ity and affordability of the services offered, not the mere existence
of technological innovation.8 4 The convergence of news and en-
tertainment-and arguably education-into the same high-tech-
nology/telecommunications industry may profoundly alter the
shape of society in the twenty-first century. The regulatory struc-
ture discussed in Part II must be designed not only to anticipate
the technological changes, but to craft the regulations in a manner
which best serves the societal goals embodied in the First Amend-
ment and Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
A. Computer Software & Hardware Industries
The computer software industry has led the digital revolution
and shepherded in the information age. The modern age of com-
puting can be traced to either 1972 with Intel's release of the 8008
microprocessor 315 or to 1981 with the marketing of the IBM-XT
personal computer. 86 Since that time, the growth of the computer
industry has outpaced all other business expenses and
economies.38 7
Computer hardware and software have led the growth of the
information age. The impact of annual hardware sales totaling
hundreds of billions of dollars has transformed the United States
economy. In 1998, the gross domestic product attributable to com-
puting and communications rose to 8.2 percent of the total U.S.
economy.38 8
[T]he United States [information technology] industry is the
key to this nation's technological leadership and a primary en-
gine for national economic growth, with the production of com-
puters and semiconductors accounting for 45% of U.S.
383 See, e.g., id. §§ 107-121 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
384 Compare, for example, the growth of the Internet with the growth of high definition
television.
385 See GATES, supra note 375, at 13.
386 See id. at 53.
387 See John P. Freeman, A Business Lawyer Looks at the Internet, 49 S.C. L. REv. 903-05
(1998).
388 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 4 (Apr. 1998),
available at <http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm> [hereinafter DIGITAL ECONOMY].
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industrial growth in the past five years. The technology compo-
nent of America's GNP currently exceeds 10%, and is expected
to reach 15-20% by the year 2000. Information technology will
soon become America's largest industry, and the one where it
leads the rest of the world by the greatest margin. 389
Computer usage is omnipresent and growing. In 1996, sales of
software reached $102.8 billion.3 10 "Revenues for the broader U.S.
[information technology] industry exceeded $747 billion and have
grown at over 7% per year since 1986. That level of growth is ex-
pected to continue for the foreseeable future, with revenues reach-
ing $1.572 trillion in the year 2007.""' 1
In 1996, the United States had 403 computers for every 1000
people.392 Although the United States led the world in computer
access, China, Russia, Brazil, and Indonesia evidenced the greatest
computer increases from 1991 to 1996.393 By the year 2000, the
United States will have 161 million computers in use and the Euro-
pean Union will be second with 132 million.394 As a result, com-
merce in intellectual property will become part of the common
daily rituals of organized society.
Job growth reflects the success of the computer industry. By
1996 computer software had become the third largest segment of
the U.S. economy, behind only the automotive industry and elec-
tronic manufacturing.395 Software's leading position in the econ-
omy came as the result of fourteen percent job growth during the
1995-96 period, a rate approximately 2.6 times that of the national
economy.396 The trend is expected to continue. According to the
National Software Alliance, "[c]omputer software occupations are
projected to grow five times faster than the economy as a whole
between 1996 and 2006 ....
Based on the industry reports, the largest job and industrial
389 Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunica-
tions, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Commerce Comm., 1 0 5 th Cong. (1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 296458 (Federal Document Clearing House) (statement of Chris Byrne,
Silicon Graphics, Inc, on behalf of the Information Technology Industry Council NTM).
390 See Ronald Rosenberg, Software fastest growing industry, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1997,
at D2.
391 Id.
392 See CYBERNATION, supra note 371, at 105.
393 See id. at 104. For the period of 1991-96, China had a growth of 528%, Russia in-
creased 460%, Brazil increased 408%, and India increased 393%. See id.
394 See id.
395 Rosenberg, supra note 390.
396 See id
397 One Million New Positions Seen by 2006-Software Sets Pace for Future Job Growth, ELEC-
TRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998, at 1-2. The numbers are staggering. The Business
Software Alliance reports that by 1996, there were 619,438 jobs in the software industry
with an annual growth of approximately 45,700 additional positions. See PRICE-
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growth will come from the software industry over the next decade,
dwarfing other aspects of the information and media arenas and
setting an economic agenda for the global economy. "Few sectors
of the global economy can expect to exceed the performance of
the software industry. The software industry is the heart of the 'In-
formation Society'-that culmination of information technology
and communications developments now heralding a new industrial
revolution."398 "According to the American Electronics Associa-
tion, jobs in the total IT [information technology] industry in-
creased 7.5% between 1990 and 1996. Whereas, there was a 57%
increase in new jobs in the software and software-related services
segments." '  To the extent that regulation of software will have an
impact on the growth rates for the products, any changes made will
directly affect the largest growing segment of employment in the
United States and have the potential to expand the economy or
disrupt its growth.
B. Internet & the Online Economy
As impressive as is the growth in high-technology hardware
and software, both are quickly being outpaced by the growing im-
pact of the Internet. The Internet has served as gasoline on an
information fire that had been threatening to burn out of control.
The expansion of the Internet has had an unparalleled growth and
economic impact. "Radio was in existence 38 years before 50 mil-
lion people tuned in; TV took 13 years to reach that benchmark.
Sixteen years after the first PC kit came out, 50 million people were
using one. Once it was opened to the general public, the Internet
crossed that line in four years."4 0 The overwhelming success of
the Internet has led to both economic and social consequences.
Electronic commerce revenue reached $8 billion in 1997 and is
projected to have increased to $18 billion in 1998, with projections
reaching $108 billion by 2003.401 An estimated 100 million sub-
scribers now use the service.40 2
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 4 (Oct. 1998), available at <http://www.bsa.org>.
398 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 397, at 4.
599 NATIONAL SoFTWARE ALLIANCE, SoFTwARE WORKERS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS HANGS IN THE BALANCE V (1998).
400 DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 388, at 4 (citing MEEKER, MARY AND PEARSON, SHARON,
MORGAN STANLEY U.S. INVESTMENT RESEARCH: INTERNET RETAIL 2-6 (May 28, 1997). See also
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, THE INTERNET PHENOMENON, available at <http://
www.cise.nsf.gov/general/compsci/net/cerf.html>.
401 See Lorrie Grant, Net Retailers Face Momentum Swing, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 1999, at B2
(citing research by Forrester Research).
402 See DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 388, at 4.
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To reposition themselves in the changing media marketplace,
traditional television networks are expanding into areas such as
cable and online services to offset the decline in broadcast viewer-
ship.40 3 NBC and its parent company, General Electric Co., for ex-
ample, have been integrating the television network into an
Internet media outlet, illustrating a new transition in the entertain-
ment industry. Networks are beginning to reposition themselves as
content providers for various media. Broadcast television is one of
many outlets, but no longer the most profitable one.
NBC President and CEO Bob Wright is not just waiting for the
next hit series to reverse what he concedes has been a swifter
and deeper than expected decline in his network's prime-time
fortunes. He is leveraging NBC's fledgling cable and Internet
pursuits to help offset a network-induced $100 million shortfall.
NBC executives are working overtime on several major deals
that will tap the company's $9 billion cable and Internet portfo-
lio and will go a long way in determining NBC's future far be-
yond the scope of broadcast network television.4 °4
NBC, the leading television network has moved aggressively
into both cable broadcasting (where it is the third largest cable
supplier with programming such as CNBC and MSNBC) and into
the Internet with its acquisition of Snap! and ownership in C-
NET, Intertainer, and iVillage.4 °5 The ownership and expansion
plans illustrate the need for traditional media to diversify among
the media and to leverage the value of the television brand into the
other markets. NBC is not alone. ABC/Disney has followed the,
same path as have Fox/News Corp. and CBS, which is in a joint
venture with AOL.4 ° 6
The transformation taking place at the television networks is
one example of the changes that will re-order the news and en-
tertainment structure. The broadcast-dominated media structure
that has been in place for the last half century is coming to an end.
Within a year, the television viewership of the traditional top three
networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) will be below that of cable broad-
casting, which may also become the more profitable medium even
for the top broadcast networks.40 7 Notedjournalist Robert Samuel-
403 See Richard Katz, Peacock Snaps! up C/NET Internet Stake, DAILY VARIETY, at 8, June 10,
1998.
404 Diane Mermigas, The Web Looms Large In Wright NBC Plan, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Jan.
25, 1999, at IA.
405 See id.
406 See Michael Krantz, Star Wars; The Gravitational Pull of a Handful of Big Web "Portals" is
Reshaping Cyberspace, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 46.
407 See Mermigas, supra note 404.
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son articulated some of the reactions to these changes by profes-
sional journalists:
Until now I doubted that the new media much menaced
the old. Cable, computers and fiber optics delivered specialized
information - on everything from stocks to diseases - that
wouldn't displace general news and entertainment. Perhaps.
But two events have shaken my confidence. The first is a survey
from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
showing big changes in our media habits. Most startling is the
eclipse of the TV networks' nightly news programs. In 1993, 60
percent of Americans over 18 "regularly" watched; by 1998 this
was 38 percent. Some of the loss reflected less interest in news,
but much of it stemmed from more viewing-during the day-
of cable news. Similarly, Internet use has soared. In 1995, 4 per-
cent of adults went online to get news once a week; now that's
20 percent.
My second jarring event was a chat with my brother Rich-
ard. He runs a small inn in Cape May, N.J. In the past year, he
started advertising with his own Web site. He's never seen any-
thing like it; almost a fifth of his customers found the inn on-
line. No magazine or newspaper ad ever showed remotely
similar results.408
The response of Samuelson-a combination of fear and awe-
captures the essence of the new technologies and the impact of
convergence. Implicit in the statement, of course, is a reaction that
assumes the current status quo. Television itself has been the tradi-
tional source of American society's news and information for only
the last half century. In a prior era of technological transforma-
tion, television usurped this role from the daily newspaper.4 "9
The lessons of the newspaper industry and their decline due
to television are not lost on the television producers today. As a
result, every content supplier-in every media-wants to find a way
to participate in the Internet revolution. The motion picture com-
panies and the television networks traditionally have dominated
the creation of media content. They are now coming together and
moving towards the Internet as the platform of the future.
[Disney Chairman Michael] Eisner argued that as the Internet
408 Robert Samuelson, No More Media Elite, WASH. POST, July 8, 1998, at A19.
409 See PHYLLis KANISS, MAKING LocAL NEWS 241 (1991). The impact of the Internet has
reduced both readership and viewership, though not to the same degree. See OliverJones,
Web Hurts Mags Most, Report Sez, DAILY VAIuETY, Feb. 26, 1999, at 72 ("Since fall 1996, maga-
zine readership has dropped 5%, with a 2% dropoff for newspapers and 3% fall in TV
viewership. Radio usage dropped 1%, while primetime TV watching declined only
marginally.").
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matured, Disney's strengths would be more important. "As tech-
nology becomes comfortable, the product takes over," he said,
comparing the Internet now to cable television in its early days.
"At first, the point was to improve the picture on your broadcast
channels. Now it has turned into a product play: How good is
the Disney Channel or the Discovery Channel?
41 °
The actual ownership relationships of the motion picture-
broadcast television-cable-Internet portal alliances are beyond the
scope of this Article or any publication that has more than a daily
turn-around schedule. The transactions are occurring too fast for
anything other than a broadcaster or newspaper to cover. Some
examples, though hopelessly out of date, may still be illustrative of
the industries' restructuring. ABC, through its parent, The Walt
Disney Company,41' has a very large Internet presence, and Disney
has used strategic alliances to build its Internet presence.412 Disney
had been in discussions to purchase Excite, the second search en-
gine and website organization company,413 but chose to restructure
Infoseek, another search engine and portal company in which it
already had invested heavily, creating GO.com as its portal for the
non-youth market. 414 NBC is moving to become the second major
network with an Internet presence by purchasing a five percent
stake in C/Net (an online content provider) and approximately
$11 million for a nineteen percent stake in Snap!, an online search
engine.415
Websites like Yahoo, Excite, Lycos, or Snap! are referred to as
"portals" because they represent the first Internet page a viewer
sees when the viewer connects to the Internet. Market dominance
of the portals will dictate which corporations dominate the In-
ternet consumer content. While the portals give users access to
search engines, and theoretically all information on the Internet,
each portal organizes the material in a manner that emphasizes
410 Glyn Moody, Old Media Gets Cosy with New for Mutual Benefit, COMPUTER WKLY., Feb. 4,
1999, at 38.
411 Disney, Inc.'s purchase of ABC was a significant realignment of the entertainment
industry. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Walt Disney to Acquire ABC in $19 Billion Deal to Build a
Giant for Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995, at Al.
412 See, e.g., Go Network (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.go.com>; infra note 414 and
accompanying text.
413 ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 8, 1998, at 4.
414 Moody, supra note 410, at 38. The Disney/Infoseek portal has been renamed "Go."
Disney owns 43% of Infoseek with options to acquire a majority stake. See Disney and In-
foseek Launch Go Network at www.GO.com (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://info.infoseek.com/
press/golaunchrel.html> (press release).
415 Katz, supra note 403.
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some content over others.4 1 6 Portals may also include advertising
or links to sites controlled by the portal's parent company. The
hierarchy, advertising and structure of the portals may dictate a
consumer's use of the Internet in a manner far more profound
than the placement of a station on the television or radio dial.417
Excite, for example, uses the channel metaphor to organize the
content of its portal.418 It also offers Excite Online, marketing a
service as an ISP through AT&T Worldnet Service.419 The Excite
Online service combines the ISP and portal functions. The portals
may grow to provide a significant economic factor in the new infor-
mation-property economy. The portals are beginning to charge
companies for the listings the portals provide. 420 This will further
segment the portals and lead to a restructuring of the Web. The
portal phenomenon was dramatically illustrated by the initial pub-
lic offering of Broadcast.com on July 17, 1998.421 Offered at $18
per share, the stock reached $68 per share on its opening day and
instantly created a billion-dollar portal company offering audio,
416 See, e.g., <http://www.yahoo.com>; <http://www.excite.com/>; <http://www.lycos.
com/>; <http://www.altavista.digital.com/>; <http://www.go.com/>.
417 Yahoo, for example, has a partnership with AT&T, as well as agreements with
Microsoft, Compaq, Gateway 2000, Ticketmaster, and E-Trade among others. "As a net-
work, its sites are the most common destinations for Web users at work and second only to
AOL in home user visits." Dwayne Fatherree, Tracking Who's Who In Portal Sites Is Getting
Harder, SARASOTA HERALD-TFuB., Jan. 25, 1999, at 16.
418 See http://corp.excite.com/Company/what.html (visited June 15, 1998) (on file
with author) ("Excite Channels delivers information to you the way you're used to getting
it: in topic-based sections like in the newspaper or on TV. Each channel contains similar
features such as topical news, a directory of relevant sites, bulletin boards, chat, and the
ever-present search box. You'll also find features and information unique to each channel
that make it the best resource for its particular subject area. Our channels are produced by
web-savvy people with expertise in their channel's subject area, so you always know you're
getting the best information available on the Web today.").
419 See Excite Online (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://get.excite.com/>. The ISP service of
Excite Online essentially bundles Excite with the pre-existing AT&T Worldnet Service-re-
branding AT&T's package with that of Excite.
420 See The Great Portal Race; Internet Companies Compete for Viewers, FORTUNE SPECIAL, Nov.
16, 1998, at 232 ("Companies that want to be linked to a portal site now pay for the expo-
sure, giving portals a steady stream of revenue independent of banner advertising.").
421 Broadcast.corn describes itself as follows:
Broadcast.com is the leading broadcast network on the Internet. Just like any
other broadcast network, we make a wide variety of programs available to our
audience. Unlike TV networks, we have no limit as to the amount of shows we
can broadcast at one time. We also archive programs and make them available
to you on demand just in case you missed the live broadcast! On broadcast.corn
we offer more than 50,000 hours of programming every week! Our program-
ming choices include live play-by-play broadcasts of more than 350 sports
teams, more than 360 live radio and TV stations, and our AudioBook Channel
and CD Jukebox where you can listen to more than 2100 full length CDs and
over 360 full-length audiobooks. In addition there are hundreds of political,
business and special events every week! All you have to do is pick what you want
and enjoy it.
What is broadcast.com? (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.broadcast.com/faq/
introduction.stm>.
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video channels, and content aggregation.422
This issue is one of the key elements in the Department of
Justice anti-trust action against Microsoft. In its complaint, the De-
partment ofJustice accused Microsoft of entering into anti-compet-
itive agreements with content providers such as Disney and CBS
under which the content providers would get preferential place-
ment on the Windows desktop.4 2 3 The government contended
that Internet content providers agreed to stop promoting Netscape
and browsers competitive with Microsoft's Internet Explorer and
were even obligated to add Internet Explorer features so that Net-
scape and other browser software would not operate as effectively
on those web pages.4 24 The lawsuit illustrates the value assigned to
placement on the computer desktop and access to consumers
when they first connect to the Internet.
The Internet is an instantaneous medium for communicating
information of all types. While news and entertainment industries
are the first beneficiaries of the new medium-and victims to its
competition-other industries are also participating in the growth.
A prime example is the impact the Internet is having on the capital
markets. For example, the online investing company Charles
Schwab & Co. has become the largest company in this very young,
highly competitive market. By 1997, it managed 908,000 on-line
accounts and held $66.6 billion in assets, with almost five million
hits to its Internet site daily.4 25 Schwab leads an industry of signifi-
cant projected growth. In 1998, the total number of investor ac-
counts doubled from the previous year to 7.3 million, representing
at least $420 billion in assets.426 According to a study by Forrester
Research, by 2002 the number of online accounts will grow to 14
422 See Robert Hertzberg, Mistaking the Shadow for the Tree, INTERNET WORLD, July 27,
1998, at 12.
423 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998).
424 Under Microsoft's Internet Explorer 4.0 channel agreements, beginning in
mid-1997, [Internet Content Providers ("ICPs")] who desired "platinum" place-
ment (and even some seeking lower-level placement) were required to agree:
a) not to compensate in any manner the manufacturer of an "Other Browser"
(defined as either of the top two non-Microsoft browsers), including by distrib-
uting its browser, for the distribution, marketing, or promotion of the ICP's
content; (b) not to promote any browser produced by any manufacturer of an
"Other Browser"; (c) not to allow any manufacturer of an "Other Browser" to
promote and highlight the ICP's "channel" content on or for its browsers; and
(d) to design its web sites using Microsoft-specific, proprietary programming
extensions so that those sites look better when viewed with Internet Explorer
than when viewed through a competing browser.
Id.
425 See Carol Power, Schwab's Webmaster Taking on the World; Discount Brokerage Building
Internet Annex for Foreign Customers, THE Am. BANKER, Sept. 19, 1997, at 12.
426 See Neal St. Anthony, Piper Report Shows Rapid Growth in Online Brokerage, STAR TRIB.,
Feb. 12, 1999, at DI.
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million households with almost $700 billion in assets, representing
approximately five percent of the investment industry.4 27 The pro-
jected growth comes in an industry that only began in 1994 when
companies first began to accommodate online trading.428 Online
trading has grown because Internet brokerage websites provide
deep discounts to investors and offer customers greater access to
information regarding the securities traded. Computer software
has automated many of the tasks involved in securities trading, fur-
ther reducing the cost. The Internet has increased the availability
of corporate and financial information, producing a much more
savvy investor who relies on her own research rather than on, or in
addition to, the broker's reports.
Underlying the rapid growth of the online investment industry
is the marketing of significant copyrightable and non-copyright-
able information. Brokerage reports and other analytical docu-
ments are protectable by copyright. Perhaps more importantly,
non-protectable data such as price quotes are highly marketable.
NASDAQ for example, provides market professionals with "real-
time" quotes (less than 15-minute delays for access to the data) for
$20.00 per month.4 29 Nonprofessionals pay $4.00 per month for
the same service.4 30 Together, this service is offered to more than
338,000 computers in 59 countries.4"' For 1997, the revenue gen-
erated from the distribution of this market data to computers as
well as transaction-based fees was $267.8 million.432
The underlying tension in the decisions of Feist and ProCD is
the incalculable value of data sold or licensed without the benefit
of copyright protection.433 The lack of protection by copyright has
not reduced the value of the data, but it has put greater emphasis
on contractual protection as the means to reap economic reward.
The user license, rather than federal law, serves to control public
access to the information. The pricing differentials used by NAS-
DAQ illustrate additional difficulties in regulating the market.
NASDAQ and other content providers set the price based upon the
value to the user, not upon the provider's cost. Nonetheless, de-
427 See David Whitford, Trade Fast, Trade Cheap; Internet brokerages are out to turn America
into a land of traders. But can investors make money that way, even when commissions are as low as
$8? FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 108.
428 See id. at 109.
429 SeeJoel Rothstein Wolfson, Contracts and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to the Meta-
morphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 79, 89 (1999).
430 See id.
431 See id.
432 See NASD ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1997).
433 See also BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436 (llth Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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spite the regulatory confusion and lack of legislative oversight, the
business of the information economy has hardly been stifled.
C. Entertainment & Broadcast
While the Internet has rapidly grown as a new medium for
entertainment content, the content is not limited to any single me-
dium. The motion picture industry has long been considered to
be an engine for growth in intellectual property and the econ-
omy.434 The growth in new digital hardware and new technologi-
cal platforms has allowed for increased expansion of the content
side of the high-technology boom. The annual growth of tradi-
tional entertainment and news industries such as newspapers,
magazines, movies, and advertisements (including computer soft-
ware), ran at a compounded rate of more than 6.2%, as compared
to a 2.4% growth rate for the rest of the economy.435 The com-
bined domestic consumer spending for films at theaters, and on
home video and television totaled $32.3 billion.4 36 This amount
reflected a 29% increase from 1992 to 1996."' 7 During this same
period, the industry payrolls in California increased by 62%, from
$7.4 billion to $12.0 billion.438 The entertainment industry has a
profound economic impact, not only in Hollywood but through-
out California and the other areas where film production takes
place.4 39 The music industry, another significant segment of the
entertainment industry, reports that 1997 sales of recorded music
exceeded $40 billion.44 °
The entertainment industry may be categorized by either the
format in which the content is created or the medium in which it is
made available to the public. The entertainment industries are
comprised of a mix of film, video, cable, television, radio, music,
publishing, theater, and visual arts.441 These industries combine to
434 See Louis FROHLICH & CHARLES SCHWARTZ, THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES AND THE
THEATER 487 (1917) ("In the year 1908, the motion picture business had reached a point
where it was regarded as one of the leading industries of the country.").
435 STEPHEN SIWEK & HAROLD FURCHTGOTr-ROTH, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY. 1977-1990 7 (1992).
436 See DAVID FRIEDMAN, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, STATE OF THE INDUS-




439 See Jon Garon, Star Wars: Film Permitting, Prior Restraint & Government's Role in the
Entertainment Industy, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. LJ. 1, 23-32 (1996).
440 See Rosen Statement, supra note 166.
441 See generally DONALD BIEDERMAN ET. AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1992); PAUL WEILER, ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA, AND THE LAw (1997). The
Court also discussed this issue in Sony.
The two respondents in this action, Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Dis-
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create the content that goes on to the Internet and CD-Roms as
well as into theaters and video rental stores, and on to television.
Many entertainment projects derive from literary works, primarily
novels and short stories.442 The short story is a popular source for
motion pictures and is particularly well suited to adaptation.443
A single short story, for example, may result in a number of
different projects. The story may initially be published in a maga-
zine and later anthologized into a collection. Either of these may
be recorded on audio-tape. While somewhat rare, the story could
be adapted for the stage. The short story (or the play) may be
optioned, adapted as a screenplay, and eventually turned into a
motion picture. As a successful motion picture, there are as many
as six different methods by which it is released to the public. In the
most common order of events, these are: (1) theatrical release in
first run motion picture theaters throughout the world; (2) pay-
per-view, in which the film is shown on home television sets on a
per screening charge to the viewer; (3) home video sale and rental;
(4) premiere cable television which is subscriber funded rather
than advertiser funded; (5) broadcast network television; and (6)
syndicated television which is advertiser supported and may be ac-
cessed either by broadcast or cable. 444 The sale of the short story
to cable generally eliminates steps (1) through (3), above, and the
sale to broadcast television eliminates steps (1) through (4),
although video sales are growing as a market even for shows that
have already aired on television and cable.4 45
ney Productions, produce and hold the copyrights on a substantial number of
motion pictures and other audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they
can exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by authorizing
theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited showings on cable and network tele-
vision, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television sta-
tions, and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs.
Some works are suitable for exploitation through all of these avenues, while the
market for other works is more limited.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422 (1984).
442 BIEDERMAN, supra note 441, at 515 n.416 ("Typically, the prospective producer of a
film begins by acquiring the rights to a book, a play, a screenplay, or other basic
material.").
443 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (concerning Cornell Woolrich's It
Had to be Murder as adapted into Alfred Hitchcock's Rear Window); King v. Allied Vision,
Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving Stephen King's Lawnmower Man as adapted
into Stephen King's Lawnmower Man and King's objection to use of his name in title);
Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 102 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (regarding dispute over
radio rights to Dashiell Hammett's The Maltese Falcon arising from sale of overlapping rights
to both parties); Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc. 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970) (con-
cerning Davis Goodis's serialized Dark Passage, its adaptation into film of same title, and
whether scope of that license included a television series, The Fugitive).
444 See Garon, supra note 439, at 15-16.
445 See id The pattern of releases has begun to change somewhat as viewing patterns
change. NBC created a direct-sale video release of its television production of Merlin.
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To these other media, the advance of technology has now ad-
ded the publication of the short story and the broadcast of the au-
dio-book on the Internet in either streaming media or MP3, the
Internet broadcast of either the play or film, and the computer
game possible on disk, CD-Rom, the Internet, and dedicated game
cartridge. Each of these can also be on the digital video disk and
played on either computer or television. The itemization above ex-
cludes merchandising rights, sequels, remakes, character licensing,
spin-offs, and ever-finer slices of the bundle of rights that
originated with the short story.
As the Motion Picture Association of America Report ("MPAA
Report") indicates, some of the fundamental restructuring taking
place is perhaps being masked by the widespread growth in the
entertainment industry.446 Theatrical motion picture revenues and
attendance have both hit record numbers, but costs are rising even
faster.44 7 Even as the traditional three television networks ex-
panded first to four and then to six, the total broadcast television
viewership has declined.4 ' Nonetheless, the advertising revenue
continues to be quite significant for cable, television, and
newspapers.44
Because the life-cycle for a new work is so tightly integrated,
the original format of the project often matters little. Whether the
project originates as a short story, a news event, or a motion pic-
ture, the project may eventually be developed in each entertain-
ment medium. Licensing schemes, such as that contemplated
under Article 2B, that differentiate the contractual default provi-
sions based on a project's medium, may create significant uncer-
tainty regarding the meaning of the contract.
Together, the computer/telecommunications industry and
the entertainment industry (both broadly defined) make up the
"Merlin, an NBC miniseries about the wizard of Arthurian legend, sold more than 100,000
boxed sets at $29.95 each in one week after it aired in April [19981." David Zurawik, Out Of
'The Box': Video Sets Are Proving Popular, STAR TRIB., June 16, 1998, at 8E.
446 See MPAA REPORT, supra note 436.
447 See Amy Wallace, Company Town; High Costs Could Torpedo Films, Valenti Warns, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1998, at DI. According tojack Valenti, President of the MPAA, in 1997 1.4
billion tickets sold for a reported $6.4 billion-but estimated as $5.8 billion by Daily Variety.
Costs rose during a one year period by 34% to an average $75.6 million per film. See id.
448 By 1996, primetime network viewership had dropped from 90% to approximately
50%. See Bob Ingram & Michael Kubin, The Challenge at The Networks: Broadcasters Must
Adjust in Face of a Changing Media Landscape, INSIDE MEDIA, Nov. 13, 1996, at 46.
449 F.C.C. Notice of Inquiry, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,353, 15,358 (1998). ("Total local advertis-
ing revenue for radio, television, newspaper, and cable was $68 billion in 1996. Local radio
accounted for $12 billion (17.2 percent of the total), television accounted for $21 billion
(30.3 percent), newspapers accounted for $34 billion (49.7 percent), and cable accounted
for $2 billion (2.9 percent).").
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new information society. Each key segment represents half the
formula for twenty-first century growth. The entertainment indus-
try provides the content-the news, information, and diversion
sought after by the public. The computer industry provides the
hardware, software and infrastructure to deliver the content liter-
ally anywhere the public wishes, whether to business, home, or
(through wireless technology) the beach. Ultimately, any regula-
tory paradigm must recognize the expectations of the public, or
else the regulations will fail. Here, the public is interested in a
system that delivers the content they want on the equipment they
now or soon will own.
IV. SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY--
THE ERA OF CONVERGENCE
The economic impact discussed in Part III illustrates the mag-
nitude of the information age's effect on the U.S. and world econo-
mies, but the social and societal impact is equally important in
determining the shape of future regulation. The current structure
of the information economy is one of empire building. Companies
like AT&T, Microsoft, Intel, Time Warner, Disney, News Corp. and
Sony are each engaged in strategies to own as large a portion as
possible of the components that make up the information econ-
omy, to monopolize a portion of it and to maximize profits within
that domain.
The idea of a growing media monopoly is neither novel nor
paranoid. At the 1998 Global Convergence Summit, Sumner Red-
stone declared "[t]he area of great big acquisitions is over. There
isn't that much that's still out there."45 ° This Article is not sug-
gesting that a dozen men are sitting in the ubiquitous smoke-filled
room carving the globe. Nonetheless, Redstone made those com-
ments while sitting alongside Ted Turner, Vice Chairman of Time
Warner-a direct competitor in every one of Viacom's divisions.4"'
Previous attempts at cornering the information markets are well
documented. The Department of Justice has repeatedly inter-
vened in these industries in the past.45 2 Nor is the irony lost. Only
450 Viacom's Redstone Declares Era of Media Megamergers is Over, ORANGE CouN- REG., Oct.
31, 1998, at B3. ("Since acquiring Viacom in 1987 Redstone has assembled an empire that
includes Paramount Pictures, the Blockbuster video store chain and the MTV, Nickelo-
deon and Showtime cable networks.").
451 See id
452 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (prohibiting film distri-
bution practices and leading to divestiture of the studios' ownership of film theaters);
United States v. IBM, 163 F.3d 737 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming termination of antitrust con-
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a few months after the declaration of the end of "great big acquisi-
tions," AT&T purchased Tele-Communications Inc. and moved to
join with Turner's Time Warner in an effort to consolidate cable
operations and integrate telephone service into the cable
infrastructure.453
The oligopoly model for economic monopoly is too compel-
ling for the parties to overcome. "A successful oligopoly must ac-
complish two main tasks: (1) establish a mutual understanding or
consensus regarding the correct price and division of output, and
(2) promote mutual confidence that there will be adherence to
these decisions. "45  Indirect collusion through price information
and parallel conduct is common in the entertainment industry.4 55
Because talent and other costs of production are essentially the
same for each company in the market, there is little opportunity
for price competition.4 56 Distribution of feature films, for exam-
ple, though highly competitive on a title-by-title basis in the U.S.
market, is subject to the common lobbying and marketing effort of
the Motion Picture Association, which is allowed to operate in a
concerted manner for all the member studios in many areas
outside of the United States.
The oligopoly model describes the motion picture or media
industries more effectively than a cartel model. The oligopoly
model provides that "[a]lthough anticompetitive, there is no evi-
dence that it resulted from explicit agreement among competitors.
Nor is it the unilateral conduct of a firm that has or threatens to
have monopoly power."4 57  The distinction between the cartel,
which will conspire to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act,458 and the oligopoly, which uses parallel
sent decree entered in 1956 regarding sale of computers and computer parts); United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (resulting in divestiture
of local telephone companies from long distance provider), affd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917) (invalidating the tying of Edison's film projector patents to the motion pictures
licensed and produced).
453 See 3 Cable Companies Talking With AT&T, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at C14.
454 George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 439,
445 (1982). ,
455 The cost of movie tickets, for example, is the same regardless of the cost of a film's
production or the studio producing the film, and production agreements are strikingly
similar at all the major studios. See Buchwald v. Paramount, 13 U.S.P.Q.2D 1497 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1990).
456 This was not always the case. During the era of the studio system, the exclusive rights
to certain performers could create widespread disparity. The elimination of the studio
system may be another example of the studios choosing to- eliminate one aspect of
competition.
457 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 151 (1994).
458 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.").
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conduct and information sharing "without expressly communicat-
ing with one another," '459 tends to describe the corporations that
make up the information oligopoly. The motion picture studios,
broadcasters, cable systems, and software companies each use the
very same information technology to compare pricing and business
practice information with each other. These companies are gener-
ally too sophisticated to act in any concerted conspiratorial man-
ner, while understanding at all times that parallel conduct is more
profitable than any attempt to challenge the status quo. To the
extent that there is a meaningful distinction between the oligopoly
and the cartel, the practical distinction, then, is that the oligopoly
is cartel behavior for which there is no Sherman Act remedy.46 °
Over the past ten years, the production costs in the entertain-
ment industry have continued to escalate, increasing by 166% over
the decade46 ' and 27% in the last year alone.462 As the costs of
production for media content escalate and the promotional costs
to operate a profitable media concern continue to grow, the eco-
nomic barriers to entry into the market increase.463 Add to the
tremendous overhead of media production, the control exhibited
by Microsoft involving access to the Internet,4 64 and the continued
pattern of corporate mergers among the media and technology
companies such as Netscape and America Online, and the moves
by the long distance companies to cross into the cable and Internet
markets, and two patterns emerge: the vertical integration of the
modern information company and the oligopoly-structured
marketplace.465
In addition to the economic aspects of monopoly concentra-
tion described above, there is also a social aspect that raises con-
cerns. The entertainment economics are somewhat less direct
than are the economics of other forms of manufacturing. Monop-
oly power is generally expected to raise prices to consumers and
slow competition. 466 Ticket prices for films, however, do not vary
based on the cost of production. The cost of television program-
ming to consumers, radio, music CDs, and other entertainment are
all affected by production costs, but these costs do not directly re-
459 HOVENKAMP, supra note 457, at 151.
460 See id. at 154-55.
461 See Gary Dretzka , Southbound, CHIC. TIaB., Apr. 5, 1998, at C16.
462 See Peter Waal, Why Mega-Movies Make Sense, CANAiAN Bus., May 8, 1998, at 71.
463 See RicHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 274-75 (1992).
464 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998); discus-
sion infra Part V.D.
465 See William Sheppard, Causes of Increased Competition in the US. Economy 1939-1980, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIs AND ANTITRUST LAw 125 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 1988).
466 See POSNER, supra note 463, at 271.
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late to the cost to the consumers. Instead, the increase in costs
would tend to reduce the number of titles produced by a company
each year. In the advertising supported media, increased costs will
pass though to the advertisers and consumers will pay higher prices
for those products, while the media content will continue to be
"free"-with free being defined as costs are not incurred at the
time of consumption of the media, but transferred through to the
consumers as advertising overhead.
Assuming ticket prices and advertising revenue remain con-
stant, the profit margin on each project would also be reduced as
production costs would increase. 46 7 For production companies de-
ciding whether or not to produce a particular project-a film, mu-
sic CD or television series-the decision to approve each project
assumes an ever-increasing margin of profitability. In other words,
as the production costs increase, the degree of risk that the produ-
cers of the project are willing to accept will decrease. This eco-
nomic model forecasts the blockbuster phenomenon in which the
studios produce fewer and fewer movies that are expected to hit
the market as larger and larger blockbusters.468 The same pattern
is true of newsgathering. As costs of production rise at a rate
higher than that of advertising, the viability of marginal news desks
erodes and coverage becomes more limited.
A. Oligopoly's Orthodoxy of Information
The reduction in output by the cartel members spurred by ris-
ing costs and decreased competition has a social impact which is
more troubling than the mere increase in costs of entertainment
content. The confluence of economic advantage, decreased risk-
taking, and social custom will set an international agenda for infor-
mation content that dampens the range of content and marginal-
izes most debate.
"At any given moment," wrote George Orwell, "there is a sort of
all pervading orthodoxy, a general tacit agreement not to dis-
cuss large and uncomfortable facts." Today, dazzled by technol-
ogy, we are being led into what we are told is an information
society, but is really a media society in which those 'large and
uncomfortable facts' are eliminated or pass unremembered on a
467 See Waal, supra note 462, at 71.
468 See Dretzka, supra note 461. Godzi//a opened on more than 7000 screens and man-
aged to become financially successful despite being a critical disappointment. Titanic, a
film more critically well-respected, opened on 3000 screens, but that number increased, as
did advertising costs, as the film achieved record-breaking box office returns. See Corie
Brown & David Ansen, Rough Waters, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997, at 64.
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moving belt of images shot and edited to the rhythms of a Coca-
Cola advertisement.
469
The movement to an information oligopoly controlled by a
few film studios, software companies, and telephone services ap-
pears to fall within this structure of less content production, lower
risk taking, and less opportunity for controversial content to be
presented.470 Although new technology is increasing the number
of media outlets, these new outlets are emphasizing re-packaging
of content rather than the development of new material. The com-
panies making up the media cartel are diverse and highly competi-
tive. They are quite unlikely to agree to broad content or other
limitations. Nonetheless, the economic and social concerns will re-
sult in an ever-diminishing range of content. Any regulatory policy
that further increases monopoly power will exacerbate this trend.
Although once idealized as the perfect democratic medium,
the Internet and the "portal" metaphor return once again to a for-
mat of content-controlled safe zones that are predetermined by
demographic trends and dictated by millions of dollars in advertis-
ing designed to lure viewers. The portals provide the primary ac-
cess to the Internet and control the content that is most readily
available to consumers. Only with concerted effort can a viewer
find material that has not been designed by one of these compa-
nies. The flow of information leads to economic power which
leads to the control of the flow of information. "The information
age may well pose unprecedented monopoly problems if the con-
trol of information flows is privatized because today the basic
'know how' about code is concentrated in a few corporations. "471
In the antitrust action against Microsoft, the Department of
Justice recognized the importance of such content control.
Microsoft has entered into anticompetitive agreements with In-
ternet Content Providers ("ICPs"). Prominent "channel but-
tons" advertising and providing direct Internet access to select
ICPs appear on the "Active Desktop" feature that is shipped with
the Windows operating system.... Microsoft's agreements con-
dition an ICP's placement on one of these buttons on the ICP's
agreement to not pay or otherwise compensate Microsoft's pri-
mary Internet browser competitors (including by distributing
their browsers) for the distribution, marketing, or promotion of
the ICP's content; to not promote any browser produced by any
469 John Pilger, What a Carve Up!, THE GuJA.DtAN (London), Mar. 16, 1998, at Media
Pae 4.
470 See Degen Pener, What Price 'Happiness'?, ENT. WKLv, Oct. 30, 1998, at 20-21.
471 Lyman, supra note 26, at 1081.
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of Microsoft's primary browser competitors; to not allow any of
Microsoft's primary browser competitors to promote and high-
light the ICP's "channel" content on or for their browsers; and
to design its web sites using Microsoft-specific, proprietary pro-
gramming extensions so that those sites look better when viewed
with Internet Explorer than when viewed through a competing
browser.4 7 2
Although the Justice Department concern focused on the
value Microsoft received through these anti-competitive practices
of granting exclusive desktop channels in exchange for Microsoft-
exclusive software promotion, the societal impact is equally damag-
ing in terms of the control Microsoft has over the desktop chan-
nels. Microsoft writes the operating software for ninety-five
percent of all new personal computers sold in the United States
and has an exclusive agreement with Apple regarding the other
five percent. 473 Essentially, Microsoft sets the Internet channels for
every new computer sold in the United States. Although Microsoft
does not limit the individual user's ability to find material away
from these channels, this nearly absolute control will have a sub-
stantial and long-lasting impact on the usage patterns of the public.
The social implications of the portal trend bears out the
prophecy of George Orwell. The information, entertainment, and
education available to the public blends and homogenizes as fewer
and fewer media outlets provide the content. With each corporate
merger, the overhead increases and the number of consumers nec-
essary to make a broadcast successful or a network/portal profita-
ble increases. To achieve the necessary audience, the content must
be sanitized to minimize the risk of offending any significant seg-
ment of the audience.
B. Power of the Editor
The problems regarding content homogenization that Orwell
identified have already been exhibited in the traditional media of
television and publishing. Rupert Murdoch, one of the leading
media barons,4 74 created an embarrassing public display regarding
his control of the content made accessible to the public. Murdoch
personally intervened after one of his publishing concerns,
HarperCollins, agreed to publish "East and West," the memoirs of
472 United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998).
473 Id.
474 See Robert La Franco, The World's Working Rich, FoRBES, July 6, 1998, at 182. ("[Mur-
doch is] a throwback to the press lords and movie moguls of old.").
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Chris Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong.475 Con-
cerned about the impression the book would leave with Chinese
officials with whom he was in an ongoing commercial relationship,
Murdoch ordered the book canceled and then fired the senior edi-
tor on the project, Stuart Proffitt. Proffitt was removed for refusing
to lie about the reason for the cancellation.476 Murdoch's direct
and inelegant approach to content control served as a reminder
that each of the media empires that make up the media oligopoly
have direct control over the content produced and often couple
this control with social or political agendas.
HarperCollins ultimately apologized publicly for the incident
and paid Patten an undisclosed settlement amount.477 Murdoch,
who has significant satellite interests in China, has had a history of
appeasement toward the Chinese leaders. 478 At the request of the
Chinese government, he removed the BBC World Service from his
Satellite broadcasts, and he gave the daughter of Deng Xiaoping a
million dollar book contract for a "loving portrait" of her father.4 7 9
Murdoch attempted to develop a similar level of political influ-
ence in the United States when he gave former House Speaker
Newt Gingrich a $4.5 million advance for his agreement to author
a book.4 8 ° Once disclosed, that arrangement created such a public
backlash that Gingrich was forced to restructure the deal and take
only a $1 advance.481 Part of the criticism over the Gingrich ar-
rangement stemmed from the timing. At the time of the book ad-
vance, Murdoch's Fox Network was heavily involved in F.C.C.
regulatory matters and the Republican-led Congress was engaged
in significant reform of the Telecommunications Act.482 More pre-
cisely, Congress was considering whether or not to allow television
networks such as Murdoch's Fox network to increase their market
ownership from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent, an impor-
tant change for Fox because it had the largest ownership of any of
the networks.483 These practices provide a glimpse into the man-
475 SeeJohnnie Roberts, Rupert's Black Eye, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 44.
476 Id. HarperCollins originally told Governor Patten that the book was too boring to be
published. See id
477 See id.
478 See Russ Baker, Murdoch's Mean Machine, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June, 1998, at
51.
479 Id
480 See Kevin Merida & Serge F. Kovaleski, Democrats Attack Gingrich for Meeting Murdoch
Before $ 4.5 Million Book Deal, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1995, at All.
481 See id
482 This. process resulted in significant changes to the Telecommunications Act. See
Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
483 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1998). See also F.C.C. Notice of Inquiry, 63 Fed. Reg.
15,353 (1998).
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ner in which the power to dominate world news and entertainment
naturally impacts governmental policy and social custom.
The social and political structure employed by the participants
in the media oligopoly are neither subtle nor novel. In ancient
Rome, the phrase panem et circenses48 was used to refer to the man-
ner in which the Caesars would control the citizenry through pub-
lic spectacle and entertainment. 485 While Murdoch (and his News
Corp.) is among the most notorious of the media barons in the
world to follow this model into the modern age, other media giants
act to develop similar synergies.4 8 6 Just as Murdoch has attempted
to monopolize rugby in Australia,487 he has begun to move into
American sports.48 8 The mogul who pioneered this approach is
Ted Turner, vice chairman of Time Warner, who used his owner-
ship of the Atlanta Braves to propel WTBS from an insignificant
484 JUVENAL A.D. c.60-c.130. "Of the citizenry Juvenal said 'Duas tantum res anxius
optat, Panem et circenses' ('Only two things does he worry about or long for-bread and
circuses')."
485 BROCKE'r, supra note 109, at 68-69 ("The theater had to compete with several other
kinds of entertainments. The oldest and most popular of these was chariot racing ....
[Others] included horseracing (sometimes with trick riding), mock cavalry battles, foot-
races, acrobatics, prizefighting, wrestling, exhibitions of wild and trained animals, and
fights between animals or between animals and men.... Perhaps the most spectacular of
all the entertainments were the naumachiae, or sea battles. The first was given by Julius
Caesar on a lake dug for the occasion; it featured a battle involving 2,000 marines and
6,000 oarsmen.... Such spectacles frequently were presented in festivals alongside plays,
and actors often had to compete with them. Thus it is often said that the necessity of
holding an audience's attention under such circumstances led to the general coarsening of
theatrical fare during the empire.").
486 See Dean Bonham, Sports As An Arsenal; Media Tycoons Use Games To Capture Enormous
Audiences, DENVER RocKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at llG ("Murdoch owns the Los Ange-
les Dodgers and a partial interest in the New York Rangers and Knicks, as well as Madison
Square Garden. He also has an option to buy an interest in the Los Angeles Lakers and
Kings and he owns more regional sports networks in this country than any other company,
by far. Turner's Time Warner owns the Atlanta Braves and Hawks as well as TBS and TNT,
both of which broadcast sports, including games of the National Basketball Association and
Major League Baseball.").
487 See Jacqueline Lee Lewes, Murdoch Soccer League Scores Controversial Super League is
Cleared to Compete Next Year, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 7, 1996, at 4 ("Rupert Murdoch's break-
away Super League competition has been given the go-ahead for next year by the full
bench of the Federal Court, which reversed an earlier court decision banning it until the
turn of the century. With Murdoch owning all of the rugby league internationally and now
half of it in Australia, Super League's domestic and global premierships will start next year.
Friday's decision gives Murdoch's cable television operation Foxtel, a joint venture with
telecommunications company Telstra, a powerful boost by providing it a much-needed
major sport for its Fox Sports channel. It also deals a major blow to Kerry Packer's Nine
Network and rival cabler Optus Vision, which backed the mainstream Australian Rugby
League that took the legal action to keep out Super League.").
488 Arguably, the purchase of football television rights in 1994 was the true beginning of
this movement. That move, however, was merely to control programming and acquire
station affiliates. See Jim Benson, TV's Traumatic Times, WKLY. VARIETY, July 18-24, 1994, at
1. Because of the NFL investment, Fox was able to shift station affiliates away from CBS
(and ABC to a lesser extent) because the local station needed football coverage. That
resulted in greater marketing for all other Fox programming and made Fox a dominant
supplier of both broadcast and cable television.
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local independent station to the center of the Time Warner media
empire.489 Disney also saw the wisdom of this strategy, and
purchased the California Angels,49 ° renaming the team the
Anaheim Angels.49 a (Interestingly, Paul Allen, the second largest
shareholder in Microsoft, has also followed the strategy, becoming
the owner of both the Seattle Seahawks, a professional football
team, and the Portland Trail Blazers, a professional basketball
team.4 9 2 His holdings, however, do not currently include baseball.)
Unlike football broadcasts and hockey interests, baseball has
two key factors that serve to make it a unique vehicle for the crea-
tion of media empires. First, it remains America's game. Although
football is more popular, baseball holds the historical mantle as a
cultural icon. In the quest to sell the amorphous brand of a net-
work or portal, there is a high value in the cultural identity that
baseball brings to the network. Since the goal is to motivate each
viewer to turn on the network or portal before that consumer
knows what is being broadcast, affiliation is critical.49 Baseball has
a similar affiliation need that makes baseball an excellent fit for the
emotional connection needed to promote the network.
Second, baseball has a long season involving a large number
of lengthy games. Football has a relatively short broadcast season
and the fewest number of games played of any televised sport.
Baseball creates a large amount of content to broadcast. Based on
a cost per broadcast hour, baseball is an excellent production
value. Add to this the relatively low cost of creating sports news
content, and the total investment can be very cost effective. Disney
controls ABC, ESPN and ESPN2.4 9 4 Fox has Foxsports, Foxsports
489 See STANLEY BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 11 (1984); Charles Haddad,
TBS unit fuels turnaround at Time Warner, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Feb. 4, 1999, at lB.
490 Bonham, supra note 486 ("Disney owns the Anaheim Angels and Mighty Ducks as
well as the premiere sports network, ESPN. [Disney Chairman Michael] Eisner recendy
orchestrated the purchase of ABC, which earlier this year signed a multibillion-dollar con-
tract to air NFL games along with its sister station ESPN.").
491 The renaming of the team as the Anaheim Angels serves as a nice example of cross-
over marketing. By promoting Anaheim rather than California, Disney reminds hundreds
of millions of potential visitors about the happiest place on earth. This choice might actu-
ally hurt the team's marketing efforts in Southern California, where the communities of
Los Angeles dismiss those of Orange County (where Anaheim is located). Presumably, the
corporate decision to promote the location and the neighboring Disney products (includ-
ing Disneyland and Arrowhead Pond, home of the Mighty Ducks, Disney's hockey team)
outweighs the negative impact on the baseball franchise.
492 See Richard Sandomir, Sports Business; Cablevision Lines Up to be Sports Leader, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 8 at 4.
493 See Bonham, supra note 486.
494 See id. Disney's major holdings include Walt Disney Co.; Walt Disney Pictures; Touch-
stone Pictures; Hollywood Pictures; Miramax; Buena Vista Int'l; Buena Vista Home En-
tertainment; Walt Disney World; Disneyland; Tokyo Disneyland; Disneyland Paris;
Hollywood Records; Mammoth Records; ABC Television Network; ABC Radio; ESPN;
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West and Foxsports 2."' Warner has not been as expansive, but it
does have WTBS and increasing amounts of coverage on CNN.4 96
Based on the importance of baseball for the three largest and
most diversified media kingdoms, few should have been surprised
by the furor which erupted when Murdoch moved to purchase the
Los Angeles Dodgers.4 9 7 While Disney should have been the more
aggrieved due to the proximity of the Dodgers and the Angels, it
was Ted Turner who undertook a personal crusade to stop Mur-
doch.4 9 8 The intrusion of Murdoch into Turner's personal domain
was too much for the Southern gentleman to bear. Despite his out-
cry, Murdoch purchased his baseball team and moved one step
closer to domination of American entertainment.
Returning to Orwell's prophecy, the media giants' use of
sports to fill broadcast time serves as another mechanism whereby
the pervading orthodoxy of silence can be filled with an innocuous
circus of sport. Like the Roman emperors, the media giants are
building great empires to pay homage to the culture of sports, cre-
ating heroes out of sports figures4 99 and focusing the attention of
the public on these arenas rather than arenas of politics or culture.
The choice to select sports over politics or culture is not rooted in
an evil objective to diminish society or a grand conspiracy to si-
lence the enlightened intelligentsia; the choice is economically
sound and it helps build a community-here a viewing commu-
nity-united rather than fragmented.50 0 As described above, the
ESPN2; ESPNEWS; ESPN Int'l; Disney Channel; A&E Network; The History Channel; Life-
time Television; E! Entertainment Television; Major League Baseball Anaheim Angels;
NHL Mighty Ducks of Anaheim. See id.
495 See id. Rupert Murdoch's major holdings include News Corp; 20th Century Fox; Fox
Broadcasting Network; New York Post, The Times and Sunday Times in London; Daily Tele-
graph, Sydney; Melbourne Herald Sun; Harper Collins Publ'g; Major League Baseball Los
Angeles Dodgers; NHL New York Rangers; NBA New York Knicks; Madison Square Gar-
den; 22 Regional Sports Networks; option to buy interest in NBA Los Angeles Lakers and
NHL Los Angeles Kings. See id. "Murdoch is probably best known in Britain as the owner
of The Sun, the biggest-selling tabloid newspaper." Newsmakers, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 16,
1999, at 3.
496 See Bonham, supra note 486. Ted Turner serves as Vice-Chairman of Time Warner,
Inc. His major holdings include Time Warner, Inc.; Time Inc.; Warner Bros.; HBO; CNN;
Turner Entertainment; Time Warner Cable; Major League Baseball Atlanta Braves; NBA
Atlanta Hawks. See id.
497 See Dave Cunningham, Owners Are Staging Clashes of The Titans, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Apr. 19, 1998, at C9.
498 Phil Rogers, 'Stop Murdoch' Bid Looks to be too Late, CHIc. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1998, at
Sports 3.
499 See Sean Paige, Sports Gladiators, Bread and Circuses, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 3,
1998, at 8.
500 See Bonham, supra note 486 ("Imagine sitting in front of your television set and scrol-
ling through 500 channels. What's going to cause you to select one channel over the other?
One major incentive will be sports. If you are a sports fan, you will be familiar with the
channels where you can be treated to your favorite offerings. More than that, you are more
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united viewing community is the necessary social structure for a
successful network or portal. The viewing community, united by
popular sport, blockbuster films, or a pervasive orthodoxy, will re-
sult in a more homogenous marketplace; a marketplace in which
the novel idea will have little opportunity to be heard over the din
of the silence.
C. Dead-Hand Control of Culture
If the fear of concerted cartel action by the dominant media
producers was not sufficient to demand a new regulatory structure,
a second social threat exists because of the individuals who have
been granted new ownership rights under the copyright term ex-
tension. Traditional property doctrine holds that the law dislikes
dead-hand control of property ownership because it slows innova-
tion and economic growth.5"' The Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly
created dead-hand control of copyrights by adopting a life-plus-50-
year term,5 °2 and the extension exacerbates this danger by twenty
years-an additional generation. The copyright term extension
only increases the likelihood that control of copyrights will pass to
individuals who had little interaction with the original authors of
the work, even in those cases where the current copyright holder
was alive at the time of the copyright's creation. This leaves the
cultural legacy of the public's intellectual property in the hands of
stewards who may or may not share the artistic interests of the au-
thors. Equally problematic is that the original author's interests
may not serve the public good decades after a work's creation.
[T]he Gershwin Family Trust points out that the copyright
extension is not only about money but also about control of how
a work is presented. A co-trustee, Marc G. Gershwin, was quoted
in a recent news article as lamenting, "Someone could turn Porgy
and Bess into rap music." The work of the Gershwin brothers
drew on African-American musical traditions. What could be
more appropriate?503
[W] hen Washington's Shakespeare Theater decided to cast
a white actor, Patrick Stewart, as Othello along with an all-black
cast last year, they didn't need permission from Shakespeare's
heirs, because the play was already in the public domain. But a
likely to watch other programming that appears on your favorite sports channel because
this programming will have been promoted while you were watching sports.").
501 ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 29-30 (2d ed. 1993).
502 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994), amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. 105-298, tit. I, § 102(b), 1125 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998).
503 Steve Zeiflin, Strangling Culture with a Copyright Law, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at
A15.
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theater group wanting to perform Porgy and Bess with an all-
white cast could not, because the Gershwin Family Trust stipu-
lates that the work can be performed only with an all-black
cast. 504
For society as a whole, the difference between the situation
described in Othello and that of Porgy and Bess may be the most im-
portant aspect of the entire monopoly debate. "The public do-
main should be understood not as the realm of material that is
undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of
the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship avail-
able for authors to use."50 5 The cumulative impact of the copyright
extension, the elimination of monopoly barriers in the Telecom-
munications Act, and the aggressive posture of the media compa-
nies to maximize value in their intellectual property assets while
minimizing risk will invariably result in fewer and fewer opportuni-
ties for new artists to expand on the public's shared cultural icons.
Only approved productions, by proven producers with permission
of the copyright stewards and media conglomerates will be allowed
to create derivative works. Virtually no unauthorized derivative
works will be made available to the public from 1999 until 2019,
eliminating the steady stream of works that should be expanding
the public's shared cultural identity.5 "6
This moratorium on the public domain does not mean that
authors' rights are being respected. The works of Dr. Seuss, for
example, were sparingly licensed during their creator's lifetime,
but upon his death his widow has decided that the best strategy is
to aggressively market his images.507 "Author Theodore Geisel re-
fused to market anything but books, but now his widow has sold
dozens of licenses. There's also a new television show, The Wubbu-
lous World of Dr. Seuss."5°s
The protection of the author's interests may also be contrary
to the public interest. In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,5°9 the re-
clusive writer sued because his papers and letters were used in an
unauthorized biography. The Second Circuit found that the biog-
504 Chaddock, supra note 140.
505 Litman, supra note 256, at 967.
506 Cultural icons such as Uncle Sam and Santa Claus are examples of characters that
devolved into the public domain after their copyrights had expired. Under the current
law, these characters would still be protected by copyright. See Zeilin, supra note 503.
507 One Busy Cat, TIMES UNION (Albany), Apr. 20, 1997, at Life & Leisure 19 ("The Cat in
the Hat is busy with new ventures that are taking him beyond the pages of a book: He's on
TV. He'll be on CD. He's got a movie contract. He's got a clothing line.").
508 SeeJodi Duckett, Toying with Success, MORNING CALL (Allentown), Mar. 6, 1997, at D1.
509 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
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rapher had infringed the copyrights held by Salinger in his unpub-
lished letters, finding that fair use provided for only a modest
amount of quotations and that the biography by Ian Hamilton took
an excessive amount of material.51' The letters in question were
written by Salinger from 1931 to 1961 and have now had their re-
moval from the public domain extended by twenty years. A similar
issue arose involving a biography of L. Ron Hubbard, in which the
Second Circuit again applied a very narrow interpretation of the
fair use doctrine to unpublished journals and diaries.5 11 The copy-
right extension will grant a powerful veto over academic research
to public figures who wish to control their image in history, ex-
tending that dead-hand control for an additional twenty years, and
greatly diminishing the likelihood that the research will be relevant
or timely when finally conducted using the public domain
materials.
The problem is not limited to unpublished or even copy-
righted works. When CBS attempted to create a documentary on
Dr. Martin Luther King, it was sued by his estate for failure to se-
cure a license to Dr. King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech.512
The Georgia district court determined that the speech is in the
public domain and free for CBS.513 Dr. King's famous speech is
governed by the 1909 Act, so the dissemination without copyright
notice resulted in a publication without notice that eliminated the
possibility for copyright protection.514 Such a speech written today
would be treated as the author's property and the author-and his
estate-would be free to limit access to the speech as they saw
appropriate.515
The balance of copyright is also not limited to the author or
the public. Often, there are multiple artists involved in the creative
process and the power granted to one comes at a cost to the other.
For example, greater power to the author will invariably limit the
control available to the director of a play or film. In theater, this
510 See id. at 99-100.
511 See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
512 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, 13 F. Supp.2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
513 See id at 1354. The court stated that "publication occurred not because of the public
exhibition but largely because of the Commission's lack of restriction on copying and its
free allowance of reproduction by the press." Id. (citing Letter Edged In Black Press, Inc. v.
Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (N.D. Ill 1970)).
514 See id. The term "divestiture" is inapposite because it would suggest that King ex-
pected copyright ownership. His objective, based on the information presented in the
opinions, was to get as broad a republication as possible, not to exercise ownership over
the speech.
515 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
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problem is already an acute issue. 5 16 Productions like West Side
Story might never have been mounted if Shakespeare's Romeo &
Juliet had not fallen into the public domain. The power to with-
hold from the public any derivative works about which the original
author does not approve will only diminish the marketplace of
ideas. While respect for the author may be a necessary part of the
creative process, providing dead-hand control seventy years after
the death of the author cannot be the correct balance between the
interests of the original author and the interests of those who fol-
low. The trend toward greater information ownership and longer
copyright terms will drive up the social costs of new work and drive
down the opportunity for works built on a shared public
experience.
V. STOPPING THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MARKETPLACE-
AN INTRODUCTION
The dangers of cartel practices and unintended interference
in the growth of the information industries described in Parts III
and TV, above, must be balanced against the constitutional frame-
work of the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. The sug-
gestions presented here are necessarily limited in scope because
the balancing needed requires a gentle, systemic approach. No
single legislative or judicial intervention can successfully maintain
the needed balance. Indeed, this inability is at the heart of the
Article 2B debate.
Each component of the regulatory framework must be inte-
grated into a fully coordinated regulatory approach. The goal is to
reduce regulation that would tend to slow growth in the informa-
tion, software and technology segments of the economy, increase
competition among the corporations in the various industries, ex-
pand opportunities for innovation, and slow the convergence of
the primary media and content providers by reducing barriers to
entry for new competitors. The success of the information society
and rapid transition to the information age suggest that the bal-
ance for such success is not difficult to grasp. In fact, the U.S. regu-
latory structure may be far more effective as it existed before the
NII recommended any improvements. Nonetheless, this Article
does not advocate reversing the clock. Instead, modest changes to
the Copyright Act and Telecommunications Act as well as a few
516 SeeJon Garon, Note, Director's Choice: The Fine Line between Interpretation and Infringe-
ment of an Author's Work, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 277 (1988).
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other regulatory suggestions may serve to reinstate the balance that
may have been lost in the past year.
A. Copyright Modifications
1. Repeal the Sonny Bono Term Extension Act
The most glaring mistake made in the regulation of the infor-
mation economy was the extension of the copyright term by twenty
years. The first step to return balance to the regulatory system
would be to repeal the copyright extension.517 This gift by Con-
gress to Disney, the estates of the Gershwins, and thousands of un-
named and unidentified copyright holders cannot increase the
incentives to produce new works and will encourage the corpora-
tions (or trusts) holding the assets to exploit the works to their
greatest economic advantage.
The decision to increase the length of the copyright term does
not make economic sense, even when balancing only the interests
of the entertainment and content providers against that of the
software makers. Comparing the relative importance in the U.S.
economy, software represented $102.8 billion in sales and $747 bil-
lion for the broader IT industry.518 The software industry is cur-
rently generating revenue roughly equivalent to that of the
entertainment industry.5 19 Although none of the software indus-
try's interests will be enhanced by the copyright extension for de-
cades, if at all, the inability to access public domain music and
video in the creation of new products adds significantly to the cost
of production. Congress has effectively chosen to reward a stable
segment of the information economy at the expense of the grow-
ing segment of that economy, raising costs to the public and creat-
ing barriers to entry for new software developers who do not have
the expertise or financial resources properly to navigate the licens-
ing regimes of the music and film industries.
Economically there is little benefit to the copyright term ex-
tension. Disney's Steamboat Willie does not generate significant
517 As a practical matter, Congress may wish to substitute a two year extension for the
twenty year extension for those copyrights that would have expired during the interim.
This would ease the transition for all copyright holders except those few who based large
transactions on the enactment of the extension.
518 See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
519 See supra Part III.A. The figures include approximately $32.3 billion for film-in-
cluding theaters, home video, and television; $40 billion in recorded music sold through-
out the world; and $68 billion in advertising revenue for radio, television, newspaper, and
cable. While the entertainment segment is the greater amount, a portion of the $21 billion
television advertising and $2 billion cable advertising effectively double-counts the film
revenues. See MPAA REPORT, supra note 436, at 12; Rosen Statement, supra note 166; F.C.C.
Notice of Inquiry, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,353, 15,358 (1998).
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revenue for the company and a combination of trademark law and
subsequent design changes will keep Mickey Mouse safe in
perpetuity. Protection of family trusts like that of the Gershwins
has no underlying social benefit. Congress has simply elected to
tax the public for the benefit of the few private families who are
capable of collecting the proceeds.
Repealing the copyright extension (or the less efficient alter-
native of having the extension declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court after Eldred v. Reno wends its way through the
courts) would deny little actual protection to authors, but would
provide additional content for the software and Internet industries,
spurring additional growth and economic development. One of
the identified objectives of regulation reform was to expand oppor-
tunities for innovation. Allowing the public domain to grow will
achieve this goal by providing source material for both the technol-
ogy industries and the entertainment industries. Derivative works,
whether they be modernized versions of songs from the twenties,
video projects based on the early talking pictures, multimedia CD-
Roms featuring works created in the Hoover era, or Internet sites
of free educational materials, all feature the same theme. New
products are based on the public domain elements that preceded
them. Without the continued, annual growth of the public do-
main, this type of development cannot occur.
2. A Modest Altenative-Amend the Term Extension Act for
Works no Longer in Print
A more modest alternative to repeal of the Sonny Bono Copy-
right Term Extension Act would be a provision analogous to that of
the library exemption which allows libraries to copy the work dur-
ing the last twenty years if it is no longer commercially available.5 21
A new statutory provision could operate as a form of renewal
clause, providing copyright protection for any work that remained
in print or that was registered with the Registrar of Copyrights.
Copyright protection would lapse only for those works no longer in
print and unregistered, just as it would have terminated under the
1976 Act. This would give Disney and the Gershwin Family Trust
the relief sought, while freeing up the vast majority of works that
are no longer commercially available and would not be made avail-
able unless a new author or publisher stepped in.
The twin mechanisms of registration or remaining in print
520 See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994), as amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
Pub. L. 105-298, tit. I, § 104, 1125 Stat. 2827, 2829 (1998).
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should serve the needs of complying with the Berne Convention
and protecting any moral rights in the works. Any author who
cared about the integrity or attribution of her works could avail
herself of the registration, regardless of the work's availability to
the public. Authors would not have to comply with registration,
however, for any works that were commercially available. The bur-
den on affected authors should be sufficiently low as to avoid com-
plaint by Berne member countries.5 21  This is a far less
comprehensive solution than simply repealing the copyright term
extension. Nonetheless, it serves as an intermediate solution which
may achieve much of the needed balance between the film and
music interests and the other information society businesses.
3. Codify the In-Home Copying Privilege
The home is another area under copyright law for which the
balance between the copyright holders and the public is sorely
lacking. To the extent that the public is supportive of copyright
and willing to purchase copyrighted works rather than illegally
copy them, the public also needs to be treated with sufficient defer-
ence so as to encourage the desired conduct. Put another way,
people will not break the law if they both know the law and respect
it. If the Copyright Act outlaws conduct that reasonable people
believe is appropriate, then not only will that conduct continue,
but the entire law will fall into disfavor. The Supreme Court un-
derstood this when it analyzed the history of home taping in Sony;
but Congress has yet to follow this lead.
The growing trend towards electronic distribution of software
illustrates the difficulty. A consumer selects software from an In-
ternet website, provides a credit card, and receives software which
automatically loads itself on to the consumer's hard drive. That
same product is also available in CD-Rom format from a retailer,
but the software publisher has created incentives to purchase di-
rectly from the website. Six months later, the consumer elects to
upgrade the computer hardware and replace the machine. Assum-
ing the consumer can overcome the technological hurdles when
the computer prompts the consumer to insert the CD-Rom (even
though none was expected or delivered-the software was exactly
the same), a legal problem arises. This is not an archive copy. Un-
til the new computer is fully operational, the consumer will not
delete any files or programs on the old computer. The consumer
will erase software from the old hard drive as a condition of selling
521 See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 117, at 12.
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or donating the machine, but not until she is about to dispose of it.
Although this conduct has never resulted in civil or criminal liabil-
ity, it remains a violation of copyright law.
If the information industries want compliance, they need to
set clear expectations for home users. A software manufacturer
should be able to specify that a software product may not be simul-
taneously loaded and used on more than a single computer. None-
theless, neither the software manufacturer nor the purchaser
expects that the license is limited to the life of the computer on
which it is first loaded. Making a transfer copy of the software
should be lawful, and if the software industry is unwilling to make
this accommodation explicit, the Congress should step in.
The same issue is true for home use photocopying, scanning
and digitizing printed records, videotaping, and audio-taping. As
one commentator pointed out, "Sony Music, a record company,
sells mini-disc recorders on the premise that you 'can copy all the
CDs to mini-disc' [and] blank cassette tapes with a picture of a
compact disc on the wrapper labeled 'for compact disc record-
ing." "' Presumably, this means that Sony, at least, allows owners of
its music CDs to archive the CD by taping it on a cassette tape in
the event the CD melts or scratches. More likely, Sony does not
object to its CD purchasers making cassette tapes for use in the car,
so long as the cassette tape is not transferred to someone other
than CD owner. Unlike the response by the RIAA to Sony and the
other manufacturers of cassette tapes and mini-discs, the industry
appears only to respond to a risk posed by MP3 or other technolo-
gies that are not controlled by the industry itself. The $40 billion
generated in recorded music during 1996 was made despite the
threat of the cassette tape industry. The law may support the in-
dustry's complaints of infringement but their own practices show
that a certain amount of infringement is essential to the success of
the industry.
Both the law and the public are better served by legislation
that differentiates between proper and improper conduct without
reliance on a category of misconduct that is silently sanctioned. To
accomplish this, a statutory exemption to the exclusive rights is
necessary to eliminate the industry-by-industry standards, provide
some predictability for consumers, and preempt any attempts to
use shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses to alter the balance. The ex-
522 Matt Fellows, Letters, Music Industry Turning a Deaf Ear to Consumers?, L. A. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1999, at C8.
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emption would work as an extension of the first sale doctrine. A
first draft of the provision would work as follows:
Any owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title may reproduce that work for personal use; pro-
vided however, that such copies must at all times remain the
exclusive property of the owner of the particular copy or pho-
norecord lawfully made and must be destroyed or transferred in
the event the particular copy or phonorecord was transferred.
Except for the limited right to copy for limited personal use,
nothing in this provision shall extend to the owner of a particu-
lar copy or phonorecord any of the exclusive rights enumerated
in section 106.
This clause gives the owner of a copy of a work the right to
make second copies. It takes from the producer of the work the
ability to make the work obsolete through the use of inferior
materials or (for software) a non-responsive loading program. It
does not extend to the individual owner of a copy the right to
upload her copy to the Internet, to display, perform, or to dis-
tribute the work.523 It has the effect of codifying existing law as
practiced while clarifying for consumers what is and is not permissi-
ble. Such a clause will become increasingly important as technol-
ogy and the media evolve over the next few decades. No actual
rights are conceded by the copyright holders, but the effect is to
clarify for the public what standard practices are allowed.
B. Eliminate State Protection-an Argument against
Article 2B/UCITA
1. Article 2B/UCITA is Too Much Too Soon
Another key component in the balance between the public
and the information age industries is the manner in which the pri-
vate transactions are regulated. Article 2B attempts to create a
scope that limits it only to software.5 24 Nonetheless, an opt-in pro-
523 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
524 The language defining the scope of UCITA has undergone extensive revision since
the August 1998 Article 2B draft. As recommended to the states, the scope of UCITA is as
follows:
SECTION 103. SCOPE; EXCLUSIONS; AGREEMENT THAT ACT GOVERNS.
(a) This [Act] applies to computer information transactions.
(b) If a computer information transaction includes other subject matter, ex-
cept as provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), the following rules apply:
(1) If the computer information is the primary subject matter, this [Act]
applies to the entire transaction.
(2) If the computer information is not the primary subject matter, this
[Act] applies only to the part of the transaction pertaining to the computer
information.
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vision also allows other information providers the option of utiliz-
(c) The following rules apply between this [Act] and [articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code]:
(1) If a transaction involves computer information and goods, this [Act]
applies to the computer information.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), if a copy of a computer program is
contained in and sold or leased as part of other goods, this [Act] applies to
the program and the copy only if:
(A) the other goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
(B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the pro-
gram is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of the
type.
(3) To the extent of a conflict between this [Act] and [Article 9], [Article
9] governs.
(4) This [Act] does not apply to subject matter within the scope of [Article
3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code].
(d) This [Act] does not apply to:
(1) a financial services transaction;
(2) a contract to create, perform or perform in, include information in,
acquire, use, distribute, modify, reproduce, have access to, adapt, make
available, transmit, license, or display:
(A) audio or visual programming that is provided by broadcast, satel-
lite, or cable as defined or used in the Federal Communications Act
and related regulations as they existed on July 1, 1999, or by similar
methods of delivering the programming; or
(B) a motion picture, sound recording, musical work, or phonorecord
as defined or used in Tide 17 of the United States Code as of July 1,
1999, or an enhanced sound recording. "Enhanced sound recording"
means a separately identifiable product or service the dominant charac-
ter of which consists of recorded sounds, but which includes (i) state-
ments or instructions whose purpose is to allow or control the
perception, reproduction, or communication of those sounds, or (ii)
other information, so long as recorded sounds constitute the dominant
character of the product or service despite the inclusion of such other
information.
(3) a compulsory license; or
(4) a contract of employment of an individual other than as an independ-
ent contractor; or
(5) a contract which does not require that the information be furnished as
computer information or in which the form of the information as computer
information is otherwise de minimis with respect to the primary subject mat-
ter of the transaction.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) (2-4), if a material part of
the subject matter of a transaction includes computer information that is
within this [Act] or subject matter excluded under subsection (d) (1) or (d) (2),
the parties may agree that this [Act], including contract formation rules, gov-
erns the transaction in whole or in part or that other law governs the transac-
tion and this [Act] does not apply; however, any agreement to do so is subject
to the following rules:
(1) An agreement that this [Act] governs a transaction does not alter an
otherwise applicable rule or procedure that may not be varied by agreement
or that may be varied only in a manner specified by the otherwise applicable
rule or procedure and, in a mass-market transaction, does not alter:
(A) the applicability of a consumer protection statute [or administra-
tive rule]; and
(B) law applicable to a tangible copy of information in print form.
(2) An agreement that this [Act] does not govern a transaction does not
alter the applicability of Section 217 or 816 and, in a mass-market transac-
tion, does not alter the applicability of unconscionability, fundamental pub-
lic policy, or good faith under this [Act].
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ing the Article 2B default provisions and remedies.5 25 Further,
treating software differently than other information providers has a
number of attendant risks. First, it again creates the Balkanization
of law that gave rise to the reforms of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. Second, multiple legal standards generate confusion for
the public, attorneys, and content producers. Content producers
of software and entertainment products (including CD-Roms, mo-
tion picture-based games and software, print and multimedia pub-
lishers, and many others) do not differentiate the products based
on the medium; rather, they base the product line on the source
material or underlying ownership. Article 2B would impose the
legal Balkanization of an industry that is rapidly seeing the techno-
logical convergence of media expand at an exponential pace. A
publisher selling the identical project in different media would be
faced with signing a distribution agreement for books, cassette
tapes, CD-Roms, and floppy-disk software that would have different
interpretative rules depending on which media was at issue. This
would immediately generate a significant level of frustration with
the regulations.
Third, adoption of Article 2B will lead to greater confusion by
the parties and the courts. Contracting parties will be forced to
guess, ex ante, which transactions will be governed by Article 2B and
which will be carved out; which provisions will be enforced by the
courts, and which provisions will be preempted by federal law, cre-
ating significant uncertainty and unpredictability. Parties will have
to be very cautious until the courts have a number of opportunities
to interpret the language and scope of the provisions, thereby in-
creasing the costs for any unfortunate parties to the litigation as
well as for the industry as a whole.
Fourth, if Article 2B is successful, the doctrines included
would invariably be relied upon by parties to other transactions as
appropriate analogies. The result would be to include a much
broader category of transactions under the rubric of Article 2B and
impose the default rules of Article 2B on those transactions,
whether or not the parties had anticipated these default rules when
planning. Article 2B would creep into the broader information
age jurisprudence. As reported earlier, packaged software transac-
tions represent less than one-seventh of the software industry. The
statutes drafted to govern this portion of the industry will govern
(3) In a mass-market transaction any term providing that this [Act] does or
does not govern must be conspicuous.
UCITA § 103 (Approved Draft of July 29, 1999).
525 See i& § 103(e).
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the broader software industry and inevitably affect Article 2, elec-
tronic commerce transactions, and intellectual property jurispru-
dence. This is far more than mere freedom to contract.
Article 2B represents a fundamental shift in the information
age legal regime. As such it seems poorly timed and ill conceived.
The industries affected have grown faster than any others in the
U.S. economy using the statutes as currently drafted. One possible
consequence of the adoption of Article 2B could be widespread
business disruption as all contracts are re-evaluated under a new
legal structure.
To maintain a consistent legal basis and increase international
uniformity, it is important that Congress not attempt to allow indi-
vidual states to regulate separately. It would be both ironic and
counterproductive to see the states create a new regulatory scheme
even as the United States amends domestic law for greater compli-
ance with the Berne Convention and WIPO treaty.
2. Misplaced Regulation-the Need for Preemption of
Shrinkwrap Agreements
In keeping with this Article's focus on the balance between the
public and the content producer, a troubling aspect of Article 2B is
the ProCD analysis that the term license agreement should be ac-
cepted at face value and enforced without limitations. A seller of
information should not be able to restructure the traditional bal-
ance between the exclusive rights of a copyright holder and the
limitations of those rights merely through the expedient step of re-
labeling the sale a license agreement. Ultimately, the issue is not
whetherJudge Easterbrook's analysis in ProCD was the correct one.
Congress has the power, and therefore the obligation, to clarify the
situation by explicitly defining the term "equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights" to include shrinkwrap agreements, clickwrap
agreements, conditions of entry at events, and all other situations
in which a license has copyrighted material as its primary subject
and is not subject to meaningful bargaining by the parties.
Such a clarification by Congress would help to restore the bal-
ance between federal and state laws. Doctrines like fair use and
first sale would have a single, national meaning and not be subject




3. Fair Use Revisited-Protection & Reformulation of the
Fair Use Standard
Re-codification and clarification by Congress regarding the
meaning of copyright preemption will become increasingly impor-
tant as the information industries continue to mature. This will
also be necessary for the scope of fair use, one of the primary ex-
emptions under the Copyright Act. The economic pressures and
increased value of information have compressed the definition of
fair use. Fair use requires a balancing of the nature, purpose,
amount, and effect of the copying on the original work.5 26 Taken
as a whole, this balancing seems quite reasonable. Because the first
prong focuses on the commercial nature of the use527 and the last
prong emphasizes the "potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work, '5 28 however, the economics involved are necessarily
emphasized. As the potential for protected works grows with the
advent of new media, the balance for finding a fair use when a
commercial user utilizes a commercially viable product has become
increasingly remote. If instead, the courts were to begin recogniz-
ing that the market for copyrighted material is both more robust
and more competitive than ever before, the nature of the discus-
sion might change. Arguably, even the most competitive use of a
product can do little to affect the market for a work that has an
established brand; conversely, the value of a work without a trade-
mark is generally very low.
Although the Supreme Court continues to stress that the fair
use test should be applied holistically,5 29 the codification implicitly
gives each of the four prongs equal weight and that weighting
makes economic impact fifty percent of the test. To assist with this
recodification, all that may be needed is a small amendment to
section 107 that would move the clause "including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational use"
from the first prong to the fourth prong. This would make the first
prong "the purpose and character of the use" and eliminate any
discussion of economics and commercial uses from that discus-
sion.5"' The fourth prong, recast, would become "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work; including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for
526 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4).
527 See id. § 107(1).
528 Id. § 107(4).
529 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
530 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
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nonprofit educational use." '31 The recombination of the same
clauses, along with legislative history explaining the prior tendency
to over-emphasize the economic prongs, would tend to change the
analysis of the courts and bring a more balanced assessment to the
fair use cases involving commercial parties. Since comment al-
ready exists in the statute that teaching includes "multiple copies
for classroom use,' 5 3 2 the recombination of clauses should not be-
come grounds to narrow the teaching exception. Indeed, strong
legislative statements to the contrary could strengthen an excep-
tion that may become increasingly difficult to defend.533
C. The Need for Balance-Limited Data Protection & Robust Fair Use
Inherent in the ProCD decision was Judge Easterbrook's recog-
nition that there must be some form of legal recourse for the man-
ufacturer of a large database that can be effectively wiped out with
the push of a button. 34 When Feist was decided, physical and prac-
tical barriers still existed to discourage the widespread pirating of
commercial products. Today, with the immediacy of copying a CD-
Rom or an entire Internet website with a single command, the eco-
nomic disruption caused by the second user is a significant eco-
nomic threat to production.
To address this issue, a solution is necessary that balances the
need for economic incentives to create expensive database reposi-
tories with the need for easy access to data and information for the
public (including competitive commercial users). To create the
proper balance, Professor Jane Ginsburg has outlined protection
based on a number of models, including enforcement of private
licenses (as was done in ProCD), providing full copyright protec-
tion, or providing copyright protection accompanied by a compul-
sory license. 53 5 As she explains:
Although I ultimately argue that the present copyright law
should be amended to extend protection-subject to a compul-
sory license-against derivative versions of fact compilations,
there exist at least two alternative proposals for reform. One
possibility would be to forgo copyright relief altogether, and to
rely on contract and self-help. Another would be to impose full
copyright liability, without the qualification of a compulsory li-
531 Id. § 107(4).
532 Id. § 107.
533 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc. 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
534 See supra Part II.C.2.
535 See Ginsburg, supra note 265, at 1918.
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cense .... [T] he first alternative is unlikely to secure effective
protection; the absence of copyright protection would therefore
threaten to diminish incentives to information gathering. By
contrast, the second alternative may afford ample incentives to
production, but too few to dissemination. A derivative rights re-
gime qualified by compelled collective licensing may preserve
incentives to information collection, while simultaneously main-
taining maximum access and opportunities to make new combi-
nations of the data.5 3 6
Implicit in the models identified by Professor Ginsburg is the
danger that any model that would give rise to protection of the
mere aggregation of information, however costly to compile, would
increase the market power and dominance of the provider of that
information. This danger compounds the other trends that lead
toward an information or media cartel. In fact, the more the com-
pilation cost is protected, the higher the barriers to competition
become, and the more likely the compiler of information can dom-
inate the marketplace. Professor Ginsburg's alternative-a com-
pulsory license-would preclude the monopolistic effect that
would follow from protection of data under either state or federal
law.
Alternatively, federal statutory database protection (whether
based on the Copyright Clause, or if that proves inelastic for the
purpose, then the Commerce Clause) could be designed to pro-
vide a "thin" copyright that would give rise to protection only for
the most direct and anti-competitive purposes. Although Congress
has not codified the concept of "thin" copyrights into the Copy-
right Act, the courts have relied on it to protect works with very
limited originality from claims of direct copying.537
The difficulty in any such analysis is apparent in situations like
that in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.,538 in which West
Publishing ("West") revisited its claim to copyrighted works in the
compilations of the court opinions it publishes.5 39 After briefly
claiming copyright in the editorial corrections it makes to the pub-
lished opinions,"' it claimed originality in elements of the opin-
536 Id.
537 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Key
Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)
("[Although] the Court pointed out in Feist [that] the 'copyright in a factual compilation is
thin,' we do not believe it is anorexic.").
538 158 F.3d 674 (2nd Cir. 1998).
539 See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986).
540 See Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 681 n.4 ("West initially claimed some creativity in its
corrections to the text of opinions, but it has abandoned this claim, presumably because
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ions regarding parallel citation, subsequent case history, and
attorney participation.541 The district court did not find these ele-
ments sufficient to establish any originality by West, and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit explained the problem.
West's editorial work entails considerable scholarly labor and
care, and is of distinct usefulness to legal practitioners. Unfortu-
nately for West, however, creativity in the task of creating a use-
ful case report can only proceed in a narrow groove. Doubtless,
that is because for West or any other editor of judicial opinions
for legal research, faithfulness to the public-domain original is
the dominant editorial value, so that the creative is the enemy of
the true.542
West uses a clickwrap license with all of its software. Using
legends in the books or the posting of notices at all law libraries,
West might be able to extend this power to the printed version of
its books. Under a scheme that allowed for no copyright protec-
tion but full enforcement of the so-called licensing agreements,
West could regain the monopoly it seeks, not only for the editorial
comments and added material, but for the entirety of the court
opinions. A compulsory license would result in full public access,
but probably a financial windfall to West, again paying it for materi-
als that it did not own.
The creation of a thin copyright would make it a violation to
copy all or substantially all of a compilation. Under this proposal,
the copyright holder would need to establish (1) a valid copyright
(or data-right to distinguish it from a full copyright) in the
database; (2) that the defendant copied the database; (3) that the
defendant's copying was identical or nearly so to the data that was
copied; and (4) that the amount taken was all or substantially all of
the database. After the copyright holder made this showing, the
defendant could still bring any affirmative defenses available in
copyright infringement actions. The amount of the copied work in
the defendant's derivative work would not be an element (unlike
the fair use test), but could be used as part of an affirmative
defense.
This test is different from the standard copyright infringement
these corrections either are trivial (i.e., punctuation or spelling), or else (nearly always)
approved by the courts by order or informal means.").
541 See id. at 681. The claims to originality were based on the following: "(i) the arrange-
ment of information specifying the parties, court, and date of decision; (ii) the selection
and arrangement of the attorney information; (iii) the arrangement of information relat-
ing to subsequent procedural developments such as amendments and denials of rehearing;
and (iv) the selection of parallel and alternative citations." Id.
542 Id at 688.
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case in which only a valid copyright and copying are necessary to
prove the claim.5 4' This test shifts the burden to the holder of the
data-right to prove that the work was taken in its entirety and left
essentially unaltered.5 While a test analogous to the fair use test
could focus on the commercial nature of the defendant's copy,
such a test misses the point. ProCD would have been injured to
the same extent if its CD-Rom was posted to the Internet by a high
school student or a direct competitor. It is the dissemination of
the data, not the motive of the disseminator that affects the data
compiler.
Under this thin copyright model, ProCD would have been
able to show it had a valid data-right in its CD-Rom, that the CD-
Rom was copied, that the copying was made in an unaltered form
(rather than for any transformative or edited use) and that the en-
tire CD-Rom database was taken. The correct result would have
been achieved. In National Basketball Association, on the other
hand, Motorola would not have been liable under such a test, be-
cause the scores and statistics from a basketball game comprise
such a small portion of the game's over-all information.
West would face similar problems. The thin copyright would
not supplant the rest of the Copyright Act, so the exclusion of U.S.
Government works would preclude West from claiming any owner-
ship in federal cases. 5 4 5 Assuming West established a data-right in
the materials it added to the opinions, the amount of total, protect-
able information added by West would fall far short of the protec-
tion it sought.
Such a thin copyright mechanism has the benefit of reducing
the number of litigated cases to only those few where the plaintiffs
misconduct was severe, while still providing some remedy for the
database companies. The standard creates a near bright-line test of
total duplication as the basis of infringement so that both database
compilers and the copiers can anticipate the extent of their poten-
543 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) ("To
establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright,
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.").
544 See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In
works devoted to historical subjects, it is our view that a second author may make signifi-
cant use of prior work, so long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of an-
other.") In Hoeling, the Second Circuit found that a motion picture did not infringe a
book which attempted to explain the disaster of the Hindenberg. The test suggested above
is even more limited, resulting in infringement only when there has been virtually verbatim
copying.
545 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994). While the states could claim copyright in their opinions and
transfer those rights to West, any such proposal should be against public policy. West has
not claimed copyrights in any state court opinions in any of these modem proceedings.
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tial liability and plan accordingly. Further, because the standard is
clear (at least initially) and liability is difficult to establish, the costs
to society are far less than a compulsory licensing mechanism with
its attendant registration, supervision, and governmental involve-
ment. This provides a low cost alternative that is heavily tipped
towards the public's right to free access to information while pro-
viding some restrictions on wholesale copying.
D. Re-Regulate the Telecommunications Industries
1. Cap Cross-Ownership
While copyright may be the most significant component of the
information age regulatory scheme, it is not the only one. Content
neutral federal regulations involving antitrust and telecommunica-
tions can also play a significant role in slowing the growth of the
cartel marketplace for information and media content.
In any scheme that relies on greater government regulation,
there is the risk that the Supreme Court will apply a strict scrutiny
analysis to the regulation and strike it down because it was not tai-
lored narrowly enough to meet the constitutional test. As was dis-
cussed in Part II, while the Internet is subject to the strict scrutiny
test, cable regulations remain subject to intermediate scrutiny.54 6
As the Court recognized, "the desire to check that perceived power
[of the cable operators] supplied the 'important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest."' 547 Because every marketplace operates more
efficiently with some basic rules of access it is essential that the
Court continue to provide Congress some latitude in fashioning
these rules.548
546 See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994) ("In sum, the must-carry provisions do not
pose such inherent dangers to free expression, or present such potential for censorship or
manipulation, as to justify application of the most exacting level of First Amendment
scrutiny.").
547 Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment and the Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 Aiuz. L.
REv. 1125, 1150 (1996) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
Cable operators occupy a relatively unique position, controlling both a content medium
and the physical infrastructure for broadcast. By controlling both, they could have signifi-
cant power to change the media being presented to the public. This power has been con-
tained by Congress through provisions such as the must-carry rules and has been
recognized by the Court in its decisions to uphold those rules. See, e.g.,Turner I, 512 U.S.
622; Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d 369 (1997).
548 The Court has continued this approach regarding the must-carry rules for cable reg-
ulation, but only with trepidation. Justice Breyer addressed this point in his concurrence.
I do not deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the "guarantee" extracts
a serious First Amendment price.... But there are important First Amendment
interests on the other side as well. The statute's basic noneconomic purpose is
to prevent too precipitous a decline in the quality and quantity of program-
ming choice for an ever-shrinking non-cable-subscribing segment of the public.
This purpose reflects what "has long been a basic tenet of national communica-
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Admittedly, the role of the courts is not to manage or super-
vise the marketplace of ideas. In a case involving the Equal Protec-
tion clause, the Court addressed this central question on its role in
the marketplace.
[A]ppellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless
the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently
and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum
for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, they ar-
gue that the corollary right to receive information becomes little
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been
taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge....
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech or the most informed electoral choice. That these may
be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a
representative form of government is not to be doubted. These
are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and
beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into other-
wise legitimate state activities. 549
Notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to monitor the out-
come of the exercise of free expression, it must remain cognizant
that failure to provide a minimal opportunity for widespread par-
ticipation will result in the shrinking and eventual elimination of
the marketplace. The strict scrutiny standard will prove too high a
threshold for review of questions of cross-ownership provisions or
must-carry rules. If the Court continues to apply the degree of
scrutiny that it did in Turner, then the need to promote broader
tions policy," namely that "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."
Turner II, 137 L. Ed.2d at 411 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663 (quoting United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972)) (plurality opinion) (quoting Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court, however, did not find a marketplace argument persuasive in Miami Herald "An
enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or
consensual. If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with
the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment
developed over the years." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
The proposals contained here do not create a right of access, but instead limit the monop-
oly power of any one speaker to the extent that party wishes to own cable and broadcast
licenses.
549 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973).
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access to the media providers will remain a reasonable regulatory
function worthy of congressional intervention.
For the issue involving the constitutionality of the must-carry
rules or the cross-ownership provisions of the Telecommunications
Act, the appropriate standard of review has again been addressed,
this time at the appellate court level.55 The D.C. Circuit Court
used the intermediate scrutiny applied in Turner I and Turner II to
interpret 47 U.S.C. § 274, as created by Telecommunications Act of
1996,"l' which restricts the "Bell operating companies" from pro-
viding electronic publishing.5 2 The Court of Appeals in BellSouth
emphasized the differences between regulation of the speaker and
regulation of the message. Even though section 274 applied to a
broad category of electronic publishing, singling out both a partic-
ular medium and a wide range of content, the court focused on
the underlying purpose of the section. The provision was designed
to keep the local bell telephone companies 553 out of the new indus-
try in which they could leverage their local monopoly power. The
BellSouth court relied on the distinctions made by the Supreme
Court in Turner I. "[H] eightened scrutiny is unwarranted when the
differential treatment is 'justified by some special characteristic of'
the particular medium being regulated." 5 4 Because the purpose
was to address monopoly power rather than content, the interme-
diate standard was applied, and under this standard, the provision
was upheld.
Following this logic and this congressional model, Congress
550 See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1495 (1999).
551 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), 47 U.S.C. § 274 (Supp. III 1997). Section
274 reinstates portions of the AT&T divestiture consent decree that had ended in 1991. See
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
552 See id
553 Under the Telecommunications Act, the definition of a "Bell operating company" is
Bell Telephone Company of Nevada, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indi-
ana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Com-
pany, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, New Jersey Bell
Telephone Company, New York Telephone Company, US West Communica-
tions Company, South Central Bell Telephone Company, Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, The
Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The Chesapeake and Potomac Tele-
phone Company, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Mary-
land, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia, The
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, The Diamond
State Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, The Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company, or Wisconsin Telephone Company; and
(B) includes any successor or assign of any such company that provides wireline
telephone exchange service; but (C) does not include an affiliate of any such
company, other than an affiliate described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
47 U.S.C. § 153(4) (Supp. III 1997).
554 BelSouth, 144 F.3d at 69 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 660-61 (1994)).
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and the courts should review the legislation limiting the national
ownership of radio and television networks and the limitations on
cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast licenses in a com-
mon market.5 55 To protect a robust and diverse base of speakers,
one solution would be to repeal the liberalized cross-ownership
rules embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and return
to the limitations that were in effect in 1992, reducing the number
of broadcast licenses any corporation could own, reducing the per-
centage of national television distribution back to twenty-five per-
cent, and retaining the cross-ownership provisions for television
station licenses and newspapers in the same market.
One further, although possibly more controversial step, would
also be appropriate. Like newspapers, the strength and monopoly
power of ISPs is not directly impacted by the broadcast license reg-
ulations. Nonetheless, the danger of media concentration is every
bit as real in the area of ISPs and Internet portal companies as it is
for broadcast. Indeed, the prospect of either AOL/Netscape or
Microsoft owning a group of local television stations and local
newspapers should raise concerns for the members of those com-
munities over access to differing points of view. The potential ex-
ists that such a combination would result in a significant reduction
of local coverage and a further homogenization of media content.
The F.C.C. should assess the extent to which this potential will re-
sult in any actual reduction in diverse viewpoints and local content.
Thereafter, Congress should begin a deliberative process to deter-
mine whether the ownership of an ISP or Internet portal company
should trigger the same cross-ownership concerns as Congress has
found with newspapers. As the public increasingly relies on the
information piped into the computer (or other Internet-capable
device) as a substitute for newspapers, radio, and television, the
need to recognize the monopoly potential also increases. Similar
treatment of ISPs and Internet portal companies to that of newspa-
pers may be a reasonable step in promoting the diversity of view-
points inherent in many of the policies of the Telecommunications
Act and the decisions of Turner and Red Lion.
2. Vigorous Enforcement of Antitrust Principles
No discussion of regulations designed to stop cartel behavior
or otherwise regulate anti-competitive conduct would be complete
without an acknowledgment of the federal antitrust laws. It is axio-
matic that aggressive enforcement of antitrust law should help re-
555 See supra Part II.B.4.
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duce the growth of monopoly power. The Department of Justice
need not even be successful for this effect to occur. The decades-
long antitrust action against IBM resulted in no liability for the
company, but it fundamentally changed the way IBM did business
and allowed companies other than IBM to dictate the path of the
personal computer revolution.556 Microsoft is starting to show
signs of the same effect. It allows competition and markets to go
unchallenged as the antitrust suit against it continues. 57 Time
Warner's acquisition of Turner Broadcasting raised similar regula-
tory issues.558
While strategic litigation aimed at the trade practices of lead-
ing companies may be an effective tool for targeting industry lead-
ers that aggregate too much monopoly in any one product or
market, as a policy it is necessarily inconsistent and gives far too
much latitude to the executive branch regarding the timing and
scope of intervention. The Telecommunications Act cross-owner-
ship provisions provide a more concrete set of guidelines than do
general antitrust principles and provide better guidance for the
companies and the government.
The oligopoly model that defines the information age further
frustrates the role of the government in antitrust policy. The oli-
gopoly model presumes widespread access to pricing and strategic
information, a hallmark of the information age, and also presumes
that the companies see the benefit to non-competitive conduct
over directly competitive conduct. In industries where consumer
or end-user prices are unrelated to the costs of production, the
corporations' pricing strategies tend to have much more to do with
competition and the marketplace than with costs. Ticket prices for
films are based on the ticket prices in the city rather than on the
production costs of the films. 559 Television and radio distribute
their costs to advertisers based primarily on viewership rather than
production costs. The public is not directly affected by the cost.
The retail price for a software title is highly flexible, depending
primarily on the scarcity of competitive products and the number
556 See PAUL CARROLL, BIG BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM 57-58 (1993).
557 SeeJube Shiver Jr. & Leslie Helm, Win Or Lose, Microsoft's Power May Be On the Wane;
Technology: As the Antitrust Trial Drags on, the Firm's Rivals, Customers and Even Allies Assert their
Independence, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at 1.
558 See In reTime Warner, Inc., No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997) (1997 FTC Lexis 13) (decision
and order).
559 The pricing for motion picture tickets at first run theaters is another example of
parallel conduct. There is no need for the exhibitors to discuss the ticket prices since they
are published. In addition, inconsistent pricing tends to create consumer unrest, but does
not appear to significantly change the attendance habits of the public.
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of units that can be sold in any given price range.56 ° The net effect
of these pricing systems is to create a system where illegal cartel
practices are generally unnecessary to accomplish the monopolistic
goals of the participants. As a result, even vigorous antitrust en-
forcement will be of limited effect.
This is not to say that indirect evidence cannot sometimes
serve to prove conduct. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,561 a
letter by a major motion picture exhibitor to the (then) eight pri-
mary film distributors suggesting minimum exhibition prices was
found to be sufficient to be a violation of the antitrust laws.56 2 De-
spite the occasional success of this approach (and the longstanding
history of antitrust violations in the motion picture industry),563 the
success of increasing antitrust activity by the Department of Justice
or the F.C.C. should not serve as an alternative to structural
changes in the regulations designed to make for a more open
marketplace.
E. Promote a Societal Norm that Values the Free Transfer of Ideas,
Entertainment and Information
In the final analysis, the source for most of the impact on the
role of the oligopoly in content will be the social response to the
monopolization. The various regulatory solutions identified in this
Part may slow the convergence and change the names of a few of
the participants, but given the First Amendment limitations on
Congress and the willingness of the courts, Congress, and states to
provide ever greater protection for copyrighted works, there is lit-
tle the law can do to stem the tide. More effective than any of the
proposals included in this article are simple steps individuals and
560 Software must be priced according to the underlying production costs, but most of
the costs to create the product are in the research and development of the software rather
than in manufacturing and distribution. The manufacturing and distribution costs are
relatively minor. As a result, a software manufacturer can set the price of the software at
the point that maximizes the cost per unit multiplied by number of units sold-fewer units
sold at a high price or many more units sold at a lower price. (This is the same model for
pre-recorded videotapes.) Some products are given expensive prices and sold selectively
while other products are sold at relatively low prices to a much wider audience. The costs
of development play only a small role in the pricing formula.
561 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
562 See id. at 222.
563 The history of antitrust in the motion picture industry stems from its early years. See,
e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See also United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Despite regular review by the Depart-
ment ofJustice, block-booking and other illegal trade practice continue to occur. "Federal
antitrust officials confirmed they have started looking into the methods Hollywood uses in
distributing movies to theater chains." James Bates, Justice Officials Confirm Film Distribution
Probe; Antitrust: The Agency Says it is Looking into how Major Hollywood Studios Book their Movies
at Theater Chains, L. A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1999, at C2.
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organizations can take to turn back the clock and return society to
a time when only the most valued works were copyrighted, and
even fewer were renewed.
The first proposal of this Part called for Congress to return to
the copyright term under the Copyright Act of 1976. If Congress
will not reduce the copyright term to a more reasonable length,
then authors can. Nothing prevents an author from dedicating her
work to the public good. By doing so, the author relinquishes the
copyright and assigns the work to the public domain. A corollary
of dedication to the public good would be to create a "public do-
main rights society" that collects the copyrights to works that are
not yet in the public domain and makes the works available to the
public at cost (or free using the Internet). Such a mechanism
would allow authors an identifiable source to will their copyrighted
works if they have no individuals to whom they wish to bequeath
their legacy. Congress could provide at least token support to such
an endeavor by providing start-up funds. Because of its artistic or
literary purpose, such an organization should readily gain tax ex-
empt status and receive some governmental benefit-even if it is
limited to the lack of tax liability564 and the ability to accept chari-
table donations.565
A national movement centered around "charitable upload
centers" could transform much of the debate. Currently, the vast
majority of works do not physically survive to gain the benefit of
the copyright extension. Of those that do, few will actually have
sufficient economic value to compete effectively in the market-
place. Despite these obstacles, an author will hold onto a work un-
less there is a reason to transfer the work. A highly recognized
charitable upload center (such as the "National Internet Library of
the Arts," "Library of Congress Public (Domain) Collection," or an
extension of an existing institution such as the Kennedy Center,
Lincoln Center, Armand Hammer Museum, or the Disney Founda-
tion) could garner the public support necessary to move significant
assets into the public domain.
Such a model could also provide limited copyright controls.
In theater, for example, it would be appropriate to continue to
charge professional companies a royalty while making the same
material available for free to amateur companies.5 66 Music rights
564 See I.R.C. § 170 (1998)
565 See id § 501.
566 Under current industry norms, the cost of the public performance rights varies con-
siderably between amateur and professional. Typically, the playwright assigns the amateur
rights to the publisher of the plays while reserving the professional rights.
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could operate in the same fashion, with publication rights becom-
ing freely available and recordings of works for which the sound
recording was not copyrighted freely transferable, while still col-
lecting compulsory license fees for any new recordings or perform-
ances of the songs. This model would make the printed music
more readily available to the next generation of musicians while
distributing the fees that are already collected. Compulsory license
fees for the recording of songs on an album are paid for all songs.
Differentiating for those songs that are in the public domain would
have little effect on commercially produced CDs and cassette tapes,
whereas the fees could be used to support the efforts of the organi-
zation. (Waiving the compulsory license fees for CDs or cassette
tapes that are produced in lots of under 5000 units would relieve
the self-published musician from the compliance requirements.)
Poetry has little economic marketplace. The vast majority of
black-and-white films are similarly lost or deemed commercially
unusable. Providing these as free content for the Internet would
give these works another opportunity to be preserved and enjoyed.
In both cases, the organization could retain the rights to license
the work if another author wished to create a derivative work using
the material. The better approach to this would be to add the re-
striction when requested by the donor of the material.
If such a project was started with some significant lead dona-
tions, it could serve to re-orient the current assumptions towards
content and public accessibility. Tax incentives, though limited in
value for works with limited market opportunities, would provide
the motivation for authors to donate their works to the center.
The model borrows from the portal metaphor to create the
first public portal-public art, literature, music, culture and com-
mentary. Like public radio and television, it may not transform the
media with which it competes, but it does provide a measuring
stick to judge the rest and provides an alternative to the orthodoxy
that Orwell predicted.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the growth of the information society, the convergence
at the marketplace of ideas has already begun. The oligopoly
model of information supply and control has supplanted any ideal-
ized open bazaar of ideas, political thought, or divergent view-
points. The modest proposals designed to slow the reach of
copyright, retain limits on telecommunications ownership, and
stem the licensing of all electronic output are limited to maintain-
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ing a status quo that is already dominated by a small number of
motion picture studios, broadcasters, and software companies.
The proposals do not begin to address the underlying concerns
that such convergence brings.
The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment each reflect a
fundamental value necessary for a vibrant marketplace. The Copy-
right Clause protects the expressions that are the primary com-
modity in the market and the public's interest in maximizing
output in that market; the First Amendment protects the producer
of the expression from government influence and control regard-
ing the content of the commodity. Together they balance the
needs of the author with the needs of the public to maximize value
for society and provide for an efficient system of public discourse.
The accepted interpretations, however, of both constitutional
clauses have changed significantly in the last two hundred years-
even in the last twenty years.
The Copyright Clause has taken on obligations to protect far
more than the public's interest in promoting authorship. It now
protects the private, unpublished works of authors, the name and
integrity of artists, the great-grandchildren of composers long since
deceased, and corporate investments nearly a century old. The
First Amendment has never provided the absolute prohibition
against government intervention that its plain language suggests.
In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has been asked to
monitor the changes to technology, telecommunications, and the
birth of the information age. It has responded by treating each
new medium as unique and applying the First Amendment with
differing standards for different media.
Against this constitutional backdrop, the companies that al-
ready dominate much of the marketplace are seeking technologi-
cal, regulatory, and economic changes that will help cement their
control of the new information society. The Internet, briefly noted
for its populist structure, has been transformed into an electronic
commerce center in which the public is channeled into portals
owned by parties to the media oligopoly. The channeling of the
public carries with it the need to aggregate the population, focus
on content that is non-controversial, and eliminate anything that
might lose marketshare. The parallel behavior of the oligopoly ex-
tends beyond pricing to the content made and the audience
served. Extension of the copyright provides safe, well-tested mate-
rial for repackaging and re-use from medium to medium. No effi-
cient content producer would decide to forgo the use of this
seventy-year-old content in favor of new, untested, potentially risky
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content. The parallel behavior is reinforced by identical economic
opportunities and significant barriers to non-parallel conduct.
The solution to the problem is to change the marketplace in a
manner that once again values the constitutional principles em-
bodied in the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, that
promote the value of free exchange of ideas and expressions, and
that select to forgo the potential economic opportunities offered
by the members of the oligopoly. The Eldritch Press serves as a
prototype for a different type of marketplace. Libraries and infor-
mation centers dedicated to the free public dissemination of mate-
rial might serve as an alternative to the controlled content
provided for the information society. If truly successful as a com-
petitor to members of the oligopoly, such an information center
could serve to reduce the barriers to entry for other content suppli-
ers and eventually change the economic premise upon which the
information age was founded.
The legislative proposals described in this article cannot
achieve the solution as described. They can serve, however, to re-
duce somewhat the additional barriers that Article 2B, the DMCA,
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 all add. The solution
comes from the free exchange of ideas, the lowering of barriers
such as cost and access for the new companies that hope to provide
quality content. All of the regulatory changes are irrelevant unless
new authors and new voices find ways to overcome the existing bar-
riers to entry and begin to add new material to the marketplace of
ideas.
Ironically, the technology that may provide the greatest tool to
strengthening the barriers may also be their undoing. The media
producers control the Internet through the portals, but no single
company is presently in a position to control the content. Mass
public distribution is therefore available for anyone; the difficulty is
finding the audience. Nonetheless, the marketplace of ideas
presumes that the best idea will generate its own currency, grow,
and become the dominant idea. Readily available equipment now
allows almost anyone to write, film, or record a work that may take
center stage in the world's consciousness. Filmmaker Francis Ford
Coppola once said he hoped the next great filmmaker would be a
thirteen-year-old girl in pigtails.567 Today she could be. At thirty-
five, she could also be president. Her website could change the
world.
567 H.ARrs OF DARXNESS: A FiLMMAKER'S APOCALYPSE (1991) (documentary on the mak-
ing of Apocalypse Now).
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